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REPORT



ON

# PAST FAMINES

IN THE

## NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

BY

C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE,

*On Special Duty.*



Allahabad:

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS, NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

1868.



FROM

C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE, ESQUIRE,  
*On Special Duty,*

TO

R. SIMSON, ESQUIRE,  
*Secretary to Government, N.-W. P.*

ALLAHABAD, MAY 26TH, 1868.

SIR,

I beg to forward the Report on Past Famines in the North-Western Provinces, which I was deputed to compile by letter from your office, No. 231, dated January 16th, 1868.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient Servant,

C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE.



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# REPORT ON PAST FAMINES

IN THE

## NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

### INTRODUCTION.

1. **Plan of the Report.**—In collecting materials for the following report, I have taken it for granted that the Government of India wishes to have as comprehensive an account of past famines in the North-Western Provinces of India as the available sources of information will admit of. The letter from the Home Office which enjoins the compilation leaves a wide margin for discretion, and neither the Local Government nor the Sudder Board of Revenue, under whose immediate control I was placed, issued any special orders at the outset. Being left to my own devices, I took such steps as seemed most likely to secure a useful report, and endeavoured to collect round me everything which would throw light on the subject. In process of time the Sudder Board raised the question whether it was desirable to push the investigation so far. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to ask for definite instructions. I therefore related in a short note the system which I had been pursuing, and received the Lieutenant-Governor's\* permission to continue the work in the same manner as before. The truth is, it became clear to me at an early stage that, owing to the Mutiny, the information which the local annals could afford would be very imperfect. It seemed advisable, therefore, to supply the missing links in the chain of evidence by referring to the files of old newspapers, historical writings, books of travel, irrigation and settlement reports, and the like. By this means I hope to give some idea of the famines that occurred under native rule; to determine with tolerable accuracy the tract of those that have happened during the period of British administration, and to show what caused them; to test the degree of suffering on each occasion; to bring to notice the various precautions and remedies adopted at different times; and to decide what measures will be most effectual in neutralizing the effect of drought hereafter. Enquiry proves that the materials do not now exist for a complete report; but, at any rate, I trust that this narrative may be of more interest than it could have been if the sphere of my researches had been more circumscribed.

2. **Sources of Information.**—The list in Appendix I. shows the various authors and documents that I have consulted. In addition to the sources indicated, I only know of three others whence I was likely to derive information,—namely, the Asiatic Society, the *Englishman*, and the *Indian Daily News*. In answer to my application, the Secretary of the Asiatic Society and the Editor of the *Englishman* regretted that they could trace nothing in their libraries which would be of use to me. The Editor of the *Indian Daily News*, in whose office I have reason to believe the files of the defunct *Bengal Hurkaru* are now deposited, has so far vouchsafed no reply, though I have written to him twice. By some unaccountable delay the whole of the papers promised by the Record Commission have not yet arrived. It is possible that what remain to be seen may contain further particulars of famines subsequent to 1828, though I am rather inclined to think they will do no more than confirm facts which I have already elicited from other quarters. At any rate, when they have been read through, I hope to intimate the result in a supplementary letter. As all other available means had been exhausted, it seemed hardly worth while to retard the

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\* Mr. Drummond.

preparation of this report till their arrival. Of the records put at my disposal by Government, the most lengthy are the Proceedings of the Sudder Board of Revenue. The correspondence that bears on the question is scattered over a hundred or more manuscript folio volumes, each one of which has been carefully inspected, page by page, for fear any letter should be overlooked. Owing to the negligent manner in which they have been compiled, the indices unfortunately give little assistance. I have frequently found, indeed, that a volume which according to the index ought to have contained nothing for my perusal, has, on the contrary, abounded in interesting matter. Moreover, the principle on which the Proceedings have been compiled detracts in some degree from the value and completeness of their information. In the majority of instances, only so much has been copied as sufficed to indicate the general policy of the Board on the subject under notice. Thus, it often happens that covering letters are recorded, whilst the enclosures necessary to fill up the outline have been omitted. The result in such cases is that one obtains the bare announcement of a fact, but nothing more in elucidation of it. Disappointment on this score frequently occurs, and the difficulty of giving a sharp impression of events is as great as though one should attempt to draw up an elaborate note from the abstract of contents which is endorsed on each paper of a modern file. Besides this shortcoming, there is another inseparable from all early records. In former days, reports were neither so detailed nor so systematic as they are now. Famines and such like catastrophes were accepted as necessary evils, to be alleviated as far as possible at the time, and to be forgotten as soon as the emergency had passed. Though more than one Collector in his correspondence during the spring of 1804 casually mentions that he had adopted measures of relief on account of the prevailing distress, not a single one seems to have recognized the advantage which it might be to posterity to know in what manner he was providing for the destitute, or what was the price of wheat in his neighbourhood. Such was the spirit of the period, that these were evidently regarded as unimportant items for a public letter. The realization of the revenue was then the all-absorbing topic, and the correspondence represents faithfully, not to say exclusively, the alternate hopes and fears in this respect. So long as a man could say that he had collected all that was due on behalf of Government, he might reckon on escaping censure; but if instalments were unpaid and balances were accruing, he was fortunate if he could devise reasons which would reconcile his superiors to the emptiness of his treasury, and no excuse that he had been looking after the wants of the poor and helpless was likely to compensate in their eyes for his disregard of the pecuniary interests of the State. Next in importance on the catalogue of official documents, but not commencing nearly so soon as the Board's records, are the Narratives of Proceedings of the Local Government. These are especially valuable for the light which they throw upon the events of 1837-38,\* just as the Summary in Mr. Edmonstone's Administration Report for 1860-61 is for the famine of 1861. In matters of detail about which these are silent, I have not unfrequently been able to fill up the gap from the files of the *Friend of India* and the *Delhi Gazette*. As independent exponents of opinion, these papers have also been useful in enabling me to test the feeling of the people towards Government, and to learn something of the temper of the country under adversity. For the later famine, too, there is the detailed account of Colonel Baird Smith. I had expected at first that, owing to his investigations, there would be little relating to this calamity which he would not have described. A more intimate acquaintance with his report, however, showed that, so far as facts are concerned, it does not extend over the whole period, but only deals with the months when distress was most aggravated. Colonel Baird Smith's appointment was not sanctioned till February, and he was back in Calcutta towards the end of June. Both before and after that interval there is much that requires notice, and therefore, though I have borrowed in places from him, I am indebted to other sources for my knowledge of the famine with which his name

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\* The Narratives of 1838 are inspired by Lord Auckland, who took over charge of the North-West from Sir Charles Metcalfe at the beginning of the year.

is identified. Many of the questions which he took into consideration, of course, lie beyond my province, and in these it is best that he should be left to speak for himself. Indeed, no subsequent history of the events of 1861 would be complete unless read in connection with his report.

**3. What constitutes a Famine.**—The famines of 1783-84, 1803-4, 1837-38, and 1860-61, are decidedly the most severe that the North-West of India has experienced during the last hundred years. In the intervals between these occur others of more or less intensity, but not so disastrous in their results, inasmuch as smaller tracts of country were afflicted. It is difficult, of course, to draw the line and say where the direct effects of drought cease, or to decide what extent of distress merits the appellation of famine. In the early days of British power, when communication was defective, and little had been done to improve the internal condition of the people, it often happened that persons were dying of hunger in one district whilst there was comparative plenty in the next. Indeed, it is not till the last of the great famines that any perceptible efforts could be made to diminish scarcity by the introduction of food on a large scale. Again, one of the first resources of a starving population in India is to emigrate. When a man has sold his last article of property and mortgaged his fields to the last anna, he and his family leave house and land, in the hope of maintaining themselves elsewhere until better times enable them to return to their village. In proportion to the area which drought influences is the force of this movement, and in proportion to the number of houseless wanderers, roaming like locusts from one green spot to another, is the tract in which relief must ultimately be provided, or else people die. In the following narrative, therefore, besides treating of the famines of wide extent, I propose to describe briefly, so far as my materials will allow, all cases of excessive local distress. For, to all intents and purposes, want, though only felt over a limited area, is famine, provided the scarcity reaches starvation point. This seems to be the best test for deciding what is and what is not famine. In obedience to it, I should exclude, amongst other cases, that of Kumaon in 1846, when difficulty was experienced for a short time in providing the troops on the frontier, owing to the partial failure of the spring crop; but I should admit the case of that province in 1867, for then, according to all accounts, the distress, though not of more than three or four months' duration, was sharp whilst it lasted. Had it not been for the importation of grain, it seems probable that many deaths would have occurred. As it was, many persons were on short rations for a considerable period.

**4. Value of the Sudder Board's Revenue Statistics as a means of ascertaining local suffering.**—The detailed tables in the Sudder Board's Proceedings relating to the realization of the revenue have in several instances given me a clue to local suffering which might otherwise have remained undetected. As these statements are recorded year by year, it is easy to judge, by the amount of suspensions, remissions, and balances, when there has been extraordinary difficulty in meeting the State's demand. Acting upon this hint, I could then examine the records of the time, on the chance of eliciting more definite information, and the search has usually proved that, where over-assessment was not in fault, an unfavourable season, with its consequent privations, had caused the mischief.

**5. Enumeration of Famines.**—Following the principle already laid down for determining what constitutes a famine, I am inclined to think that my narrative should embrace the events of the following years:—

1845.	1770.	1819.	1837-38.
1471.	1783-84.	1825-26.	1860-61.
1631.	1803-4.	1827-28.	1865.
1661.	1813-14.	1832-34.	1867.
1739.			

Comparison will show that this list is rather more detailed than that of Colonel Baird Smith, so far as the present century is concerned. For the past century he has met with traces of famines in 1733, 1744, 1752, and 1790 also. All I can say is that nothing in regard to these years has come to light in the course of the present enquiry, and I do not know where else, besides the sources indicated, to turn to in quest of information.

**6. Range of the Narrative.**—An account of the droughts which befell the Delhi territory, or parts of it, during the period when it was not under a separate administration, seems to come naturally within the scope of this narrative. Were I to refrain from all mention of such incidents, it is probable that much interesting matter, which the annals of these Provinces alone can furnish, would remain in obscurity. If it be the object of Government to learn everything about famines that local records can teach, such an omission could not fail to be inexpedient. And in thus overstepping the boundaries of the North-West, as at present defined, I do not think that I can be fairly charged with travelling beyond the issue, for at the time of which I propose to speak the Delhi territory was an integral portion of the dominions subject to the Governor of Agra. The same argument holds good of any remarks that may be made in the course of these pages concerning the Saugor and Nerbudda Districts, and parts of Bundelcund.

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## SECTION I

### FAMINES PREVIOUS TO 1783.

**7. Famine of 1345.**—The disastrous policy of Mohamed Toghluk seems to have resulted, in or about the year 1345, in a famine which raged more or less over the whole of Hindustan. The constant expeditions which this monarch undertook in order to put down rebellion in distant provinces, and the magnificent ideas which he conceived of conquering Khorasan, and even China, necessarily led to increased taxation throughout his dominions, and caused men to be pressed for the army who would otherwise have remained peaceful tillers of the soil. Not content, too, with this drain on the agricultural population, he on more than one occasion ordered out troops as though for a wild-beast chase, but really with a view to kill unfortunate villagers, whose only fault was that they could not satisfy his arbitrary demands. Even now his name is better known for the massacre of unoffending men at Canouj, than for those wonderful talents and accomplishments which were almost unique in the days when he lived. A long series of oppressions ended, as it might be expected that they would end, in wide-spread distress. The peasants fled from their houses and resorted to the jungles in despair. Many adopted a career of plunder, many more died through sheer starvation. To make matters worse, the calamity which man's violence had originated was enhanced by unfavourable seasons. There were neither labourers nor cattle enough to ensure a sufficiency of food, and the few crops that were sown failed for want of rain. The fertile plain of the Doab relapsed into a wilderness, and in the provinces beyond the Jumna the desolation was equally apparent. In Delhi,\* says Mr. Thornton, so great were the pangs of hunger, that men ate one another. The intense sufferings in this particular city seem to have been due to the return of the wretched inhabitants whom Mohamed Toghluk, for the gratification of some passing whim, had forced a few years previously to migrate *en masse* to Deogiri, in the Deccan. Famine and pestilence had been their lot almost from the moment that they had reached their new abode. When at last they received permission to go back, they were so reduced that many died on the road, and the remainder, according to the historian, "escaped death by the way only to "encounter it in the same frightful form at the place from which they had been so "capriciously expelled."

**8. Famine of 1471.**—The Orissa Commissioners speak of a notable famine in 1471, but I have not been able to trace any mention of it in the histories of either Thornton, Mill, Elphinstone, or Hamilton. The date falls within that long period of twenty-six years during which the royal house of Jaunpore was contending with Behlol Lodi. It may very possibly have happened that scarcity was one of the evils attendant on this protracted war. The struggle began in 1452, when Mahmood of Jaunpore laid siege to Delhi, and ended in 1478 with the annexation of the former district to the Empire. The field of operations, it will thus be seen, was an extensive one, and, if an unfavourable season befell the country whilst the issue was still undecided, it is not improbable that famine would have occurred.

**9. Famine of 1631.**—The reign of Shah Jehan is marked by a famine which† afflicted not only India, but almost the whole of Asia. Two‡ successive droughts in 1629 and 1630, and the devastation which the Emperor's army caused throughout the Deccan, reduced the inhabitants of that quarter to the utmost straits. The suffering reached its height in 1631. With no means of support at home, the people of the south emigrated in multitudes, and carried sickness and want with them wherever they went. No amount of public benevolence could avail to stop the hand of death, for food was everywhere lacking. Of the effect on the North-West we know no more than is contained in the remark quoted by the Orissa Commissioners,

\* Vol. I, p. 17.

† See Mill, Vol. II, p. 329.

‡ See Elphinstone, p. 507.

that "money could not purchase bread, and a prodigious mortality ensued. Disease followed famine, and death ravaged every corner of India."

**10. Famine of 1661.**—The next famine on the list is that of 1661. This, too, was mainly owing to extraordinary drought. Although the records of that time do not specify its tract, it is not altogether impossible to give a rough sketch of the country over which it extended. The date of its occurrence coincides with the fourth year of Aurungzebe's reign. During the period that intervened between his accession to the throne and the illness which prostrated him at Delhi early in 1663, we know that Aurungzebe had been \* engaged in various expeditions, which took him successively to Lahore, Delhi, Etah, Cawja (half-way between Etah and Allahabad), Agra, and Jeypore. Operations against the Mahrattas had not then commenced, nor does the Emperor seem to have had influence enough in the Deccan at that time, or, at any rate, resources available, for checking Sevajee's encroachments. We know also that the events connected with the famine of 1661 made a great impression on Aurungzebe, and that he personally superintended the relief of his subjects, one of his plans having been to bring grain on a large scale from Bengal and the Punjab—a circumstance which shows that those provinces were unhurt. It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that the scene of the famine lay about Delhi and the upper half of the Doab. Several things tend to prove that the calamity was severe. The Emperor opened his treasury and granted money without stint. He gave every encouragement to the importation of corn,† and either sold it at reduced prices, or distributed it gratuitously amongst those who were too poor to pay. He also promptly acknowledged the necessity of remitting the rents of the cultivators, and relieved them for the time being from the burden of other taxes. Economical himself in his personal expenses, he had always inculcated the folly of extravagance amongst his courtiers; and so, when the hour of need came, he had large means at his command. The vernacular chroniclers of the period attribute the salvation of millions of lives and the preservation of many provinces to his strenuous exertions. Even when a margin has been left for manifest exaggeration, there can be little doubt that Aurungzebe's foresight and administrative ability caused the area of this famine to be much less extensive than was the tract of that which had devastated the country thirty years previously.

**11. Distress at Delhi in 1739.**—The spring of 1739 was a time of acute suffering to the inhabitants of Delhi and its neighbourhood, for this was the year of Nadir Shah's invasion, who left famine in his train wherever he went. It needs only to recall to mind the outrages which he sanctioned, to justify the conjecture that for long after his departure the people did not recover from the effects of his barbarity and exactions. The pitiless massacre which he acquiesced in probably numbered amongst its victims many of the agricultural classes, whose labour in those disorderly days could ill have been spared; and, after the depredations which he made on the imperial and local treasuries, little could have remained for the purposes of cultivation. It must be borne in mind, however, that this was an exceptional catastrophe, due wholly to the inroads of an enemy, and not in any way dependant on climate.

**12. Famine of 1770.**—The burden of evidence is against the idea mooted by Colonel Baird Smith that the great famine of 1770 had its origin in excess of rain. Drought was really the cause,‡ as it has been the cause of almost every

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\* See Elphinstone, Book XI., Chapter 1.

† Report of Orissa Commissioners, Part the Third, Sec. 6.

‡ Mill, Vol. II., p. 349.

§ See the various letters from Mr. Rumbold, Resident of Behar, and Mr. Becher, Resident of Moorshedabad, and the passages from their Minutes dated 23rd October, 1769, given by Mr. G. Campbell in his "Extracts from the Records of the India Office." See also, in the same volume, the letters from the Government to the Court of Directors. The only ground for the supposition appears to be the fact that there had been floods in Behar during August, 1768. After this date there was unquestionably drought in Bengal, which continued up to the time of the famine.

calamity of a like nature that has befallen India, in whatever quarter of the Peninsula. The autumn crop of 1768 and the spring crop of 1769 had both partially failed, and consequently the price of grain had risen by degrees to such a height that, by November of the latter year, starvation was staring the poorer classes of Bengal in the face. The distress was worst in the Bengal districts to the north of the Ganges, and in Behar; but it is questionable whether the famine was not felt considerably above the Kurumnassa also. On the 16th of February, 1770, Colonel Primrose Galliez, commanding at Allahabad, had been ordered to form a depôt of grain in the Fort, for the subsistence of his garrison in case of emergency. On the 3rd of May he received orders, as his situation was deemed less precarious than that of the Lower Provinces, to forward at once to Behar whatever he could with prudence spare of his store, and to despatch as soon as possible to Patna any further supply that he was able to collect. He excused himself unhesitatingly from the first part of his instructions, and his letter shows that he had little hope of executing the second. "Relative to the grain,"\* he writes to the Select Committee on the 19th of May, "I am sorry it is not in my power to comply with your directions. The quantity I have been able to collect to the present time would be barely sufficient to support the garrison a month in case of necessity, and the prospects of getting more are very distant. Though the inhabitants are not in such distress here as in the provinces, yet grains of all sorts are immoderately dear, and His Majesty has absolutely refused me liberty to buy up any to send down the country, lest the inhabitants of this place should suffer in consequence of it. It is true that I have been able to purchase some grain at Corah; but there is such difficulty, perpetual interruptions, and disputes in getting it down, that I fear little can be obtained from thence. It is but a few days since three or four boats laden with grain arrived from Corah, after a passage of three months, owing to the continued molestations they met with from the people of Sujah-ul-Dowlah, who no sooner, in consequence of perwannahs I procured from the Nabob's son, released them at one place, but they stopped them at another. I cannot help thinking there was some design in this, as I wrote to the Vizier on the subject, but received no answer. From the grain which I have collected for the use of the garrison I cannot with prudence spare any, as affairs are now situated; nor, indeed, would the trifling quantity I have in garrison, could I spare it, be of any service. I shall, however, in obedience to your orders, endeavour to purchase what grain I can, and will, if I succeed, forward it to Patna with all possible expedition." The officer in charge at Fyzabad received the same injunction, but experienced equal difficulty in carrying it out. These frequent attacks on the boats seem to imply that, as far as Allahabad and Fyzabad at all events, the people were driven to plunder by stress of circumstances. Of the mortality due to this famine I can find nothing more definite than the remark of the Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors, that more than a third of the inhabitants of Bengal were computed to have been destroyed. Colonel Baird Smith has ascertained the price † of food in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, but no records like those of Chinsurah exist to give the same information for these Provinces. Indeed, it was not to be expected that such particulars should exist, for even Benares at this time had not finally passed into the hands of the British.

\* See Mr. George Campbell's Extracts, pages 25 and 26.

† The prices in Bengal at this time were per rupee—

	Sears.		Sears.
Rice, No. 1, ...	3	} compared to which ordinary prices were	28
Do., No. 2, ...	3½		40
Inferior grain, ...	4½		45
Dal, ...	4		30
Wheat, ...	4½		26

## SECTION II

### FAMINE OF 1783-84.

**13. First Symptoms of the Famine.**—If the region which we now designate the North-West Provinces escaped the brunt of the attack on the last occasion, it fared otherwise with it in 1783-84 \* The first sound of alarm came from the neighbourhood of Agra, and from this centre distress seems to have diverged both to the East and West. The prices of grain for many months previously are said to have indicated much disturbance of the ordinary seasons. In the upper part of Hindustan, indeed, an extraordinary drought had prevailed for two years. During the spring and summer of 1783, the inhabitants of Delhi and its vicinity had experienced great difficulty in providing for their own wants, and the gravest apprehensions were entertained for the cold-weather crop, owing to the continued absence of rain. The dwellers beyond the Jumna were emigrating in the direction of Lucknow as early as October, and death left its mark freely along the road. Such was the general apathy that the bodies were not removed from the spot where they lay, even in towns or villages. No relief was held out to the sick or dying. Every man's hand was against his neighbour, and the strong ruthlessly seized the portion of the weak, for the struggle to maintain life overcame all scruples. In this solitary instance the drought affected Oudh also, though in a less degree than the surrounding country; and it was feared that this province, so fortunate hitherto, would not escape the horrors of famine. Lastly, on the 18th of November, the very day on which Mr. Fox was introducing his abortive East India Bill into the House of Commons, tidings came to the Government of riots in that very city of Benares which was destined hereafter to furnish the English Statesman with proofs against Warren Hastings. In utter despair of obtaining food by fair means, the poor had resorted to violence.

**14. Precautions taken by the Bengal Committee of Revenue.**—The first measures of relief were taken in September. A Committee was appointed with absolute powers to regulate the price, distribution, and sale of grain, to establish store-houses, and, if need be, to prevent exportation from the Company's territories. Early in October, the Committee of Revenue issued the following Circular "to all Chiefs and Collectors." It deserves to be recorded, if only for the policy which it advocates, so opposite to that of more modern times:—

"The general information we have received from many districts of the crops having been considerably hurt from a want of rain, and the consequent rise in the price of every article of produce, renders it necessary that immediate and effectual precaution should be taken to prevent the ill effects arising either from a real or—what will be equally distressing to the inhabitants—an artificial scarcity, created by the merchants from hoarding grain, and greatly enhancing the price of it, and withholding the usual supplies from the public markets.

"We direct that you do in the most public manner issue orders by beat of tom-tom in all the bazaars and gunges in the districts under your charge, declaring that if any merchant shall conceal his grain, refuse to bring it to market, and sell it at a reasonable price, he will not only be punished himself in the most exemplary manner, but his grain will be seized and distributed among the poor.

"The objects to which we also direct your attention are to obtain the most accurate state of the districts under your charge, in regard to the quantity of grain which may be expected from the crops on the ground, comparatively with the ordinary produce of former years.

"You will endeavour to obtain an account of all deposits of grain of every denomination, the places where it is lodged, and the names and places of abode of the persons to whom it belongs, and transmit it to us twice in every month, noting the quantity that may at different times be exported, and that which may be consumed in the district.

"You will particularly attend to the price of grain in the public markets, and order daily reports of it to be brought to you, an abstract of which you will transmit to us four times every month; and, to frustrate any attempt to raise the price of grain to a higher rate than any real deficiency might give cause

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\* Much of my information for the events of this period is derived from Mr. George Campbell's Extracts,—see pages 112—129. Luchmun Singh, Deputy Collector of Boolundshuhur, has also given me some valuable assistance.



for, as well as to check any combinations of the merchants, we direct that, in any instance where a sudden or extraordinary advance of price is required, you will summon the persons to appear before you and assign their reasons for imposing such increase; and if they appear unsatisfactory, and with a view to extort a personal advantage from circulating a belief of a scarcity existing, you will prevent its having effect by forcing the sale of the grain at a rate which may be deemed reasonable and fair by such number of the principal inhabitants whom you will call upon for the purpose of fixing a rate of price; and, that a public example may be made of every person attempting such practices, we direct that you hold them in confinement till you receive our directions from the report of the case which you will immediately transmit to us.

"We recommend this subject to your particular and serious attention, more especially as the dominions of the Vizier are threatened with a famine, and will require every aid which the Company's districts can afford, consistent with their own safety. In your correspondence with us on this subject, you can suggest any further measures which from local information you may judge will be conducive to the purposes proposed."

The Residents at Lucknow and Benares were further enjoined to "give passports to all persons desirous of coming into the province of Behar from the countries beyond the Jumna, and to supply such other aids of money and provisions as in their discretion shall be absolutely necessary for the immediate relief and support of those who may be in need." This assistance was meant exclusively for those who were likely to settle and become cultivators of land. It was resolved also to take off the duties upon every kind of grain, and to allow free communication in corn throughout the Company's provinces, including Benares.

**15. Testimony and Probable Conduct of Warren Hastings.**—It was hoped at first that Bengal would escape the scourge, but the result proved that the Government had been too sanguine in its expectations. The constant demand on the granaries, together with the irruption of innumerable starving creatures, and a partial drought in the direction of Beerbhoom, Purneah, Rajshahye, and Tirhoot, caused want lower down also, though in a less terrible degree. Of the desolation which pervaded Cheyte Singh's former dominions, Warren Hastings was himself an eye-witness. "From the confines of Buxar to Benares," he wrote\* with a curious candour to the Council Board under date of 2nd of April, 1784, "I was followed and fatigued by the clamours of the discontented inhabitants. The distresses which were produced by the long-continued drought unavoidably tended to heighten the general discontent; yet I have reason to fear that the cause existed principally in a defective, if not a corrupt and oppressive, administration. I am sorry to add that from Buxar to the opposite boundary I have seen nothing but traces of complete devastation in every village." Oppression had indeed brought the province of Benares to the most abject state of misery. The resources of the people had been exhausted by the Governor-General's extortions, and an unfavourable season gave the finishing stroke to their misfortunes. That Warren Hastings took any steps to alleviate the distress I can find no intimation whatever. It is impossible that, even with the will to distribute money, he should have had funds at his command. The whole tenor of the Court of Directors' instructions to him at that time was to keep the peace with his neighbours and make large remittances to England, and the enormity of the exaction was in his case the measure of his loyalty to the Company's interests.

**16 Enquiry concerning the Price of Grain during the Famine.**—Colonel Baird Smith has observed that, so far as he could learn, the price of grain never was higher than 10 to 12 seers for the rupee. If this were really the case, a reason for it might perhaps be found in the emptiness of Warren Hastings' treasury, and the still greater straits of the people; but I am not satisfied that his statement on this point can be taken as conclusive. The *Calcutta Gazette* † of May 13th, 1784, contains the announcement that wheat was selling then at Buttaleh for 9 seers, at

\* See Mill, Vol. IV., p. 439.

† See Mr. Seton-Karr's Selections from the *Gazette*, under the date quoted.

Lahore for 4 seers, and at Jummoo for 3 seers the rupee. Mr. H. G. Keene\* has had the good fortune in the course of his career to meet and converse with an old Gosaen who served under Himmud Bahadur, and from him he heard that flour sold in 1840 Sumbut (1783-84 A. D.) for 8 seers for the rupee, "which," observes Mr. Keene, "allowing for the subsequent fall in the value of money, is equivalent to a rate of 3 seers for our present rupee—a state of things partly conceivable by English readers if they will imagine the quartern loaf at four shillings, and butcher's meat in proportion." I myself have also learnt from native informants that grain was selling in Meywar and Marwar at six seers during the height of the famine. As want of rain was the chief cause of this famine, it is hardly conceivable, when we know that the suffering was acute throughout the greater part of the Bengal Presidency, that prices should have ranged between 10 and 12 seers lower down country, whilst only 4 seers were obtainable for the rupee at Lahore. It is much to be regretted that there are no records in the office of the Commissioner of Benares to throw light on this matter. Although letters dated so long ago as June, 1780, are extant, there is unluckily a break in the correspondence between November of that year and the beginning of 1787. But for this hiatus we might have profited by the knowledge which the Resident must have had of the current rates within his jurisdiction. Very likely, too, some mention would have been made of the extent to which the province had been depopulated by death or emigration.

**17. Difference of Opinion between Colonel Baird Smith and Mr. Rose concerning the effect of the Famine in Cawnpore.**—On other points, too, my information is contradictory. Mr. Rose, who was himself an eye-witness of the famine of 1837-38 in the District of Cawnpore, who from his position as Collector would be likely to hear all the old traditions that would be raked up at such a time, and to whose energy and intelligence those of his cotemporaries who still are serving in India give ample testimony, says† that though the Chalisa, as this famine is termed from the Hindu years in which it occurred, lasted for two years, yet, comparatively with the duration of each, its devastations were not so dreadful as those of 1837-38. There was not such a total absence of vegetation, and therefore cattle lived; and moth, a valuable means of sustenance, was spared to the people. Colonel Baird Smith, on the other hand, observes:—"When‡ recently in Cawnpore, I had some conversation regarding it with a very old native merchant, a man who said he believed he was ninety years of age, and was, at any rate, old enough at the time of this famine to have retained some personal recollections of it, strengthened, no doubt, afterwards by the traditions relating to it which even still linger among the native community. He had recollections also of all the other subsequent famines specified in the second list given in paragraph 24, but among the entire series he ranked that of 1783 as the most severe, even more so than that of 1837-38, and much more so than that of 1860-61. The old man's faculties seemed scarcely impaired, and his benevolence of character was shown by the fact that he was, at the time I saw him, supporting at his sole cost fifty or sixty starving people."

**18. Conclusion as to the Localities where the Famine was most severe.**—I believe myself that the chief suffering was in the country round about Jummoo, Lahore, and Agra, and in the Native States of Rajpootana to the South-West of the Jumna. It was from these quarters that the hordes of emigrants flocked towards Lucknow,§ and it was in them too that prices, so far as our scanty information guides us,

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\* See his *History of the Moguls*, p. 140.

† See his letter No. 9 of 1838 to the Commissioner of Allahabad.

‡ See his Report, Section II., para. 25.

§ In a letter, dated Lucknow, June 16th, 1784, to the Court of Directors, Warren Hastings observed that Oudh had suffered less than the countries to the Westward, though even in Oudh he had been forced to concur in the proposition of the Nawab Vizier's Ministers to reduce the revenue for the year, owing to the unprecedented badness of the season.

were highest. The inrush of such numbers of strangers into regions themselves affected by the prevailing drought must have caused want almost as pressing as that which the exiles left behind them. There are many men still living who have heard the story of these days from their fathers, though not many who can recount the events on their own authority. I have consulted several whose opportunities should make their tale trustworthy, and all agree in saying that the famine of 1783 was the most awful that the country above the Kurumnassa ever underwent. Throughout its tract, natives date events from the "Chalisa," as we ourselves do from the Mutiny. Every child in the Punjab, the Doab, and Oudh, has heard of it. If there is strength in the multitude of witnesses, tradition in this instance is not so valueless as it is when the story has passed through several generations.

**19. Close of the Famine.**—At the end of February, 1784, there were signs that the distress was abating both in Bengal and in the West. An early and copious fall of rain helped further to alter the aspect of affairs. Although on June 16th\* Warren Hastings wrote from Lucknow to the Court of Directors that barley and nuhoot, the chief articles of food amongst the lower classes in that part of India, were still selling at the rate of 15 seers, in contrast to their ordinary prices of a maund and a half for the rupee, it was evident that Government had no forebodings about the Khureef, otherwise it would hardly, after its recent exhibition of terror, have allowed grain to be shipped in moderate quantities during March and April for the relief of Madras. The out-turn of the autumn crop fully confirmed the anticipations of plenty, and in December the Government considered itself justified in taking off the embargo which it had laid on the general exportation of corn a twelvemonth before.

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\* See Mr. Campbell's Extracts, p. 118.

## SECTION III.

### FAMINE OF 1803-4.

**20. Preliminary Remarks.**—The famine of 1803-4 is the first on which the Sudder Board of Revenue's Proceedings throw any light. Indeed, were it not for them, I should have been at a loss whither to turn for information. The historians of this period, so far as I can discover, are silent on the subject. The pages of Mill and Thornton, whilst they give detailed accounts of the military operations against Holkar and Scindiah, do not contain a word which would enable their reader to learn, even by inference, that the country had been laid waste by a scourge far more terrible than war. As a rule, the devastation of armies is trifling compared to the ruin which famine causes. It is only in the neighbourhood of the battle-field and the camping-ground, and along the line of march, that the evil effects of an enemy's movements are felt. But famine strikes a whole tract, and leaves its mark on all but the very rich. Within the limits of its incidence, the poorer classes, if left to themselves, must either starve or emigrate; and emigration, their first resource, only extends the area of want. Even those who can boast of accumulated wealth are not always safe, for money is useless when food is not at hand. Recovery, too, is easier in the one case than in the other. When once the tide of war has passed along, the husbandman breathes freely again. His temporary disasters are soon repaired; the plough, the cattle, and the seed are brought forth from their hiding-place; and the land, as fertile as before, can at once be made available for production, without the invariable necessity of extraneous help. But in a season of drought everything is sacrificed to ensure mere existence. Cattle, implements, clothes, the very bed on which he sleeps, and the very vessel from which he drinks, are disposed of, before the peasant proprietor will move from the home of his fathers. And, granted that his resources enable him to keep body and soul together till the rain unbinds the soil, he is then utterly without the means of renewing his cultivation. He is involved in every sort of difficulty. The little capital he possessed is gone. He is in debt to every money-lender who would give him credit. He owes more on account of his land than he can hope in a long series of years to repay. He must have aid from without, or he is lost. So it happens that he begins life afresh with a millstone round his neck, with instalments of revenue thrown back on subsequent years, with a lien on his future crops to secure the advances which enable him to purchase bullocks and seed, and with the knowledge that, under the most favourable circumstances, the labour of his hand cannot result in more than a mere pittance for his own support during several years to come.

**21. Extent of the Famine.**—Such was the condition to which hundreds of thousands were reduced during the autumn of 1804 in Moradabad, Bareilly, Etawah, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, and Allahabad.\* Nearly three years had elapsed since the Nawab Vizier had ceded these districts (together with Gornuckpore) to the East India Company, whilst Benares had then been under the British administration for more than a quarter of a century. In the trouble of those days the latter province fortunately had no share. Fear† was entertained of a scarcity early in September,

\* These districts were much more extensive then than now. I gather from the correspondence of the period that Budaon belonged to Moradabad, Mynpoorie to Etawah, Shahjehanpore to Bareilly, and Futtehpoore to Allahabad.

† The accompanying letter shows what were the apprehensions in the north of the province. Jaunpore at this time was a sub-division, and not a separate district.

To

GEORGE DOWDESWELL, Esq.,

*Secretary to Government, N.-W P., Judicial Department.*

DATED JAUNPORE, THE 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1803.

SIR,

"I AM concerned to be under the necessity of representing to Government the distressed situation of this district from the loss of the Bhudvee and Khureef crops, and the small prospect of a public harvest from the same cause.

1803, and the Resident was ordered to report on the state of the people, and on the price of grain, which had risen rapidly. He also received authority to make any advances that he thought fit for digging water-courses, wells, and tanks. But in October a favourable change took place, and a downpour of rain dissipated all anxiety for the future.

**22. Famine Due partly to Drought and partly to the Short-sighted Policy of the British Government.**—With the “Division of the Ceded Provinces” it fared otherwise. Independently of the influence of drought, the policy of the British Government, from the time that it came into possession of this territory, seems to have been accountable for some portion of the calamity. As the Nawab Vizier made the cession in commutation of his former subsidy, it was hardly likely that he would have under-estimated the productive powers of the soil. The land assessment, as returned by him on the 22nd September, 1801,\* amounted to Lucknow Sicca Rs. 1,35,23,474. In 1802-3 (1210 Fuslee), the first unbroken year of our management, there was no enhancement. We limited the demands to Rs. 1,34,83,329, the collections were Rs. 1,33,74,238, and the balances Rs. 1,09,091. In 1803-4 (1211 Fuslee) the reign of exorbitance commenced. The demands were Rupees 1,42,50,140, the collections Rs. 1,18,21,821, and the balances Rs. 24,28,319. The sum of Rs. 15,52,417—the difference between the collections of this year and the former year’s receipts—may fairly be ascribed to the influence of the drought; but, with this deduction, there is still an item of Rs. 7,66,811 attributable to gross miscalculation of what the country could bear. Moreover, the people were utterly unprepared to grapple with any sudden calamity. They had just been released from the yoke of a Sovereign whose oppression and tyranny were notorious. They were weighed down with poverty, and long years of experience had taught them to look upon Government as their common enemy. In the face of this universal destitution, and on the strength of the exceptionally good autumn harvest of 1802, the triennial settlement was made, and, simultaneously with the imposition of heavier rates, came bad seasons to add to the general exhaustion of the country.

**23. Early Reports from the Collectors of the different Districts.**—In the spring of 1803, hail-storms were prevalent in Etawah and Furruckabad, and considerably diminished the out-turn of the Rubbee. This was only the prelude to

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2. This circumstance, together with the superstitious prejudice attached by the natives to an earthquake, and the late irruption of the Mahratta Horse into the Doab, has so alarmed the minds of all, that the possessors of grain can scarcely be induced to bring it to market at any price, and the evils of famine already begin to be felt, while the whole country is notoriously stocked with a supply sufficient for at least three years’ consumption. This store is almost exclusively in the hands of the zemindars, and generally not kept for sale.

3. The only modes which occur to me of relieving the industrious and poorer classes of the people, who alone materially suffer by this pressure, are by large importations of grain from the Eastward, and by Government receiving part of the revenue in grain and selling it to the people, unless some means could be devised of bringing the hidden stores of the zemindars to market. The nature of the food of the inhabitants does not admit of any large aid from the introduction of economy, otherwise than by curtailing a part of their daily diet.

4. All the requisite suggestions for the better security of the public revenue, by the usual advances of tuccavee to the ryots, digging wells, shutting up the mouths of nullahs, repairing embankments and reservoirs, &c., will of course have been submitted to Government from the Revenue Department. There is still time for active zeal to effect considerable benefit by an immediate adoption of the above measures, but after the expiration of another month it will be too late to commence on the most useful with a fair chance of success.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) J. DEANE,

Magistrate.

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\* This was immediately previous to the cession. The date of the Treaty is November 14th, 1801.

greater disasters, for these districts, in common with the others included in the Division of the Ceded Provinces, were destined to see a more or less complete failure of rain at the time that the cultivators were sowing the autumn crops. On 5th July, Mr. W. Lyecester, Collector of Moradabad, informed the Board of Revenue in Calcutta that the cotton and sugar plantations were drooping for want of water, and that he entertained great apprehensions for the entire Khureef. The same want of rain had been experienced in the country to the West, and hence the usual influx of grain to his district had been stopped. In fact, contrary to custom, at the time that he wrote Moradabad to his sorrow was exporting instead of importing corn, and prices were rising steadily every day. In a letter written afterwards, during the first half of September, he intimated that balances were accumulating, and that, unless the rain fell soon, it would be of no use to sow the seed for the Rubbee in any but irrigated fields. The prosperity of the country, the attachment of the people, and the peace of the district, he considered, required that Government should openly admit its determination, in case of famine, not to enforce its demands. He also announced that he had been busy in making enquiries how to promote the irrigation of the Rubbee by damming up rivulets, and had begun to bank up the River Gongun, the cost of which work he estimated at Rs. 5,000, and from which he hoped to save revenue to the extent of a quarter of a lakh. On July 26th, Mr. Richardson, the Collector of Cawnpore reported that the rains had been late in setting in, that so far the fall had been very partial, and that the cotton and Khureef crops had already suffered. Later—on 4th September—he wrote that all his Tehseeldars had sent in reports which confirmed his previous suspicions. So far as he knew, not a single shower had fallen throughout the Ceded Provinces since the 12th of August, and hot winds were blowing, just as in May and June. From Bareilly, complaints of scanty rain came in the course of July; and on the 28th of that month Mr. R. Ahmuty, the Collector of Allahabad, applied for a large sum of tucavee, in order to replace the cattle which had died by reason of the drought. On the 4th of September, Mr. Claud Russell, the Governor-General's Agent, informed the Board that the entire Khureef was injured or destroyed in Furruckabad; and that the balances were increasing. Two days later, Mr. Ross, the Collector of Goruckpore, reported the alarming state of the weather in his district. Not a drop of rain had fallen since the 18th of August, and very little before that date. The small-grain crops were much injured, and the cultivation of paddy, of which much had always been grown in the low lands of Azimgurh and Goruckpore, had been checked owing to the dryness of the soil. If rain did not descend shortly, he feared that the Rubbee would be affected also. Similar apprehensions and similar failure of the Khureef were intimated about the same time from Etawah.

**24. Measures taken by the Board.**—The result of these representations was that the Board instantly took steps to show the people that the Government sympathized with them in their trouble. They enjoined on Collectors the necessity of transmitting such accurate information on the state of the weather, the price of food, and the condition of the crops, as should enable them to be prompt in dealing with distress. They allotted Rs. 94,123, equivalent to about 5 per cent. on the jumma of the district, as tucavee to Allahabad, and have recorded that they made considerable advances, though it is not specified how much, to Furruckabad. They recognized the expediency of suspensions, and submitted a proposition embodying their views for the Governor-General's sanction. They also recommended temporary works of irrigation to be undertaken, set on foot an enquiry whether it would be advisable to restrict the exportation of grain to foreign territory, and at their suggestion the following proclamation was issued from Fort William on the 27th of September :—

“Information having been received that the price of grain has been considerably enhanced in the province of Benares and in the provinces ceded to the Hon'ble Company by His Excellency the Nawab Vizier, His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, with the view of encouraging the importation of grain into those provinces from the province of Bengal, has been pleased to direct that a bounty shall be paid on all grain imported at the city of Benares or Allahabad from the province of Bengal within three months, and at Cawnpore or Futtehgurh within four months, from the date of this proclamation.

"The following is the rate of bounty which will be paid on the different kinds of grain at each of the above-mentioned stations:—

"On all Grain, Wheat and Barley excepted:— Per 100 mds.

At Benares, ... ..	Rs. 15 0 0
„ Allahabad, ... ..	„ 19 0 0
„ Cawnpore, ... ..	„ 23 0 0
„ Futtehgurh, ... ..	„ 27 0 0

"On Wheat and Barley:—

At Benares, ... ..	„ 17 0 0
„ Allahabad, ... ..	„ 22 0 0
„ Cawnpore, ... ..	„ 24 0 0
„ Futtehgurh, ... ..	„ 31 0 0

"The bounty to which persons importing grain at the above-mentioned places may be entitled agreeably to the tenor of this proclamation will be paid at Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore by the Collectors of those districts respectively, and at Futtehgurh by the Agent to the Governor-General at Furruckabad. In order, however, to entitle the importers to the payment of the bounty, such persons will be required to produce the rowannahs for the grain, bearing the seal and signature of one of the Collectors of Customs in the province of Bengal, and the usual endorsement of the Collectors or Darogahs of the intermediate Custom-houses. The officers of Government shall likewise be at liberty to examine the boats whenever they may have reason to apprehend that the quantity actually imported is inferior to the quantity on which the bounty may be claimed.

"Persons importing grain into the province of Benares or the Ceded Provinces from the province of Bengal in consequence of this proclamation will be at liberty to dispose of their grain at such price and in such manner as they may judge proper.

"Maafee rowannahs will be granted for the transportation of the grain."

**25. False Hopes Excited by a Partial Fall of Rain at the end of September.**—There is little in the records of these days to show in what portions of each district the distress was worst. With one or two exceptions, the statements are general rather than particular, and, such as they are, we must perforce be content with them. I gather that, up to the middle of September, 1803, the Khureef had more or less failed throughout the Ceded Provinces, and that there was grave anxiety about the ensuing harvest. At the end of the month came a ray of hope to cheer men's minds. Tidings poured in to Calcutta from one district after another that rain had fallen in abundance; that food\* was cheaper; that timely labour had saved a remnant of the Khureef in some places, notably in Cawnpore; and that there was a general expectation of good spring crops. Restrictions on the exportation of grain from those districts whence exportation was usual were deprecated, the Rubbee sowings were extensively taken in hand, and, in the prospect of a joyous harvest, the Board declined at present to allow remissions of revenue, but contented itself with issuing instructions to postpone the payment of instalments in proportion to the losses actually sustained.

**26. Aspect of Affairs up to the end of 1803.**—Meanwhile, with an ingenious sort of duplicity, the Board intimated it as their opinion to the Governor-General that the failure of the Khureef had been in no wise exaggerated. Though they had cautioned Collectors not to hold out to the zemindars any expectation of absolute remission, they suspected that eventually a large sum must be abandoned. Indemnification was due also to the Revenue Contractors† who had so far been punctual in their payments, though the landholders on whom they relied for recouping themselves were already defaulters to a large extent. Of the instalments for which the Khureef of 1803 was answerable, the ryots furnished little or nothing, and the zemindars, being dependent on the ryots, were equally in arrears. Whatever proportion of its demand Government realized was at the expense of the Tehseeldars, who raised loans at high rates of interest on the security of their own resources. Having themselves paid, but not received, their dues, they were naturally enough hard on the zemindars, as the latter were on the cultivators. So what with the pressure brought to bear

\* In Furruckabad, wheat, which had fallen from 34 to 20 seers for the rupee, now rose to 32 seers.

† In the correspondence of this period, the term "Tehseeldar" is always used to designate these individuals.

on them by those of their own colour to extract money, what with their uncertainty as to the Government's intentions, and what with the state of poverty to which the drought had reduced them, the agricultural population were ready to emigrate, plunder, or resort to any expedient which seemed likely to give them a respite from their sufferings.

**27. Relief Proposed about this period in the way of Remissions and Suspensions.**—I have not been able in every instance to ascertain the actual results of applications, but from various sources I have collected the following items, which will show the relief that was thought necessary on account of the Khureef alone :—

Collector of Etawah suggested on account of the				Ra.	Ra.
losses* on the Koar and Kartick kists, ...				Remissions, 1,00,000	
				Suspensions, 50,000	
				—————	1,50,000
Suspended for Allahabad on account of the above					
kists,	...	...	...	...	1,81,000
Ditto	ditto	in Bareilly,	...	...	2,62,800
Governor-General's Agent for Furruckabad sug-					
gested for losses on the Khureef, ...				Remissions, 28,125	
				Suspensions, 1,46,010	
				—————	1,74,135
Board recommended for Cawnpore on account					
of Khureef losses, ...				Remissions, 2,33,197	
				Suspensions, 2,33,197	
				—————	4,66,394
Board recommended suspensions for Moradabad					
on account of Khureef losses, ...				...	2,50,000
				Total Ra.	14,84,329

In other words, rather more than a tenth of the whole year's revenue was thought to be irrecoverable from the effects of one bad harvest. Concerning the condition of Goruckpore at this period I can find no mention at all; but as the Collector wrote after the rain of September that there was no great apprehension then of default, the probability is that so far the loss to the Government, if any, was inconsiderable.

**28. Aggravation of Distress in January, 1804.**—By the beginning of 1804 it proved that too sanguine hopes had been expressed of the Rubbee. The rain at the end of September had been sufficient to moisten the soil, and so to admit of the seed being sown, but the Mahawut, or cold-weather showers, had been everywhere wanting, and the growth of the young crops had been generally stunted. The Tehseeldars and Government officers still did their best to encourage artificial irrigation, but the people were becoming disheartened and reckless. Many were disposing of their cattle and implements, whilst those who had nothing more to sell were forsaking their homesteads and emigrating. There had only been want before; there was now actual starvation. Famine had laid its hand on the people, and an awful stage of suffering had to be passed through before any relief could be expected from Nature. The balances had been increasing at an alarming pace. In October, 1803, there were Rs. 5,22,645 due upon a demand of Rs. 10,51,387. The proportion was much the same in November, but fell to about two-fifths of the demand for the instalments of December. In the

\* The losses on the Khureef were estimated at Rs. 7,34,807, of which the Collector expected to realize Rs. 3,94,000 from the Rubbee.



next two months there was an alteration for the worse, as will be seen from the following figures :—

			<i>Demand.</i>	<i>Balance.</i>
January,	...	...	Rs. 26,82,641	Rs. 11,50,186
February,	...	...	,, 28,52,189	,, 14,41,661

Henceforth I propose to deal with each district separately. This mode of treatment will admit of greater clearness of description, and will enable me to give a few particulars which there has not so far been an opportunity of mentioning.

**29. Progress of the Famine in Moradabad.**—On the 7th of February the Collector of Moradabad reported to the Board that the state of the crops throughout his district afforded little hope of a good harvest. Although great exertions had been made, his people were, he considered, worse off than their neighbours, for the soil of their fields, being for the most part sandy, did not admit of the possibility of making wells. The water of the nullahs was the only means that they had of irrigation. There was no hoarded wealth and few money-making men in the district. Internal discord was rife, and the dread of invasion by the Mahrattas and the expectation of a revised settlement made many conceal the real capabilities of the land. The defalcations in the revenue were already so great that the Collector was unable to make the usual advances for sugar-cane from the Treasury. The zemindars were absconding in every direction, and much land was lying fallow. The price of grain on the 28th of January stood thus :—

Wheat, 39 seers for the rupee.  
Gram, 49 ditto.

And on February the 5th—

Wheat, 31 seers for the rupee.  
Gram, 35 ditto.

The cost of every article of food was becoming greater every day. Towards the end of March the Collector announced that the cultivators were clandestinely removing whatever of the crops had arrived at maturity. Another device of the zemindars at this time was to cite the Tehseeldars into the Criminal Court on some false charge, in the hope of having them put under restraint till the case was settled. By this ruse they prevented them from making the collections. Towards the end of April it was possible to judge of the Rubbee, and by common consent it was allowed to be worse than that of many previous years. The Collector represented that it was quite out of the question for the people to make up any deficiencies. As the standing crops were being ruthlessly plundered, he urged the expediency of sending a military force to overawe the people, and so letting the Civil authorities have a chance of collecting the revenue. He also asked for a large allotment of tuccavee as the only means of giving an impulse to the succeeding year's cultivation. By the end of July, when the rain had begun to fall, Moradabad had attained the unenviable notoriety of having the largest balances (Rs. 9,32,759) of any of the suffering districts.

**30. Progress of the Famine in Bareilly.**—The loss from the Khureef was probably greater in Bareilly than in any other district. This is essentially the crop from which the food of the agricultural classes always has been, and is likely always to be, derived. When this therefore fails, want, if not a worse calamity, is imminent. According to the kistbundee of 1802-3 (1210 Fuslee), the payment of the instalments had been so arranged in the settlement that eight annas should fall on the autumn and eight annas on the spring crop; but on enquiry it turned out that no more than four annas could be realized from the Khureef. The balances rose from Rs. 1,38,166 in October to Rs. 2,97,000 in November, and many of the ryots fled through fear of payment being enforced. The arid soil of Rohileund, the Collector maintained, made it peculiarly liable to all the evil effects of drought, and, beyond embanking a nullah

within two miles of Bareilly, and another not very far from Kasheepore, in the jagheer of Rampore, nothing could be done by art to counteract the niggardliness of Nature. The result in the neighbourhood of the streams so arrested was admirable, for the water spread itself over a considerable area. But the money or the organization was not at hand to carry out similar works throughout the district. In April, when the famine was at its height, the Collector took a tour in order to satisfy himself of the actual condition of affairs. The reports of his subordinates were amply confirmed by what he saw with his own eyes. The people were everywhere starving. The Rubbee on the lands of sandy soil was so scanty that it was not thought worth reaping, and the farmers fed the shrivelled stalks down with their bullocks.

**31. Progress of the Famine in Etawah.**—Early in 1803 cultivation had been stopped in Etawah by the menacing attitude of the Mahratta army, which was encamped on the border at Bidjighur. The zemindars as a body were poor men, who under ordinary circumstances had difficulty in supporting themselves after paying their malgootzaree. They were now living in daily expectation of a raid which should deprive them of their cattle and their crops, of which the indigo gave the best promise. The merchants who held stores of corn were eager to empty their granaries at any price. This cause probably operated here as elsewhere to make prices lower than they might have been but for the vicinity of the enemy. Besides this, the rebellion of the Tettiah Rajah had tended to make life and property insecure; and what he and his followers spared a succession of furious hail-storms destroyed. Then came the drought of June, July, August, and September. No wonder that under this accumulation of disasters the loss of the Khureef was estimated at Rs. 7,34,807,—about a quarter of the whole jumma of the district,—or that the malgootzars should have asserted that much which they paid on account of the Khureef instalments was really raised upon their private credit. From this time matters went steadily on from bad to worse. A violent hail-storm swept down upon the district in the second week of 1804, and left ruin in its track. Though seed had twice been sown, the ground was too baked to allow of its germinating. Water was too far below the surface to be procurable. The consequence was that the land lay bare. Emigration was constant during February, March, and April, and many years elapsed before the district recovered the blow which this famine dealt it.

**32. Progress of the Famine in Furruckabad.**—Here, too, in Pergunahs Koralee, Bewur, and Sonj (which have since been attached to the later-formed District of Mynpoorie), violent hail-storms had occurred in the spring of 1803, and again in January, 1804. On the 27th of this month the Agent to the Governor-General wrote to the Revenue Board in Calcutta that many defaulting zemindars had fled across the border into the Nawab Vizier's dominions through fear of coercion, and that the aspect of affairs was as bad as bad could be. Later—in May—he estimated that a remission of about one-third of the whole jumma would be needful. At the end of July the gross balances were Rs. 3,20,391.

**33. Progress of the Famine in Cawnpore.**—In a letter to the Board dated November the 22nd, 1803, the Collector of Cawnpore had given it as his opinion that all reason for fearing scarcity was then at an end, thus giving a signal proof of how little he anticipated the extreme suffering which he was destined to witness. On February the 1st, in consequence of the failure of the winter rain, he started on tour in order to learn by personal experience what was going on. He found that with the exception of Canouj, where the crops were fair, the prospects of the Rubbee were universally bad. Many of the zemindars had levanted, and only the members of the industrious castes were trying to remedy their misfortunes by digging wells. The sole means that he could suggest of checking emigration was for Government to grant an indulgence of some Rs. 4,60,000 at once—half by way of remission and half as a suspension—to be liquidated with the instalments of the following year. In May, to promote future cultivation, he urged the distribution of tucavee on a large scale.

Two and a half lakhs were asked for, and Rs. 1,80,826\* were allowed. The out-turn of the spring crop proved inconsiderable. The returns from Abkaree, Stamps, Customs, and Sayer, attached to Mr. Montgomery's Report, have enabled me to judge indirectly of the people's resources during this period. The last two items included at this time taxes on all productions of the soil, and on all manufactures and professions. The test is not an unfair one, for there is a disinclination, not to say an inability, to pay such duties on the part of persons plunged into acute distress. The collections for Abkaree were, in

						Rs.
1802-3,	...	...	...	...	...	21,733
1803-4,	...	...	...	...	...	62,657
1804-5,	...	...	...	...	...	53,539
1805-6,	...	...	...	...	...	70,026

These figures are curious, as showing that the diminution was after rather than during the crisis. The following abstract shows the sums paid into the Cawnpore Treasury on account of Customs, Stamps, and Sayer for the same four years:—

	<i>Customs.</i>	<i>Stamps.</i>	<i>Sayer.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1802-3, ...	3,29,133	2,625	1,56,181	4,87,939
1803-4, ...	1,93,647	2,172	1,03,117	2,98,936
1804-5, ...	1,38,378	5,251	77,691	2,21,320
1805-6, ...	2,12,391	6,318	86,158	3,04,867

From this it will be seen that in 1803-4 the receipts from these sources had fallen off by considerably more than a third of the previous year's amount, and that in 1804-5, though there had been a marked improvement in Stamps, the three items taken together showed a diminution in round numbers of three-fifths of the sum obtained before the famine. I may add that it took some years before the income from Customs and Sayer reached its normal condition. Mr. Montgomery makes no mention of the price of grain or the extent of crime in these days.

**34. Progress of the Famine in Allahabad.**—On the 23rd of January, 1804, the Collector of Allahabad was obliged to admit that the Rubbee, which had looked so luxuriant a short time before, was in consequence of the drought dried up and dwarfed in growth. The wheat and barley were in worst plight, but there was no crop which had not fallen away from its early promise of abundance. The peasants were making the most of their wells, but the prospects of a good harvest, or rather of any harvest at all, were fading away daily. To the inclemency of the season he added, as a reason for the deficiency, the depredations of the Boggailahs in Pergunnah Barah, and the proximity of the Mahrattas to the line of the Jumna. In April the Collector estimated the loss in the Rubbee at half of the previous year's produce in some parts, and one-third in others. Under such a state of things it was evident that the spring crops could not redeem the default on the Khureef. Indeed without tuccavee he declared that it was impossible to undertake the sowings, and accordingly he sent in an urgent request for more advances, though in the preceding September he had been credited with Rs. 94,123 for this purpose. From all accounts the suffering in this district was worst in the pergunnahs situated beyond the Jumna and in the Doab, though here and there in the latter the greater number of wells caused plots of ground to yield tolerable results.

**35. Condition of Goruckpore.**—The records are almost silent concerning Goruckpore. I have ascertained that in October, 1803, a considerable exportation of grain to the reserved dominions of the Nawab Vizier took place. This could scarcely

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\* Mr. Montgomery says Rs. 1,88,836 (see para. 29 of his Statistical Report). My figures are according to the Collector's own application, and the letter from Government conveying sanction (see the Board's Proceedings for July, 1804).

have happened if there had not been supplies enough in store for home consumption. It is also stated that rain fell for many days continuously in August and September. At the time of the cession, Goruckpore was the least populous of all the districts which came into our possession. It is probable therefore that, with more moisture and less mouths to feed, the Khureef placed the people above actual want. There are other reasons besides for this inference. The revenue was realized up to March with only trifling balances, and the subsequent monthly accounts show Goruckpore to have consistently maintained a smaller gross balance than any other district. No remissions were thought needful up to November, 1804, when the crisis had passed.

**36. Setting in of the Rains, and its result.**—At last in June and July the long-desired rain fell throughout the Ceded Provinces, and so copious was the supply that fears for the future speedily vanished. The country however still staggered under the shock. A dash of cold water recalls the fainting person to his senses, but does not at once give him back his strength. So too the people revived, but did not immediately return to the point from which they had sunk. The Tehseeldars showed a general inclination to send in their resignations. Many of the malgoozars were so disconsolate that they asked to have their engagements cancelled for the last year of the triennial settlement, and individuals could not be found to take the estates of defaulters, unless they were absolved from all liability for the balances. In Cawnpore alone, within twelve months of the famine, 238 estates, assessed at Rs. 3,64,386 annual jumma, were sold; and others that were put up were thrown back upon the hands of Government for want of purchasers, and were managed under the peculiar circumstances at great loss. Slowly the emigrants came back to their homesteads. Government showed itself alive to their necessities by authorizing large advances, both for purchasing seed and for replacing bullocks and implements, and this timely help enabled many to profit by the favourable season.

**37. Loss incurred by Government.**—Besides pledging itself to grant tucavee, Government had a still heavier burden in the suspensions and remissions which became necessary. The tables in Appendix II., which have been carefully compiled from the statements in the Revenue Board's Proceedings, show in detail the demands, collections, remissions, and suspensions between November, 1803, and October, 1804—the period during which the famine and its effects were most felt. They are also useful as exhibiting what were the balances which accrued month by month in each district, and therefore as proving by inference when and where the mischief was greatest. The following statement gives the results in a more concise form :—

## ABSTRACT OF TOWZER ACCOUNTS FOR 1803-4 (NOVEMBER TO OCTOBER, INCLUSIVE.)

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
		Net balance at close of October, 1803.	Aggregate of Kists for the twelve months, from November, 1803, to October, 1804.	Total Demand.	Total Collections.	Gross Balance at the end of October, 1804.	In train of liquidation at the end of October, 1804.	Remissions between November, 1803, and October, 1804.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Allahabad (Rupees of sorts),	...	90,446	28,95,532	29,85,978	23,74,130	10,8,779	1,08,779	1,60,463
Bareilly (Bareilly Rupees),	...	39,420	19,23,322	19,62,742	17,38,140	1,39,878	15,025	*2,96,030
Etawah (Furruckabad Rupees),	...	2,30,736	28,99,357	31,30,093	22,60,048	1,08,217	...	...
Furruckabad (ditto ditto),	...	11,524	9,48,357	9,59,881	8,51,127	89,428	39,428	1,49,605
Goruckpore (Lucknow Rupees),	...	No account received.	16,20,001	16,20,001	14,65,606	1,06,985	1,06,985	...
Gawnpore (ditto ditto),	...	13,990	26,06,858	26,20,848	21,65,456	34,758	34,758	4,09,842
Moradabad (Moradabad Rupees),	...	1,53,743	22,39,354	23,93,097	14,08,901	1,18,102	...	...
Total (Rupees of sorts),	...	5,39,859	1,51,22,781	1,56,72,640	1,22,63,408	6,56,147	3,04,975	10,15,940

\* Of this, two lakhs were remitted on account of over-assessment.

From this it will be seen that the total demand during the period that I have assigned to the famine was Rs. 1,56,72,640, the collections Rs. 1,22,63,408, and therefore the balances Rs. 34,09,232. Of this sum, if allowance be made for the two lakhs abandoned in Etawah on account of over-assessment, Rs. 8,15,940 were remitted during the year in consequence of the drought. Later entries in the Board's Proceedings show that remissions to the amount of Rs. 5,11,679, Rs. 6,17,699, and Rs. 8,385 were sanctioned for Moradabad, Etawah, and Furruckabad respectively, after the compilation of October's accounts. From Mr. Montgomery's Report I learn also that Rs. 1,03,877 additional were relinquished in favour of Cawnpore. These are the only items regarding which the information is precise. In other points the calculation, though not hazardous, cannot claim to be absolutely accurate, particulars being wanted to complete the tale. Thus it will be seen from the above abstract that the gross balances at the end of October, 1804, were Rs. 6,56,147, of which Rs. 3,04,975 were in train of immediate liquidation. Did all the entries harmonize with one another, it would be reasonable to conclude that Rs. 27,53,085 were suspended during the period, and Rs. 3,51,172 after its expiration. But there are discrepancies which it is not easy to account for. In the case of Bareilly and Furruckabad, for example, the sum of the figures in columns 5, 7, 8, exceed the total demand! For this I can suggest no better excuse than that, perhaps in ignorance of what was being contemplated at head-quarters in the way of relief, Collectors on the spot were doing their utmost to realize the revenue at whatever cost to the contractors, and that literally money was received for the relinquishment of which Government had given its sanction. The extent of the suspensions therefore must remain an open question. All I can say in elucidation of it is, that in the Board's Proceedings for 1804 it is casually mentioned more than once that the suspensions for the North-West Province up to and including June amounted to Rs. 10,13,972. This tallies with the sum total in column 9 of Table H., Appendix II., and hence I am led to infer that the column of suspensions up to that date reiterates, with corrections and additions, the items of former months. It certainly cannot be that the account of each month contains only the suspensions for that month. On this supposition, the aggregate suspensions alone on the year would exceed 73 lakhs—a sum more than double the balances, independently of any remissions. It is impossible to say what amount of the suspensions would in time be written off as irrecoverable. I am inclined to think the greater part would never be realized. The Proceedings of the Board abound in applications and sanctions for abandoning balances. The total sum so abnegated between 1804 and the conclusion of the settlements made in virtue of Regulation IX. of 1833 must have been enormous. Unfortunately the reasons for the accretion of the debt are seldom or ever given, and though I have no doubt that much was owing to bad seasons, there is no evidence to establish the fact. But, confining myself to the enumeration already given, I do not think Government could have lost less by non-payment of revenue alone than some Rs. 30,71,552. In tabular form the figures stand thus:—

				Ra.
Remitted for Moradabad,	...	...	...	5,11,679
Bareilly, ...	...	...	...	96,030
Etawah, ...	...	...	...	6,17,699
Furruckabad,	...	...	1,49,605	
			8,385	
			<hr/>	1,57,990
Cawnpore,	...	...	4,09,842	
			1,03,877	
			<hr/>	5,13,719
Allahabad,	...	...	...	1,60,463
Suspensions for the North-West Province to end of June,	...		...	10,13,972
				<hr/>
				Ra. 30,71,552
				<hr/>

This calculation I give for what it is worth, for I am well aware that it is not exhaustive. The suspensions certainly must have been more during the period, but as they would probably include the sums ultimately remitted for Moradabad and Etawah, the very low total at which I have put them is roughly balanced by the amount of the remissions. The sum, if it at all represents the cost to the State, proves plainly the extreme severity of the distress, for the area within which Government abandoned its revenue was less than that in which the two great famines of 1837-38 and 1860-61 prevailed, and the value of money was far larger then than later.

**38. Distribution of Tuccavee.**—I have already stated that as early as September, 1803, the Collector of Allahabad had received Rs. 94,123 tuccavee, and was pressing for more afterwards; and that in June, 1804, Rs. 1,80,826 were sanctioned for Cawnpore. Other districts made as urgent applications about the same time as Cawnpore, though I can trace no final orders in any other but the cases cited. Doubtless their claims were recognized also, for the Board was constantly inculcating on its officers the wisdom of this plan. If I put the whole amount of advances at ten lakhs, I believe that I shall be well within the mark. There would be a fair chance, but not a certainty, of recovering money thus lent, for in those days balances under this head were almost as frequent and quite as difficult to realize as were those of the land revenue.

**39. No Particulars extant Concerning other Losses.**—No information exists on which to form any idea of the number of deaths, the cost of relief to the starving, the probable value of the crops that perished, the damage done to the trading classes by the stagnation of their business, or to the agriculturists by the destruction of the capital embarked in seed, implements, and cattle. All these are items in the aggregate of loss which is attributable to a famine. But we can describe roughly the area of the tract; we know that emigration was common, and therefore may conjecture that considerable mortality must have occurred amongst the homeless and hunger-stricken multitudes as they travelled hither and thither in search of food, and we can calculate approximately the reduction in the income of Government. From these premises I think it is just to include this famine in the category of those which have most severely afflicted the North-West.

**40. General Policy of Government and the Board of Revenue.**—The measures of relief taken by Government and the Board of Revenue appear on the whole to have been wise. They did not anticipate the extent of the calamity, it is true. But experience shows that this is the most difficult error to guard against on such occasions. Panic must be avoided on the one hand, and the interests of private persons must be respected on the other. The principles of political economy must be borne in mind, but not slavishly followed. If Government is too precipitate in proffering help, and a favourable change of season ensues, the policy which has inclined the people to abandon their habits of self-reliance is deprecated; and if the signs of distress are too evident to be mistaken, Government in providing food and labour must take care not to clash with the mercantile community. This contingency fortunately did not exist in the days of which I write, as the Company had virtually a monopoly of trade. The question therefore whether it would be advisable to restrict the exportation\* of grain from the Ceded Provinces into foreign territory, which the Governor-General asked of all Collectors through the Board in September, 1803, was certainly not unbecoming the consideration of Government in such an emergency; and, under fear of a scarcity, the retention of corn within British territory would have been excusable. Though the prohibition, if issued, might have

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\* Bareilly at this time exported rice to Hattass, Moradabad wheat to Delhi and the Mahratta country, and Gornuckpore rice and other grains to the reserved dominions of the Nawab Vizier. The traffic however was on a small scale comparatively speaking.

affected the transactions of petty dealers, the lives of many would have been spared by the system of protection. But no sooner had the enquiry been instituted than the rain fell, and the Collectors who had been consulted unanimously declared their conviction that there was no need to stop the free transit of grain. Government acted on their advice, and it is possible that, in the short-lived joy which overcame every one at the prospect of a plentiful spring harvest, sufficient thought was not taken for the morrow, and food which would have been afterwards invaluable was allowed to find its way to foreign markets. In the early days of drought, the necessity of suspensions had also received attention, and the Board were liberal in their permission to throw back on future months the instalments which the proceeds of the Khureef were inadequate to defray. Their great object was to let the agricultural classes be assured of indulgence, if their case was deserving. But the instances of contumacy and abuse of kindness were at this time so numerous and so flagrant that there was always the risk of showing sympathy to the wrong person. Hence it was needful, even after the Board had owned that remission would ultimately be required, to conceal their intentions from the public at large. Tuccavee was given freely, not only for the sinking of wells and the embankment of nullahs, but also for the purchase of seed, cattle, and implements. This course was uniformly pursued throughout the whole period of distress. When there was a likelihood that the Rubbee of 1804 would make up for past deficiencies, and again in May, when the usual rains were being anxiously looked for, every encouragement was given to the people to replace their stock and tools by loans from the Treasury. This generosity eased the burden of the country, and was the source of true economy in the end; for had not Government supplied the money, so great was the dearth of wealthy individuals, that the agriculturists would have had no way of rescuing themselves from their destitute condition, and the payment of revenue would have been indefinitely postponed, for want of the means to till the land.

**41. The Board Discountenanced all Coercion.**—The Board also consistently warned its subordinates of the danger of coercion. They thoroughly perceived that drought had been the principal cause of the existing state of things, and they refused in consequence to press the *malgoozars*. As long as they dared, they held out hope of nothing more than suspension; but at last, in April, the frequency with which landholders and their labourers were absconding, made it imperative upon them to avow their ultimate intentions. A good Rubbee was no longer possible then. Famine had so completely got the upper hand that there was no chance of arresting it till rain fell. The only thing left was, in the interest of a future crop, to induce the country folk to stay by their lands. This could only be done by the promise of remissions. Whatever loss Government would thus incur would be trifling compared with the disastrous effects of a general emigration. It is probable that the Board's fear of being over-reached by unscrupulous persons made them delay too long before they accorded this measure of relief. The people laboured under a general uncertainty of the Government's intentions. They were strange to the new race of administrators, as the latter were to them. They would fain trust in their promises of mercy, and did so for a time. But when, month after month, their balances were accumulating, and they received no conclusive intimation of release, many could bear the anxiety no longer, and crossed the border in hope of better times, and sure, at any rate, that they had thrown the load of debt behind them.

**42. Mistake of the Board in not subsequently completing Irrigation Works temporarily thrown up during the Famine.**—Another error of judgment on the part of the Board was that, when the danger was over, they refused to sanction money for the completion of those temporarily-constructed works, which, if they had been properly finished, would have perhaps lessened the chance of future scarcity in their respective neighbourhoods. On this point the Collector of Moradabad made frequent applications. In the course of the famine he had, on his own responsibility,



commenced damming up various small streams,\* with the object of flooding the adjacent country. He had proved very successful in these undertakings, and beyond a doubt managed thereby to raise crops which would otherwise have perished. So long as the necessity of his operations was apparent, the cost was allowed to be defrayed by tucacavee. As was to be expected from dams hastily thrown up, greater solidity was needful, if they were to be permanently useful. But unfortunately the Board would listen to no proposal which necessitated a further expenditure.

**43. View taken by the Government of the Famine.**—The lesson of the famine is admirably detailed in a letter dated the 27th of September, 1804, from the Secretary to Government, in the Department of the Ceded Provinces, to the Board of Revenue, Fort William. With the paragraphs that I shall quote ends all that I can put on record concerning the events of 1803-4 :—

“His Excellency in Council having now sanctioned the remissions proposed by you to be granted in the several zillahs in the Ceded Provinces (with an exception to Goruckpore, in which zillah it is not expected that the remissions will be considerable), on account of a drought of unusual duration, His Excellency cannot avoid recurring to the magnitude of the amount of those remissions, and to the causes which have rendered such remissions indispensably necessary.

“A doubt cannot be entertained that a just application of the resources of the Ceded Provinces, and a due attention to their improvement, combined with the beneficial effects which may be expected to result from the system of internal government established in those provinces, will enable the generality of the landholders and cultivators of land at no distant period of time to supply the deficiency of an unproductive season from their private funds, or to obviate such deficiency by increasing the artificial means of irrigation and by other improvements.

“The liberal remissions of revenue which have been already granted in the Ceded Provinces, in consideration of the impoverished state of those provinces, occasioned by the oppressive administration of the former Government, and of the consequent inability of the malgoozars to fulfil their engagements in an unfavourable season, must have sufficiently manifested the desire of the British Government to promote the prosperity of the Ceded Provinces, and the welfare of the inhabitants. His Excellency in Council, however, is not without apprehensions that the general remissions of revenue granted in the Fuslee year 1211 may induce the landholders to rely on obtaining remissions whenever the periodical fall of rain shall prove insufficient for the purposes of cultivation. Under this reliance on the liberality and generosity of the Government, some of the landholders might omit to use those exertions for the improvement of their lands which Government is justly entitled to expect they should employ. The public revenue would consequently be rendered fluctuating and precarious, and material embarrassment might arise in the financial arrangements of the Government.

“His Excellency in Council therefore considers it to be of importance that the persons paying revenue to Government in the Ceded Provinces should be apprized that the remissions allowed to them in the Fuslee year 1211 were granted (as already stated) in consideration of the unprecedented extent in which the calamity of drought had prevailed, and also of the generally impoverished state of the country, and that the most confident expectations are entertained that they will obviate the necessity of preferring similar claims in future, by employing their utmost exertions for the extension of the cultivation and for the general improvement of the country. The great extent of the indulgence which the proprietors of land and other descriptions of landholders have experienced from the British Government, and the laws which have been enacted for the protection of their persons and property, and for securing to them the enjoyment of the fruits of their industry, will, the Governor-General in Council trusts, satisfy them of the justice and reasonableness of these expectations.

“In order to guard more effectually against any future calamity of season similar to that which has occasioned so considerable a defalcation in the revenues in the Fuslee year 1211, His Excellency in Council observes that the several Collectors in the Ceded Provinces should consider it to be an important part of their duty to obtain the most accurate information respecting the means afforded in their respective zillahs of watering the lands in cases of drought, and for the usual purposes of cultivation, and to suggest such measures as may appear to them to be calculated to render those means equal to the occasion for them.

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\* In 1865, when a scarcity was apprehended in the Doab, Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts, the Collector of Allahabad, advocated the damming of the Sussoo Khaderie and Burna Rivers in his district; but nothing appears to have come of the proposition. Besides the more extended irrigation which it affords, the plan has this advantage, that it raises the level of water in the wells round about by infiltration. The tanks constructed on this principle throughout Marwar by Colonel Dixon are a proof of how the water running streams can be utilized.

"In issuing the necessary instructions to the several Collectors in the Ceded Provinces under the present orders, you will call their particular attention to the present state of the rivers, nullahs, water-courses, tanks, and wells in their respective aillahs capable of being converted to the purposes of irrigation. You will at the same time inform them that Government is disposed to afford every reasonable assistance to such of the zemindars and cultivators of land paying revenue to Government whose means may be insufficient to provide for the watering of their lands to the extent required. Whenever a Collector shall have reason to believe that the expense attending the execution of any work immediately connected with the irrigation of the country may be too considerable to be defrayed by the landholders, and he shall be of opinion that the work should be undertaken at the charge of Government, he will submit to you his sentiments on the subject, together with the grounds of his opinion.

"The Governor-General in Council has been the more desirous of directing your attention to the important objects comprised in the foregoing observations and orders, from the consideration that the amount of the ensuing settlement of the land revenue in the Ceded Provinces will be principally regulated by the extent of the produce of the Fuallee year 1212."

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## SECTION IV.

### MINOR FAMINES BETWEEN 1813 AND 1837.

**44. Famine of 1813-14—Condition of Agra.**—The next mention of famine\* is in connection with Agra, Cawnpore, and Bunde'ound. The autumn crop of 1812 failed in many parts of the former district, and the harvest of the following spring was indifferent. Yet about this very time reports were pouring in from neighbouring districts that the prospects of the Rubbee were excellent. Contrary to the general run of luck, every week was adding to the trouble in Agra, and by July it was computed that half the inhabitants had left home in search of food and employment elsewhere. The rains set in late, but on the chance of arresting the mischief large advances of public money were made to all who returned to the cultivation of their fields. In this way the tide of emigration was checked; and not only this, but a large number of strangers from the Western States were attracted by the same inducement to settle in the district. The exertions of the labouring classes were worthy of all praise. Those who had no ploughs took to their hoes, and by this means alone some thousands of beegahs were prepared to receive seed. Had the season been favourable, it was thought that the proceeds of the harvest would have gone far to repay the balances of the previous year. But the rain-fall was only partial, and in the majority of places there was no adequate return to the toil and money that had been expended. Suhar, Sirhindiee, and Jagneer were the localities which suffered most. Every tank and stream was dried up, and wells were the only source from which water was procurable either for domestic or agricultural purposes. "Many died from hunger," says Hamilton, "and others were glad to sell their women and children for a few rupees, and even for a single meal." Those who could recall the past considered that the distress of 1783 was not to be compared for intensity with that which existed before their eyes.

**45. Relief proffered by the Board, but declined by the Collector.**—As early as the summer of 1813, the Board had intimated to Mr. Wright, the Collector, their readiness to allow a remission of revenue, subject to the acquiescence of Government. But at that time the Collector did not despair, and preferred to wait and see what good a liberal application of tuccavee would effect. He evidently did not take into account the possibility of a second season more disastrous than the first. The result was that in the spring of 1814 the arrears were great. The Collector then resorted to coercion, but apparently without the knowledge of the Board. "I released the malgoozars from confinement," he writes on July the 14th, "in compliance with your instructions, and required them to state what measures they purposed adopting for extending the cultivation of the ensuing year and liquidating the balances of the past year. Some eagerly entered into engagements, others reluctantly complied, several positively refused to come to any terms, asserting they had exerted themselves to the utmost of their abilities, and that their losses and sufferings had been very great. If there was rain in season, they would do their duty, and the produce might be appropriated for the discharge of the revenue. They merely required food for themselves and their families. If these terms were not agreeable, they and their estates were at the disposal of Government. One of the landholders plainly told me that he did not wish to quit the jail, as he had not been so well off for the last two years."

**46. Meagre Scale of Remissions.**—It is almost impossible to understand why, with the knowledge of this continued drought, the Board should not have sanctioned a remission of more than Rs. 994 up to the end of April, 1815, when the crisis was over. Their conduct in the early stage of the famine is explained by the Collector's disinclination to grant relief; but their subsequent omission to help the distressed zemindars is utterly unaccountable, except on the supposition that pressure was brought

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\* The information concerning this famine is derived almost entirely from the Proceedings of the Board of Revenue.

to bear upon themselves by the Government so as to compel the realization of the revenue at any cost. Despite the catastrophe, the State did not suffer materially, for the last of the Board's statements appertaining to this period only shows a balance of less than three and a quarter lakhs, out of a jumma of Rs. 97,69,200, for the four Conquered Provinces of Agra, Allygurh, Seharunpore, and Bundelcund.

**47. Price of Grain.**—The following table shows the average market prices in Agra for the three years in which there was distress, and for one year afterwards:—

Years.				Wheat.		Barley.		Gram.		Rice.	
				S.	C.	S.	C.	S.	C.	S.	C.
1812,	...	...	...	33	14	50	15	48	5	19	7
1813,	...	...	...	20	9	25	3	21	7	15	10
1814,	...	...	...	30	7	44	11	33	1	18	14
1815,	...	...	...	41	9	62	7	47	15	20	3

**48. Condition of Cawnpore.**—With reference to Cawnpore, the details are fewer, but what little information is extant tends to prove that the blow was heavy. In a letter dated October the 25th, 1813, Mr. Newnham, the Collector, wrote to the Board of Commissioners that the drought of 1220 Fuslee (1812-13 A. D.) was generally more severe in his district than that of 1211 (1803-4), and that in the latter year grain never sold at the price which it had recently reached. It is a pity that he gave no figures, for I have not been able to learn the market rates from other sources. In a single month's (September's) accounts there were balances of Rs. 52,274, compared with Rs. 37,227 collected. The remissions for the year were according to the Board's statistics—

						Ra.
In 1813-14,	...	...	...	...	...	4,525
,, 1814-15,	...	...	...	...	...	1,498

And according to Mr. Montgomery—

In 1813-14,	...	...	...	...	...	5,830
,, 1814-15,	...	...	...	...	...	21,275

Whence the discrepancy, I have not been able to find out.

**49. Condition of Allygurh and Etawah.**—An intimation in the Sudder Board's\* tables that Rs. 3,474 were suspended in 1813-14 for Allygurh, and Rs. 6,129 remitted for Etawah, inclines me to think that the famine extended to these districts also, though to what degree I am not prepared to say. As regards Allygurh, the prices of grain seem to point to the same conclusion. The average for the year was as below:—

			Wheat.		Gram.	
			S.	C.	S.	C.
1812,	...		35	8	49	8
1813,	...		23	8	23	12
1814,	...		35	0	38	8
1815,	...		47	14	49	8

**50. Condition of Bundelcund.**—I can trace nothing more concerning Bundelcund than that the inhabitants of Punwaree were the greatest sufferers at this period. On the 22nd of July, 1814, the Collector wrote to the Board that there had been a succession of bad seasons in this locality for the two previous years, and that absolute famine was devastating the pergunnah at the date of his letter. Many persons

\* See Appendix III., Table B.

had died, more had emigrated. Everything, indeed, seemed to have been against the cultivators of late. In the spring, when the prospects of the Rubbee were fair, a hail-storm had levelled the crops with the ground. The Collector's plan was to have a present distribution of tuccavee, and to grant subsequently a reduction of the jumma, which he considered must of necessity be too high when the balances were Rs. 11,862 upon a total demand of Rs. 18,653. The remissions were on account of

	Rs.				
1812-13,	...	...	...	...	11,105
1813-14,	...	...	...	...	3,504
1814-15,	...	...	...	...	3,448

As compared with the remissions sanctioned for other districts about this time, these sums appear too large for the relief of a single pergunnah, and therefore it is not unlikely that other parts of Bundelcund felt the famine also.

**51. Scarcity of 1819. General Prevalence of High Prices.**—Want of proper materials makes it impossible to give more than a very faint sketch of the events of 1819. Prices were high in various parts of the North-West during the year, but the increase seems to have been due not to one but to several distinct causes. In January a severe frost made havoc amongst the wheat and barley in Jounpore, and brought up the cost of the former grain to 10½ seers for the rupee. In Benares the price about the same time was 21 seers (the seer being about one-eighth less than at Jounpore), but the rate was attributed in part to the unusual shallowness of the Ganges, which prevented the larger grain boats from coming up the river. The average value at Allygurh throughout the year was—

	S.		C.	
Wheat,	...	...	19	12 for the rupee.
Gram,	...	...	20	4 „

And at Agra—

Wheat,	...	...	17	0 „
Gram,	...	...	20	9 „

Yet the Collectors of both Allygurh and Agra, as I shall presently show, had orders in the course of the autumn to export largely to Allahabad, Cawnpore, Banda, and Calpee—a circumstance which shows that these latter districts were in a bad plight at any rate.

**52. State of the Revenue.**—Unfortunately the Revenue Returns do not help to elucidate the matter, for, whether owing to the high prices or some other cause I know not, the remissions and balances for this year were remarkably small, as indeed they had been for the year previous. The accounts of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces and the Province of Benares for the year beginning May the 1st, 1818, and ending April the 30th, 1819, as made up on the 1st of July, 1819, stand thus:—

1818-19 A. D.					
Total Jumma.	Collections.	Suspensions.	Remissions.	Collected to June 30th	Balance on July 1st.
Sicca Rs. 3,33,68,435	3,17,23,743	31,668	1,77,870	7,37,270	7,24,541

The details of the remissions and balances are only recorded in rupees\* of sort, but for

\* The difference in value is considerable. Thus, rupees of sorts 1,85,886 = Sicca rupees 1,77,870 (remissions), and Rupees of sorts 7,57,195 = Sicca rupees 7,24,541 (balances). Only the sums total, and not the individual items, are recorded in Sicca Rupees at this period.

the sake of showing where default was greatest, I give the entries as they appear in the Proceedings :—

	<i>Remissions.</i>		<i>Balances on July 1st.</i>
	Rs.		Ra.
Allahabad, ...	...	...	29,197
Bareilly, ...	...	73,546	29,957
Cawnpore, ...	...	...	46,464
Etawah, ...	...	15,853	41,834
Furruckabad, ...	...	...	36,539
Goruckporé, ...	...	...	6,491
Moradabad, ...	...	3,479	7,599
Shahjehanpore, ...	...	4,747	39,125
Agra, ...	...	...	2,91,718
Allygurh, ...	...	...	69,117
Bundelcund, ...	...	6,435	55,231
Meerut, ...	...	...	7,933
Seharunpore, ...	...	60,685	65,049
Benares, ...	...	21,641	30,941
		1,85,886	7,57,195

Within this period, the distress, if it is to be judged in any degree by the country's ability to pay the revenue, must have been worst, for the returns of the next year are still more favourable :—

#### 1819-20 A. D.

Total Jumma.	Collections.	Suspensions.	Remissions.	Collections to June 30th.	Balance on July 1st.
Sicca Rs., 3,32,67,672	3,19,20,424	13,602	49,684	8,88,253	4,09,310

In the districts which I have reason to believe were affected by scarcity the remissions and balances are thus distributed :—

	<i>Remissions.</i>		<i>Balances on July 1st.</i>
	Rs.		Ra.
Allahabad, ...	...	...	25,409
Banda, ...	...	10,859	16,421
Calpee, ...	...	4,210	15,007
Jounpore, ...	...	4,129	1,24,015
Cawnpore, ...	...	20,905	9,127

**53. Reports of Collectors.**—The little correspondence which is extant appears to me to justify the inference that the rains had set in late, and that consequently the fear of continued drought, coupled with the knowledge of high prices in various quarters, made Government take all precautions against famine. When rain fell, it seems to have come in abundance—too abundantly indeed in Cawnpore, according to the Collector's account. It is evident that some time in August or September enquiries had been made by the Board, then sitting at Furruckabad, from its subordinates, for several letters from Collectors on the subject of the weather and the state of the crops, dated during the last two or three days of September, are still on record amongst the Proceedings. On the 28th of September, the Collector of Agra reported that a favourable change had taken place in the crops, owing to a late fall of rain. Wheat had been selling at 20 seers instead of 14, and, though at the time he

wrote the current rate was 16 seers for the rupee, he attributed this retrogression to the conduct of the merchants, who were exporting largely. The prospects of the Rubbee were good. From Bareilly, the Collector wrote on the 29th of September that the rain had revived the Khureef, and that there was every chance of a good harvest. Prices were high, but no rate was specified. On September 30th, it was intimated, both from Calpee and Furruckabad, that the Khureef would be below the average, but not by any means a total failure. In both places the market rates continued to be dear. On the same day the Collector of Meerut reported favourably of his district, and the Collector of Cawnpore that the rain had so far produced no good results. News had reached the latter that in Saugor multitudes were dying daily from famine, and that emigration was also taking place from Gwalior and Marwar. The prospects of the Khureef in his own district were good, provided the rain held off. Unfortunately the aspect of the sky gave no assurance of fine weather. Wheat had risen to 9½ seers—a price which he considered due to the exportation that was going on to the East. Under these circumstances, he asked that exportation should be prohibited. To this request the Board answered that they doubted whether Government would sanction such a measure whilst the new territories to the South and the Eastern Provinces were suffering so urgently from want. The following passage in a letter from the Collector of Moradabad, dated the 22nd of December, 1819, shows that there was no anxiety felt in the western half of Rohilcund:—"I have already," he writes, "had opportunities of personally visiting many of the pergunahs, and I am enabled to assure the Board that so fine a Khureef has never come under my observation previously; and this circumstance, combined with the extraordinarily high prices of grain of all descriptions, has removed the apprehensions which the reports of the droughts in other districts were calculated to produce." A letter from the Collector of Banda, dated October the 8th, announces that no rain had been experienced till the 20th of August, but that, when once it set in, the fall was incessant for three weeks. The land, which had hitherto been so dried up by the heat that sowings had been undertaken twice without any effect, became so drenched that a third sowing was not possible till the middle of September. Accordingly the Collector recommended a postponement of the Khureef instalments, to the extent of Rs. 1,97,327, till the time of the next Rubbee collections, and to this suggestion Government gave its sanction. A short time before the date of this letter wheat had been selling at seven and eight seers for the rupee.

**54. Measures taken by the Board.**—The result of these communications, and of others which, though not recorded, are spoken of in the Proceedings, was that the Board desired the Collector of Agra to buy up grain to the value of one lakh, and despatch it to Banda and Calpee. At the same time, the Collectors of Bareilly, Allypore, Seharunpore, Meerut, and Moradabad received instructions to purchase supplies, each to the extent of half a lakh, and to furnish Allahabad and Cawnpore with the grain as quickly as possible. The Board considered that they were safe in issuing these orders, as a comparison of prices made it apparent that there was no chance of a deficiency in the districts which were chosen to export.

**55. Further particulars about Bundelcund.**—A Minute recorded by Mr. Newnham, Officiating Member of the Board, on January the 18th, 1820, gives incidentally further information about Bundelcund. The Khureef of 1819 failed extensively, and frost nipped the spring crops in the beginning of 1820. The people were the less able to bear the loss, as they had been subject to indifferent seasons for the two preceding years. During this continued period of drought they had struggled manfully against adversity, and had shown a disposition to fulfil their engagements to Government at any cost to themselves. This constituted one reason for the prosperous state of the finances, whilst another was the unparalleled speculation in cotton, which had made the prices of that article so high as to preclude the Board, despite the prevailing want, from buying seed for distribution. It was natural that, under such a stimulus, the ryots should devote all their energies to the more remunerative crop.

But with the increase in cotton cultivation, the production of grain fell off. When, therefore, drought befell the land, there were no stores on which the inhabitants could rely, and, till Government set the example of exporting, the district fared badly for the means of subsistence.

**56. Mr. Waring's Settlement in 1816 helped to increase the Distress in Bundelcund.**—Nature, however, was not altogether to blame for the misfortunes of Bundelcund. For the ten years subsequent to 1806, when our rule first commenced in this part of the country, "the administration," says Mr. William Muir in his report\* on the settlement of the Calpee Pergunnahs, "would appear to have been just and equitable. The forbearance and happy arrangements of Government appear to have had their full effect in developing the resources of the country. We can conceive what an impulse must have been given to its onward progress from the combination of security and peace with a moderate and just assessment. We have it also on the authority of Mr. Waring that the Government expenditure in the district exceeded at this period the revenue received into the treasury—a circumstance which should not be overlooked in considering the enormous increase which was soon after demanded. In 1816, or the Fuslee year 1223—an era memorable in Bundelcund—a new settlement was made by Mr. Collector Waring. It raised at once the revenue of Humeerpore by three lakhs and a quarter. And here, again, I am compelled to state that, while the jumma of the other pergunnahs was increased by 33 per cent., that of Koonch was raised only 14. If so large an increase was in the one case demandable, it follows that on the other there was a strange dereliction of the duty we were bound by to improve the revenues of so important a trust. The truth, however, is that no course more favourable to the real interests of the pergunnah could have been adopted than the one unintentionally pursued by Mr. Waring; the assessment of that time has continued unchanged, and the result is a proof of the prosperity which similar treatment would have secured in the other pergunnahs. It may reasonably be enquired in what manner such an unparalleled enhancement of the revenue was procured. The answer is simple. The prosperity occasioned by favourable years and moderation of demand had so improved the aspect of this country that men began to think its resources inexhaustible. A crowd of speculators, who looked only at the extent of the fallow land, and took for granted the continuance of the same auspicious seasons, fancied they could see a source of great gain in contracting even at so enormous an increase. Trusting to these or some such fallacious grounds, there was no bound to their mad competition. Mr. Waring himself seized at every circumstance which could warrant the imposition of an increase, and rarely failed to adopt, often to exceed, the highest estimate of the Tehseeldar and Canoongoe. The good name of those officers was made to depend on the highness of their 'douls' and 'nuzzerandazes,' upon which the settlement was based; and we may conceive of what nature those statements must have been when the Tehseeldar of Calpee was dismissed from his appointment for submitting too low an estimate, and the Tehseeldar of Jelalpore was turned out of the Collector's camp with indignity because he failed to procure a farming offer sufficiently high. Surrounded by a band of capitalists, the unfortunate zemindar well knew that, if he refused the Collector's offer, his estate would be instantly snatched from his hands. Mr. Waring could have had no stronger proof of the injustice of his settlement than that, with this prospect before their eyes, the proprietors† of one hundred and seventy-eight villages, rather than accede to his

\* See Reports on the Revenue Settlement of the North-Western Provinces, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 820-21, paras. 19-24.

† In consequence of the notification, made in Section 2 of Regulation IX. of 1818, that proprietors not willing to hold their lands under the proposed new settlement must intimate the same to the Collector before July 1st, 1819, the proprietors of 331 estates in Bundelcund paying an aggregate jumma of Rs. 8,68,168, and of 87 estates in Calpee paying Rs. 1,95,463, had sent in their resignations. The assessment for the whole district then was Rs. 37,36,641. There were also 239 estates in farm, with a yearly jumma of Rs. 4,37,663. (See Mr. Newnham's Minute, above mentioned.)



“ terms, allowed them to be let in farm. It would be useless to recount the more  
 “ immediate miseries attendant on this settlement—the sickening detail of absconded  
 “ zemindars, who, according to Mr. Waring, fled only because the real value of their  
 “ estates was beginning to come to light; or of desolated villages whose lands, it was  
 “ said, were thrown out of cultivation merely to procure a decrease of assessment.  
 “ Suffice it to say that Mr. Waring entered with most sanguine expectations on the  
 “ cultivation, from Government resources, of several of these deserted estates; but his  
 “ eyes appear at last to have been opened, and in his final letter he acknowledges that  
 “ his experiment had completely failed. Had he remained, it is most probable that he  
 “ would have acted upon this acknowledgment; but he almost immediately left the  
 “ district, and the flattering reports submitted by most of his successors could not fail to  
 “ set him at ease when in a superior position he had it in his power to have effected a  
 “ revision.”

**57. Probable extent of the dearth, and date of its termination.—**

The returns for 1820, up to July the 15th, show a net increase amounting altogether to Rs. 3,60,229 over the receipts of the corresponding period of 1819. All districts but three shared in the improvement of the revenue. Those in which there was a diminution were—

					Rs.
Cawnpore,	...	...	...	...	44,919
Banda,	..	...	...	...	39,035
Calpee,	...	...	...	...	35,060
Total,					1,19,014

This falling off is attributed in the Board's letter which explains the details of the statement to the “ failure of the Khureef harvest.” As this letter is dated August the 15th, 1820, and no mention is made of deficiency in the Rubbee, I gather that the scarcity ceased with the cold weather of 1819-20, and extended only to Allahabad, Cawnpore, Calpee, and Banda, and that of these four the two latter districts were most severely affected. The rain-fall in this year is said to have been plentiful.

**58. Severe Drought in 1824-25 in the Delhi Territory, Meerut, and Seharunpore.—**During the season of 1824-25 the weather was so unpropitious in the Delhi Territory that the balances, which had amounted to Rs. 1,83,133 only on a demand of Rs. 26,87,643 in the preceding year, increased to Rs. 10,59,212 on a demand of Rs. 28,72,272. So severe was the effect of the drought in the Northern Division, that the Governor-General granted a remission of the whole year's revenue. In the Western Division the distress is said to have been considerable also. Further particulars than these I have not been able to obtain, and indeed this information is only given incidentally in a letter from the Board which accompanied the yearly returns transmitted to the Government at Fort William. I gather from some remarks in a correspondence, which I shall notice at greater length presently, that Seharunpore and Meerut were suffering from want of rain at the same time.

**59. Drought of 1825-26. Area over which it prevailed.—**A year later, drought had pervaded the whole of the territories then known as the Western Provinces. This designation comprehended all the districts above Cawnpore \*—to wit, Etawah (including Mynpoory), Furruckabad, Shahjehanpore, Pillibheet, Bareilly, Suheswan (Budaon), Moradabad (including Bijour), Seharunpore, Mozuffernuggur, Meerut, Boolundshuhur, Allygurh, Saidabad (Muttra), and Agra. To the unkindliness of the season must be added another cause for the deficiency of the crops. The existing settlement was on the point of expiring, and the landholders, in conformity with the practice which they had found so advantageous before, were lessening the cultivation on their estates and rack-renting their tenants unmercifully, in the hope of a reduc-

\* The Proceedings of the period relate to these districts only.

tion of jumma on re-engagement. These two circumstances combined to render Government so anxious that on the 22nd of December the Board were instructed to enquire from all Collectors what had been the loss on the Khureef, and what was the chance of the Rubbee proving equal to the average of ordinary years. A circular to this effect was accordingly issued on the 12th of January.

**60. Reports from Collectors. Pilibheet.**—On the 21st of January, Mr. G. F. France, the Sub-Collector of Pilibheet, replied that rain had fallen without intermission for many hours, though at the time he wrote there was no prospect of more. The earth had been so thoroughly moistened that it was quite fit to receive the seed for the Rubbee. Five days earlier his account had been much more gloomy. “The malgoozars,” he wrote, “are so cast down by the want of rain that they are neglecting their interests. I have received innumerable petitions from the most respectable farmers, soliciting me to take the whole produce of their estates, and to realize what ever is obtainable from the sale of any private property they may possess; after which to allow the balances to lie over till next year, for the due payment of which they offer the best security.”

**61. Furruckabad.**—On the 21st of January, Mr. H. Newnham, Collector of Furruckabad, reported that the failure of rain had been much greater in his district during the last autumn than in 1803. In the neighbourhood of the Sudder station only one shower had been vouchsafed in the early part of the season, and in every village large patches of land, though broken up with the plough, remained unsown. In the Tehseeldarees of Taligram and Aligunj the rain had affected one village and not another. The Khureef crops, with the exception of the cotton, had perished. No pressure had so far been needful to enable the Collector to realize the Government dues, for the malgoozars had been exerting themselves bravely; but their labour was often in vain, for, even when wells were at hand, the high winds which prevailed dried up the soil almost as soon as it was watered. On the 6th of March, Mr. Newnham wrote that all hope of the Mahawut, or cold-weather rain, was gone. On this the people had staked the last chance of the Rubbee. If rain came now, it would involve hail, and that would make the cultivators worse off still. The only benefit that it could possibly bring would be to forward the growth of the sugar-cane and revive the drooping cattle. “With an accurate knowledge, due to a recent tour through the district,” he adds, “I think I can speak with some degree of certainty on the season. A line drawn from Mohamedabad to the Ganges, inclining Westward, nearly divides the district into two equal portions. To the West of this line are situated the Tehseeldarees of Shumsabad and Uzumnuggur. A close inspection of the Urhur crops which are not watered affords some criterion of the comparative extent of drought, and, generally speaking, they are good in this direction. The reason is, the rain in July was more abundant, and some showers in October materially assisted the cultivation of the Rubbee. The labour and exertion to secure a crop has been wonderful, and wells have been dug wherever the soil admitted, although many have failed. Price, as demonstrating the quantity of produce, is generally referred to by the zemindars, who seem of opinion that the present rates are much too low for the deficient quantity of grain produced in the Khureef or expected from the Rubbee. The cause of this comparative cheapness I cannot learn. Cotton has latterly fallen in the market, and many are of opinion that a scarcity of money has operated equally with increased produce. In the portion of the district to the East of the line above described the drought is excessive, the rain in July having been very light, and not a shower has fallen since that time to the date of this letter. Around the city of Furruckabad and Futtehghurh, where irrigation from wells was possible, the same industry and exertion has been exemplified, but with some diminished success, as the crops are lighter. In this tract the revenue will, I hope, be realized. Further Eastward, throughout a part of Pergunnah Bhojepore and the whole of Pergunnah Chupramow, Sowruck, Beewur, and Taligram, the scene calls for commiseration. A simple fact may possibly

" elucidate more than argument. About the 10th February, 1825, I was encamped  
 " at a large village called Oomraen, on the banks of an extensive jheel, which was  
 " then covered with water-fowl, and, I guess, of a depth varying from three to four  
 " feet. I visited the same spot in last month, and found the same jheel had been  
 " ploughed in October, but much of it, and particularly the deep part, remained unsown,  
 " and the seed had not vegetated where the trial had been made. The whole tract of  
 " country between the Rivers Kalae Nuddee and Eesun, with exception of the few  
 " villages which possess wells, presented the same picture. The cultivation always  
 " depended on the irrigation afforded by jheels (or, indeed, I might call them lakes),  
 " and these resources, which had in many spots never been known to be dry in the  
 " hot winds, were this year without water in the rains. I visited several such spots,  
 " and saw with my own eyes the failure and its consequence. In this tract, wells very  
 " generally fail, from the under-stratum being a quicksand called seelwah. To attempt  
 " to estimate the crop in this direction would be useless. In a very great many villages,  
 " there can scarcely be said to be any crop, and what may be produced will not  
 " be sufficient for the food of the inhabitants. In the very finest villages, possessing  
 " wells and cultivated by Koormees, the sugar-cane has not yielded an average, as its  
 " growth has been impeded. The Rubbee, notwithstanding the labour and exertion  
 " bestowed on it, promised to be exceedingly light; and the Urhur, to which I refer  
 " as proof, was scarcely anywhere three feet high, and had generally dried up. The  
 " Pergunnahs of Kunnonj and Bilhour, in Cawnpore, are said to be in a similar  
 " condition. Under such circumstances, I know not how to estimate the produce,  
 " though I would hazard the opinion that the crop will not be two-fifths of an  
 " average one, and the produce will be equally influenced by the market rates, as  
 " before noticed. The scene of general distress and poverty which I observed is  
 " beyond my ability to describe. The villagers constantly declared that they were  
 " without food and in despair. The zemindars urgently solicited me to look at their  
 " lands, and some, quite forgetful of the usual respect, actually seized my horse's  
 " reins, and attempted to force me to contemplate their sterile fields, although I had  
 " no reason to doubt their representations. Here and there I could not fail to  
 " observe the smoke of the charcoal pit, and at other spots the sawyers at work on the  
 " mangoe-trees, which had been sold and felled, as one resource of realizing funds to  
 " discharge the Government demand. This fact I believe to be sufficiently demon-  
 " strative of the season, and, if another be wanting, I could add that, on a transfer of  
 " a village, the tenant outgoing affirmed that out of Rs. 400 paid to Government he  
 " has received only Rs. 75 from his ryots—an assertion which the new tenant  
 " appeared to admit as correct, and promised to reimburse. Satisfied, therefore,  
 " that relief must be granted to the suffering villages, I request the permission of the  
 " Board and Government to some measure for this purpose. To agitate remissions or  
 " suspensions without due consideration and sanction would only involve me in great  
 " responsibility; to apportion them at once would be impossible. The general line  
 " I would recommend would be to collect according to the year's produce for  
 " the Government share, from the villages which are destitute of wells, and the soil  
 " of which is bhoor or sand, and to press the more productive villages for the full  
 " liquidation of the revenue. The good lands, though paying high rates, form indeed  
 " the security of the revenue, and repay the cultivator in a course of years. Profit  
 " from the inferior soils is always problematical, and I cannot ascertain the calculation  
 " on which they are broken up. This year there is an entire loss of seed and labour  
 " in the latter, and the cultivator has besides to maintain himself and cattle for a  
 " whole year. In some cases this procedure may lead to almost an entire relinquish-  
 " ment of the revenue, and in others to one-half. The better villages which have  
 " produce may be secured in a great measure by the price of grain, which must,  
 " I think, rise. The enquiry is difficult, and some abuses may occur. These may be  
 " in a great degree prevented by a reservation declaring the final adjustment to  
 " depend on the revised settlement now in progress, which forces into notice the

“operations of past time, and will enable a Collector to satisfy himself that the ryots obtained the relief.”

**62. Agra.**—On the 24th of January, Mr. James Fraser, Collector of Agra, gave it as his opinion that in all probability the revenue would fall very much short of the average, not only on account of the want of rain in proper season, but also by reason of the large army assembled on the frontier.

**63. Shahjehanpore.**—On January 26th, Mr. A. Campbell, Collector of Shahjehanpore, gave the tidings that the crops were in a singularly unflourishing condition. He had just concluded a tour through his district, and could vouch for the sterile appearance of the fields, so different from the luxuriance of former years. The malgoozars had behaved well as a rule, but only in the Terai was there a chance of anything like an adequate return for labour. On the Bhoor lands the crops were completely withered, and sugar-cane, the refuge for the destitute in other districts, was here a failure to the extent of at least one-third. A frost during the cold weather had blighted the Urhur. The wheat and gram had not attained half their ordinary height, and the grain would not form in the ear. Hot winds were blowing incessantly. The Collector estimated the loss at about one-third of an ordinary year's yield.

**64. Moradabad.**—On the 26th of January, Mr. A. N. Forde, the Collector of Moradabad, announced that no rain had fallen in his district since the beginning of September, but that though the Khureef had failed the malgoozars had been saved by the proceeds of their cotton and sugar-cane, from both of which the yield was good. The seed for the Rubbee had been widely sown in the ploughed land, but the Khureef grounds, which would have given a second crop in ordinary seasons, lay fallow. Prices had risen, but the poor were not actually starving as yet.

On the 6th of March, Mr. N. J. Halhed reported of the northern division of Moradabad that the Rubbee was so thin and unpromising that he expected on account of it alone a loss of one quarter of the year's revenue. A field near the tent in which he was writing, though of five pukka beegahs in size, was expected only to yield four maunds! This was a fair sample of all unirrigated land in the district. In the Tehseeldarees of Nugeena, Bijnour, and Shercote, the Khadir of the Ramgunga and the Ganges was giving some return; but nowhere else was there a vestige of a crop. The condition of Thakoordwara was very bad. Chandpore had suffered less, because it had escaped its usual inundation from the river. In Bazpore the loss was expected to be trifling, but in Kasheepore and Jusspore it would be heavy. The agricultural classes were enduring great privations, though corn had been imported largely for their consumption from Kumaon and Gurhwal. The grain sold by the merchants was the refuse of old pits. Many persons had been existing on the washings of the sugar cauldrons boiled up with cotton-seeds, whilst the buthooa, a vegetable which is only eaten in very hard times, was eagerly sought after. Such improper food had naturally caused many deaths. The Collector deprecated any present publication of Government's intention to remit, as likely to make the people less reliant on themselves.

**65. Bareilly.**—On January the 29th, Mr. S. M. Boulderson, the Collector of Bareilly, answered the questions put to him by saying that the Khureef had failed throughout the district, and had been even worse than the Rubbee threatened to be. As for the latter crop, he did not anticipate an out-turn of more than two-thirds, or perhaps three-fourths, of the produce of ordinary seasons; and in this estimate he was confirmed by the general opinion of those natives whom he had consulted. The Government would not suffer a greater loss, he thought, than two annas in the rupee. Where irrigation was possible, the yield would be fair, and the high prices which prevailed would secure large profits to the proprietors; but where the ground was sandy, and destitute of wells or streams, it was probable that it would not return even the cost of the seed.

In another letter, dated the 15th of March, the Collector represented that, as no rain had fallen in the interval, prospects were worse. He therefore urged the policy of postponing a portion of the jumma, equivalent to two or three annas in the rupee, in the case of all who would promise to continue their existing engagements, and repay the deferred instalments in future years with interest. He advocated a speedy declaration of Government's intentions, as the rumours which prevailed were unsettling the minds of the people, and tended to make them less energetic than they should be.

**66. Seharunpore.**—On February the 1st, Mr. M. Moore, Collector of Seharunpore, reported that the Khureef had failed, and that there was every probability of the Rubbee falling short of the produce of the last or any former year.

On the 7th of April, Mr. Fraser, the Second Member of the Board, wrote thus of his experience here and in Allygurh:—"In many places women and children were begging in considerable numbers—not common, every-day beggars, but people who had before been supported on their own labour. Great numbers have crossed the Jumna and gone to the West, where the season has been most favourable. If it had not been for supplies of grain from that quarter, a more general emigration would have taken place."

**67. Meerut.**—On the 11th of February, Mr. R. C. Glyn, Acting Collector of Meerut, reported the result of a tour which he had just made in his district, where drought had prevailed for two years past, to the detriment of two successive autumnal harvests. The usual rain required for the Rubbee had not fallen in any part of the zillah. The crops in the Khadir of the Ganges and the Jumna had been kept alive by the inherent moisture of the soil, but in other parts there were no signs of any vegetation, except in the neighbourhood of wells, and even the irrigated crops had been deteriorated by the West winds. There was little provender either for man or beast, and already grain was being imported from the other side of the Jumna into the markets of Baughput and Shamlee. But this did not avail much, for the prices of imported food were too high for the poorer classes of zemindars and village labourers, who were subsisting chiefly on roots and berries, and could only allow themselves the occasional luxury of a handful of meal. Wheat was selling at 25 seers for the rupee, and sugar-cane at 20. The least distressed of the agricultural classes were the Jats, whose industry still enabled them to keep the wolf from the door. Under existing circumstances, the Collector estimated the loss to Government at two lakhs, out of a total jumma of Rs. 15,14,223.

**68. Suheswan (Budaon).**—On the 22nd of February, Mr. H. Sweetenham, the Collector of Suheswan, wrote that he estimated the loss from the drought at one-third of the average produce of the district, and that the balance would in June amount to Rs. 30,000, which sum he might with luck reduce to Rs. 18,000 by the close of the official year. Pergunnahs Ooseith, Suleimpore, Morareh, Sorund, and Islamnuggur had suffered most.

**69. Belah (Etawah).**—On the 24th of February, Mr. C. B. Elliott, Sub-Collector of Belah, intimated that in Talooqua Tirwa he feared there would be a balance of some Rs. 6,000. In the other pergunnahs under his jurisdiction he hoped to be able to realize the revenue, with the exception perhaps of a few hundred rupees.

**70. Allygurh.**—Mr. W. J. Hardinge, the Collector of Allygurh, writing on March the 8th, represented that the last Khureef was very poor, and had caused great loss to the zemindars. They had not been blessed with a shower for the last six months, and many of the ryots had left their homes. The consequence was that the cultivation of the Rubbee had much decreased—to the extent over the whole district, he estimated, of at least 8,000 beegahs. The crops on the irrigated lands looked flourishing, but the fields not under the influence of wells gave no room for hope of a tolerable harvest. The Collector expected to realize the revenue, but the task would, in his opinion, be a difficult one.

**71. Sirpoorah.**—On the 22nd of March, Mr. T. J. Turner, the Sub-Collector of Sirpoorah, the pergunnahs of which are now merged in Etah and Furruckabad, estimated the deficiency in the Rubbee at one-third of a common season's yield, and quoted as an instance of an ordinary year that very 1232 Fuslee (1824-25 A. D.) which I have already shown was in districts higher up a period of drought. The Tehseeldaree of Sukhrawur, which, from its light sandy soil, precluded the digging of kutchha wells, suffered most. Pergunnahs Nidhpore, Oolai, and Putialee, from their surface being lower, had the benefit of partial inundations from the Ganges. Sukhet, Etah, Koraalee, and Marehra, all had their full share of adversity.

**72. Boolundshuhur.**—On March the 29th, Mr. R. Lowther, Collector of Boolundshuhur, informed the Board that all the pergunnahs to the West, Secunderabad and Tilbegumpore excepted, had suffered severely, and that so unfavourable a season both for Khureef and Rubbee had not been known for many years past. In September there was very little rain, and in December and January none; so that the seed had no chance of germinating. The consequence was that the crops had not attained half their proper height. Having been an eye-witness himself of the desolation which he described, he could safely recommend for the indulgence of Government the agricultural communities of Dadree, Shuckurpore, Dunkour, and Kasnah, in particular. For the whole district a suspension of at least Rs. 26,500 would be needful.

**73. Saidabad (Muttra).**—On the 7th of April, Mr. R. H. Boddam, Collector of Saidabad, forwarded returns of the Rubbee crops for the year, as contrasted with the produce for the same period of the preceding year. The comparison stands thus:—

<i>Produce of 1232 Fuslee.</i>	<i>Produce of 1233 Fuslee.</i>	<i>Decrease.</i>
Maunds.	Maunds.	Maunds.
12,97,094	10,88,745	2,08,349

Mahabun and Julleysur were the pergunnahs in which the decrease was greatest.

**74. Etawah.**—On April 8th, Mr. H. T. Owen, Collector of Etawah, sent in his report, which was to the effect that the drought had been variable in his district. Some villages had wholly escaped its influence, others had not a blade of grass or a stalk of any kind remaining. He desired no close enquiry into the state of the people till the crops had been cut, as the zemindars would undoubtedly take advantage thereof, and keep back their instalments; whilst if he called on the Tehseeldars to declare the damage done in the villages of their respective pergunnahs, he would infallibly be opening the door to partiality and corruption.

**75. Mozuffernugger.**—On April 12th, Mr. H. Dundas, Sub-Collector of Mozuffernugger, replied to the Board's Circular that the scantiness of the crops in his district, especially in the Bangur lands, was notorious. Before all hope of the cold-weather rain had passed away, the Tehseeldars had reckoned the probable amount of balances at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  annas in the rupee on the whole jumma; but, with the additional knowledge that he had since gained, the Sub-Collector thought this estimate much below the truth.

**76. Action taken by Government.**—As quickly as the reports were received, the Board transmitted them to Government, and on the information which had reached the Governor-General in Calcutta by the 13th of April the following order was issued:—

"His Lordship in Council authorizes your Board to direct the Collectors under your authority to suspend one-fourth of the demand of the current Fuslee year in all cases in which they may have reason to believe that the malgoozars are not able to discharge more than three-fourths of the jumma out of the produce of their lands. It will of course be competent to the Collectors to suspend any less proportion of the jumma than that above stated, and as different estates must have suffered in different degrees, it is necessary to leave a considerable discretion to the Collectors. They must in each case fix the amount of suspension to be granted, under such general instructions as you may furnish them with. They must not leave the determination of the matter to any of their native officers. They must be careful that the extent of the indulgence granted is fully made known to the malgoozars and under-tenants, and it must be required of the former that they engage to extend a like indulgence to the latter."

The advances that were made during May, June, and July, for the sake of the ensuing Khureef cultivation, were large. Sirpoorah received Rs. 3,500, Moradabad Rs. 42,000 (in addition to a previous grant of Rs. 28,000 for sugar-cane), Meerut, Rs. 50,000, and Etawah Rs. 17,715. Besides what has been put on record, it is probable that other districts, concerning which no special mention is made in connection with Tuccavee, received loans in proportion to their wants.

**77. Revenue Returns for the Period of Scarcity.**—After so unanimous a testimony to the distress of the Western Provinces, and after so liberal a measure of relief had been conceded by the Government, it would have been natural to expect large and frequent suspensions. Nothing of the sort, however, seems to have happened. To judge by the statistics of the period, the country was never more prosperous. In 1824-25 (May 1st to April 30th), after deducting authorized remissions of Rs. 6,496, and subsequent collections to June the 30th, there was only a net balance of Rs. 1,06,528, and this sum included Rs. 36,252, arrears for Kumaon. The following table shows the condition of the revenue for the two following years. The accounts of Kumaon are comprehended in the returns.

	Total Jumma.	Collections.	Remissions.	Suspensions.	Collected to June 30th.	Balance on July 1st.
1825-26,	1,83,12,045	1,72,40,167	2,841	440	*10,69,036	1,53,570
1826-27,	1,87,91,609	1,79,95,287	30,117	13,127	3,69,668	3,83,430

Of the Rs. 30,117 remitted in 1826-27,† Rs. 22,260 were for Pilibheest, and Rs. 8,046 for Etawah. Of the suspensions for this year, Rs. 1,324 were for Agra, Rs. 1,058 for Etawah, and Rs. 11,336 for Furruckabad. Further than 1826-27 I do not think it would be safe to go in estimating the effect of this drought on revenue. Certainly the contrast between the reports and the relief is most striking. In July the apprehension of further ill seems to have departed with the advent of rain. Concerning the prices during this period, I can only learn that the average of wheat in Cawnpore, Allygurh, and Agra, was about 20 seers for the rupee.

**78. Scarcity in the Saugor and Nerbudda Territory in 1827.**—During the spring of 1827, many parts of the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, and specially the Districts of Jubbulpore, Nursingpore, Hoshungabad, and Seonee, suffered from scarcity.‡ Blight destroyed much of the wheat in February and March, and at the end of the latter month and the beginning of April came a succession of hail-storms which beat down the standing crops, whilst heavy rain, alternating with the hail, did great damage to the corn that was reaped, but not stored, by causing it to swell and germinate. A report was at once forwarded to the Government, but, in the absence of detailed statements, the Governor-General's Agent could not give any idea of the loss that had been entailed. He intimated that, by way of immediate relief, he had directed his assistants to suspend the demand of all sums on account of rent which they might find on enquiry would ultimately require to be recommended for remission. This policy the Government highly approved of. I have not been able to ascertain from any source what was the amount of the sums abandoned. The volumes of the Sudder Board which should have contained the returns of this year were, I learn from the record-keeper, lost in the Mutiny.

**79. Scarcity beyond the Jumna in 1827-28.**—The autumn of 1827 and the following spring were marked by drought across the Jumna. In Pergunnahs

\* Some of the later collections were probably, as often happened in these days, in anticipation of coming kiats; otherwise the excess of collections, remissions, suspensions, and balances, when added together, over the demand, is unaccountable.

† New Furruckabad Rupees.

‡ The information contained in this and the succeeding paragraph is chiefly drawn from the papers supplied by the Record Commission.

Raneea and Sirsa, where the water lies further below the surface than in other parts of Hissar, and where consequently wells are few and costly, the rains commenced auspiciously, but stopped abruptly early in July, and did not begin again till the 22nd of September. It was then too late to retrieve the mischief which the drought had already caused. To add to the general distress, there was every chance of a failure in the wheat. This was the staple Rubbee crop in these regions, and its success was mainly dependent on the River Ghuggur overflowing its banks. On the present occasion the usual inundation did not occur. It had fared even worse with Government than with private cultivators. By the death of the Bhuttee Chief, Zabita Khan, the Kusbah of Raneea and some villages adjoining had, in the absence of fit persons coming forward to engage, been taken into kham management, and the result of the spring's out-turn was that Government realized Rs. 3,644 on account of rent, in the place of Rs. 19,800, the jumma paid by Zabita Khan as farmer in the previous year. In Pergunnah Bawana the Khureef was so much under the average that a remission of 10 per cent. was granted. Pergunnahs Hansee, Hissar, and Sewanee are also said to have suffered, but to what extent there is nothing in the correspondence to show. The loss to Government, so far as it is recorded, was as follows:—

	<i>Jumma.</i>		
Remissions to the proprietors of 15 villages in Pergunnah Raneea, ... ..	Rs.	9,893, out of	Rs. 23,165
Losses by estates under kham management in Pergunnah Raneea, ... ..	,,	15,656	,, ,, 19,300
Remissions to proprietors of 34 villages in Pergunnah Bawana, ... ..	,,	2,089	,, ,, 20,898
		<hr/>	<hr/>
	,,	27,638	,, ,, 63,363
		<hr/>	<hr/>

**80. Distress in Rohtuck, the Delhi Territory, and Ajmere, during 1832-33.**—The Punjab appears to have suffered again in 1832-33, but the information concerning the events of that period is very scanty. Rohtuck and the Western division of the Delhi territory were the parts principally affected, and in the case of the former suspensions had to be made, whilst in the latter a total remission was sanctioned. The drought was not so extreme as to deprive the cattle of pasture, and therefore when rain did fall, the cultivators were able to repair their disasters more quickly. The famine extended on this occasion also to Ajmere, which had now been some years under British rule. It is said that not a single shower fell during 1832. Fodder for the cattle was even more difficult to procure than grain, of which providentially small quantities remained in store. Many of the Mairs either resorted to plunder, or fled to Malwa in hopes of obtaining a livelihood. So great was the loss in population and in cattle that the improvements which had already been begun were brought to a stand for want of proper labour and means of transport, and several years were required before the country recovered its former state of prosperity. The remission of Rs. 92,024 which was sanctioned must have in fact been a relinquishment of all, or nearly all, the year's income, for in 1835-36 the jumma on the whole district only amounted to Rs. 96,805.

**81. Famine in Cawnpore, Bundelcund, and Ajmere, during 1833-34.**—The drought of 1833-34 was most severely felt in the Bundelcund Division and in the southern pergunnahs of Cawnpore. In the latter district, the Khureef\* crop was a total failure. In the pergunnahs bordering on the Ganges the Rubbee was good, owing to the facilities for irrigation; but in Bhogneepore and the neighbourhood of the Jumna there was no harvest worth speaking of, either in the autumn or spring; and, though the greater part of the Government demand was realized, "it is to be

\* See Mr. Rose's Settlement Report on Cawnpore, paragraph 49.



“feared,” writes Mr. Rose, “that all the profits which the poor people had for years accumulated were forced into the Government treasury.” The remissions on account of unfavourable weather were Rs. 33,245, and of this sum

Rs. 21,525 were abandoned for Bhogneepore.

„ 5,900	„	„	Ghatumpore.
„ 1,400	„	„	Akburpore.

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Rs. 28,825

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Here, as elsewhere, over-assessment had its share in impoverishing the people. The sums which were ordered to be written off about this time as irrecoverable balances of land revenue and tuccavee, and also the sums abandoned on account of balances designated nominal, being the difference between former and revised assessments, were enormous. It will be remembered what a fatal policy Mr. Waring had pursued in his settlement of Bundelcund. His successor, Mr. Valpy, who superintended the settlements of 1821 and 1826, seems to have had equally erroneous views concerning the zemindars' ability to pay higher rates, and taxed them most ruthlessly. Balances increased as a matter of course. In the Pergunnahs of Calpee, Humeerpore, Julalpore, and Koonch, they rose from an average of Rs. 2,760, which amount they never exceeded previously to 1806, to an average of Rs. 5,535 in the first settlement, Rs. 16,001 in the second settlement, and Rs. 30,300 in the third settlement.\* The Eastern pergunnahs of Humeerpore had suffered from a bad season in 1829-30, of the results of which all we know is that the balances† were very heavy. A new settlement was then in progress, and the number of resigned estates for which relief had to be given was estimated at “far more than half the whole number.” The relaxation which was afforded was based on no regular system, and consequently, on the occasion of the next settlement in 1835-36, the proportion of persons still unwilling to engage was very large. Meanwhile drought had intervened, and caused unparalleled distress to the people and loss to the Government. Famine, pestilence, and emigration deprived the district of half its population. Whilst in other districts crime stood generally at or below the average of former years, it here showed a marked increase. Up to the 25th of May, 1834, Rs. 1,106, out of Rs. 1,900 set aside for this purpose, had been expended by Government for the support of the destitute,—Rath, Punwaree, Koonch, Humeerpore, and Jelalpore being the pergunnahs where the outlay was largest. By the end of November, Rs. 20,150 had been spent on account of relief throughout the whole of the Bundelcund Division, and this sum did not include private subscriptions, of the amount of which no mention is made. In the Calpee Pergunnahs frequent alienations of property occurred, and the villages became rapidly deserted. Of about 75,000 houses in the district, it is said‡ that 38,000 were abandoned. In Ajmere the drought still continued, and Mr. Edmonstone, who was deputed in 1835 to make a settlement of the Khalsa villages, represented the folly of such a proceeding, as, owing to the previous season's (*i. e.*, 1833-34) drought, the state of the district and its inhabitants was such that a correct knowledge of the resources of the land could not be procured. In the Jubbulpore districts there were remitted on account of inclemency of season Rs. 93,897, and in Meerut Rs. 921. The balances on the whole year's demand throughout the provinces (exclusively of Ajmere) were Rs. 66,70,556, and the remissions Rs. 1,19,922.

**82. Condition of the Revenue between 1832 and 1837.**—The following abstract shows the condition of the revenue for the Western Provinces and the Delhi

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\* See Mr. W. Muir's Settlement Report of the Calpee Pergunnahs, paragraph 27.

† See Mr. Allen's Settlement Report of Humeerpore, paragraph 42.

‡ See Mr. W. Muir's Report, paragraph 29.

Territory up to the time when the famine became general. It has been compiled from the Board's annual statements of demands, collections, and remissions:—

Year.		Demands.	Collections.	Authorized Remissions.	Net Balance on April 30th.
		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1832-33,	...	3,70,38,215	3,29,62,264	37,234	40,38,717
1833-34,	...	3,77,28,757	3,09,38,279	1,19,922	66,70,556
1834-35,	...	4,10,08,174	3,53,20,975	1,29,893	55,57,306
1835-36,	...	3,92,18,591	3,53,93,646	1,97,066	36,27,879
1836-37,	...	4,06,70,832	3,70,42,105	2,17,917	34,10,810

The details of each district are not given as formerly, but from a later volume\* I have been able to ascertain that some of the balances which remained in 1835-36 and in 1836-37 were subsequently written off. For the former year there were remitted in 1245 Fuslee (1837-38)—

				Rs.
For the Meerut	Division,	...	...	77,813
„ Agra	„	...	...	5,729
„ Allahabad	„	...	...	3,495
„ Benares	„	...	...	4,167
„ Saugor and Nerbudda,		...	...	18,383
„ Delhi Division,		...	...	959
Total,				1,10,546

For 1836-37 there were remitted in the same year—

For the Meerut	Division,	...	...	1,21,207
„ Agra	„	...	...	18,786
„ Rohilound	„	...	...	740
„ Allahabad	„	...	...	4,55,367
„ Benares	„	...	...	10,330
„ Saugor and Nerbudda,		...	...	23,906
„ Delhi Division,	...	...	...	1,27,205
Total,				7,57,541

The remissions to the Delhi Division were thus distributed:—

Delhi,	...	...	...	7,222
Goorgaon,	...	...	...	60,975
Paneeput,	...	...	...	1,693
Hissar,	...	...	...	22,630
Rohtuck,	...	...	...	7,335
Bhutteeana,	...	...	...	27,350
Total,				1,27,205

Of the remissions allowed to the Allahabad Division, Banda absorbed Rs. 4,53,386; Mozuffernugger appropriated Rs. 36,131, and Seharunpore the remainder—namely, Rs. 85,076—of the remissions granted to the Meerut Division. On what grounds Government relinquished these sums I have not been able to ascertain, but, knowing as we do that great irregularity of season preceded the crisis of 1837-38, there is good reason to believe that drought is answerable for the greater part of the loss.

\* Sudder Board's Proceedings for May 6th, 1840.

## SECTION V.

### FAMINE OF 1837-38.

**83. First tokens of a general Famine.**—During the season of 1837-38 the misfortunes of the North-West reached their height. So far, though there had been a succession of indifferent seasons since 1832, distress had been strictly local, for only a small tract of country at a time had been reduced to extremities for want of rain. But in the summer of 1837 there were signs that a famine was looming over the greater part of the Doab and of the Trans-Jumna Pergunnahs. In and about Delhi strong west winds were blowing, and tatties were still in as great request as during April and May. At Meerut the thermometer was standing at 94° in the shade. In Allygurh the bunneeahs would not produce grain, even when payment was offered at their own exorbitant prices, and the ryots could get no advances for seed from the bankers unless they possessed irrigated land. Throughout the Agra District not a drop of rain had fallen up to the end of the month, and wheat was selling at twenty-two seers for the rupee. Boolundshuhur was already being overwhelmed with emigrants from Marwar and Hurrianah. The jails of Mynpoory were filling rapidly, as the destitute peasants became alive to the fact that the commission of some trifling crime would insure them food there at any rate. At Futtehgurh wheat had risen to twelve and a half seers for the rupee. In Bareilly agriculture was said to be at a standstill, and the people were on the point of starvation. Shahjehanpore was the scene of great rioting in consequence of the drought. In Banda the cattle were dying by hundreds, and the price of wheat, which was as high as ten seers for the rupee, limited the consumption to the wealthier classes. At Allahabad the Ganges had only risen eight feet above its lowest level, whilst at the corresponding time in the previous year, late though the rains were in commencing, the rise had been twenty-four feet. Equally gloomy was the prospect beyond the limits of these Provinces. In Gwalior corn was as dear as at Futtehgurh. Sickness and mortality were rife in Behar, and the abnormal state of the weather was blamed as the cause thereof. In Cuttack insufficiency of wholesome food had made cholera prevalent. The pangs of hunger were compelling mothers to dispose of their children, and crowds of persons, the picture of misery and despair, were crawling about the town and the cantonments begging for a mouthful of rice. In Calcutta the tanks were empty, and the grain merchants had doubled their prices within six months.

**84. Partial fall of rain in September. Subsequent disappointment. Attacks upon granaries.**—Such was the state of things during July and August. Then came one of those breaks in the drought which on this as on other occasions only served to induce false hopes. Rain fell in torrents for some hours at Allahabad, and instantly all anxiety concerning famine ceased. The inhabitants of Furruckabad and Shahjehanpore had a similar piece of good fortune, and were equally sanguine about the harvest. The illusion proved short-lived, and people were soon deploring the partial character of the fall and its insufficiency. Between the western boundary of Mynpoory and the eastern limits of Meerut and Delhi scarcely a single shower had been vouchsafed. The utter hopelessness of their case was enough in the minds of the lower classes to justify recourse to violence, and soon in Rohilcund, Allahabad, Allygurh, Agra, Boolundshuhur, Goorgaon, Rohtuck, and Delhi, neither store-houses nor grain-boats were safe from attack, whilst the public roads were dangerous to travellers, owing to the number of armed men who were roaming about in quest of plunder.

**85. Policy of the Local Government and the Board.**—Under these circumstances it was needful to meet force with force, and accordingly the police were

increased in many districts.\* It having come to light, too, that there was an organized system of robbery established along both banks of the Jumna, the Commissioners of Delhi, Meerut, Rohilcund, and Agra were ordered to give protection by convoy or otherwise to all despatches of grain, whether transported by land or water. The signs of the times were too plain to be misunderstood, and both Government and its subordinates were prompt in devising measures of relief. As early as August 17th Mr. R. N. C. Hamilton, the Commissioner of Agra, in answer to a request that he had made, received the sanction of the Board to a plan by which he proposed to set apart an aggregate sum of Rs. 2,000 a month from the Road Funds of the districts within his jurisdiction for the employment of the able-bodied poor. Simultaneously the Commissioners of Meerut and Rohilcund suggested the propriety of large advances to help the ryots in buying seed. To this proposition the Board demurred, for the reason that the chances of the ground yielding any produce this autumn were almost nil. If anywhere the land was still capable of being sown, they thought that seed itself should be distributed, and not money for seed, and that tuccavee should only be granted for the construction or repair of wells. Their desire was to "apply local funds freely on all such lands of a reproductive nature as would be proper objects, supposing that financial arrangements, irrespectively of the particular pressure of famine, had enabled Government to devote public money to such purposes," and that all demands on account of revenue should be suspended for the time being. This was the burden of their instructions to Commissioners. The Lieutenant-Governor on his part authorized a special officer, Captain Drummond, to entertain labourers on the Grand Trunk Road wherever the population was in search of employment and the supervision of Europeans could be relied on. Blankets were distributed amongst the gangs of workmen, and a sum of Rs. 5,000 was allotted to each of the three divisions which the road intersected. Commissioners were empowered to disburse unlimited sums on behalf of any and every one who would give labour in return for food; but gratuitous charity was discountenanced as involving a policy which Government could neither beneficially nor generally pursue. The support of the helpless, it was argued, was incumbent on private, and not on public, benevolence.

**86. The Famine increases in severity.**—Despite all that Government could do or devise, its efforts seemed powerless to arrest the evil. Matters were gradually going from bad to worse. On October the 20th, Mr. John Lawrence wrote from Goorgaon,—“I have never in my life seen such utter desolation as that which is now spread over the Pergunnahs of Horul and Pulwul. The people have been feeding their cattle for the last two months on the leaves of trees, and, since this resource failed, are driving them off.” Under these circumstances, he recommended that the newly-revised settlement should be suspended for a year, as, if brought into operation at once, it would cause enhancement. His proposition was sanctioned immediately. Within the same months came equally disastrous tidings from Calpee, Cawnpore, Furruckabad, Etawah, Agra, Boolundshuhur, and Mynpoory. The people were dying rapidly. The majority of those who survived were emigrating before their strength quite failed them, whilst the few who remained steadfast to their fields were being ruined by the destruction of the seed in the ground and the mortality amongst the cattle. By the end of the year it was evident that the Khureef had failed throughout the whole Doab from Meerut downwards, and, owing to the protracted drought, the Rubbee was in the greatest peril. Nor was the drought confined to the tract between the two rivers: from Shahjehanpore, Pillibheet, Banda, and Humeerpore, and from the Trans-Jumna Pergunnahs of Agra, Muttra, and Allahabad, came reports almost as unfavourable as those from the Doab. Advances were solicited and granted for damming up the streams of the Kutree, the Loriah, and the Kukrah, in Rohilcund; but neither there nor in Goorgaon, where Mr. Lawrence was perpetually giving tuccavee for the construction of wells, did the increased means of irrigation avail to save the people from starvation.

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\* It was reported in November that all was quiet in Delhi, so the extra police establishment was dismissed.

**87. Arrival of Lord Auckland on the scene.**—On the 1st of January, 1838, Lord Auckland assumed charge of the Government of the North-West from Sir Charles Metcalfe at Cawnpore, and went on tour immediately, in order to judge of passing events with his own eyes. It is questionable whether this was a wise course on the whole, for his train of followers was numerous, and consumed one hundred and fifty maunds of grain a day, to say nothing of the fodder required for seven hundred camels and upwards of a hundred elephants. Personal inspection satisfied him that the reports which had reached him of the calamity had been in no way exaggerated. "From Cawnpore to Furruckabad," he wrote to the Court of Directors on the 13th of February, "the agricultural distress and destitution of the people was the subject which most imperiously demanded attention. In a despatch from the General Department, dated the 6th ultimo, a brief allusion was made to the measures which had been adopted with a view to the relief of the people. Amongst others, reference was made to authority which had been granted to the Deputy Collector of Cawnpore to employ the destitute poor at the different Tehseeldarees in the immediate neighbourhood of their residences. I have it in my power at this early period to lay before you a copy of a report on this subject just received demi-officially from Mr. Rose. It will be found as a separate number in this packet. The report explains clearly the mode adopted in affording relief, and establishes in a most melancholy manner the necessity which exists for relief of the soil. Similarly harrowing accounts of famine and distress pour in from Calpee, Agra, Etawah, and Mynpoory. This is the part of the country which has suffered most, and where the largest expenditure is required in order to palliate the evil and prevent the total depopulation of the country by starvation and emigration. The fall in the usual season of the rains last year was unusually late and scanty, and an absolute drought has followed up to the present time, the consequence of which has been that not only has the Khureef crop in these districts entirely failed, but the grass and fodder were also lost. This has led to extensive mortality amongst the cattle, and in some districts nearly all those which have not perished on the spot have been driven off to other parts of the country in order that they might be saved. It has thus happened that great difficulty has been experienced in irrigating the land for the Rubbee crops, and much land which would otherwise have been cultivated has lain waste from this want of means for irrigation. There is every reason to suppose that there is still a large quantity of grain in store in these Provinces, and this is sufficiently shown by the comparatively reasonable price which grain maintains—viz., from ten to sixteen seers the rupee. But still the fields are thrown out of cultivation; the cultivators are unemployed; the merchants can no longer support them when there is no coming crop to make good the advances. Were grain even much cheaper than it is at present, the distress would be but little alleviated. No change in the weather can now materially affect the agricultural prospects in these districts, nor can any amelioration be expected till the ensuing rains. It will, therefore, be necessary to continue the present measures of relief till July next, whatever may be the result then. Not only will the usual receipts this year from the land revenue in these Provinces in a great measure fail, but every other source of public income has been impaired, and a considerable increase of expenditure will have been forced on the Government, leading naturally to some embarrassment at the principal treasuries in the Doab. At Agra, Futtehghurh, and Cawnpore, difficulty has been experienced in the supply of means to meet the usual monthly demand on those treasuries. It will apparently be necessary either to make cash remittances from Bengal to a considerable amount, or to devise some other means to remedy the pressure. The subject is now engaging attention, and communications on the subject have been addressed to the President in Council at Fort William. After crossing the Ganges at Futtehghurh, the appearance of the country very much improved. Rohileund has suffered far less severely than the part of the Doab above alluded to. In the eastern parts of the province—i. e., in the Districts of Bareilly and Shahjehanpore—the crop is scanty, but in Moradabad it is generally considered an average season; and, notwithstanding the want of rain in

“ December and January, a good fall during the first half of the current month would ensure a fair return to the agriculturist. A similar remark may be extended to the upper part of the Doab, where the camp is at present pitched. The subject that most demanded attention in Rohilcund was the crowded state of the criminal jails. During the month of August last disturbances broke out amongst the agricultural classes in the districts of Budaon, Bareilly, and Shahjehanpore. They arose from the apprehension then entertained of famine. Tranquillity was soon re-established, but during the fortnight that the disturbances lasted numerous depredations and excesses were committed. Large numbers of persons were apprehended on the charge of being concerned in these outrages; the local Magistrates consequently became overburthened with work, whilst the Sessions Judges were unable to dispose of the commitments which were made to them. These circumstances had not been reported to the Government, but, on reaching Bareilly, they were brought prominently to my notice, and it was evident that the strongest measures became necessary for aiding the Magistrates, and enabling them speedily to dispose of the numerous cases pending before them.”

**88. Mr. Rose's First Report on Cawnpore.**—The report to which Lord Auckland referred is dated December 1st, 1837. In it Mr. Rose, the Deputy Collector, intimated that he had at the time of writing personally visited every part of the district where his presence seemed desirable. The fall of rain in October, which had done good to the crops in the Eastern and Southern Pergunnahs, had not extended beyond Sheorajpore, and consequently the Khureef in the Western Pergunnahs had been a total failure. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the Tehseeldars to collect according to any fixed rule, and therefore he had instructed them to measure their demand by the actual produce and, where there had been deficiency, to desist from all attempts to realize the revenue by coercion. This step he considered necessary in order to give the people an assurance of Government's sympathy, and so prevent them from abandoning their fields. As a matter of fact, his own experience convinced him that the people had appreciated this policy; and emigration, the greatest danger which Government had to fear, had been in a great measure prevented. Notwithstanding his exertions, the sufferings of the people were great. With the exception of one slight shower, no rain had fallen in Pergunnahs Bilhour and Rasoolabad since March. During July, August, and September, when vegetation is usually so luxurious, not even a blade of grass was to be seen;—cattle had been fed on the leaves of trees, and when these were no longer to be had they had died by hundreds. In many villages the malgoozars had kept their labourers together by giving them food. But in villages where Putteedaree and Byacharee tenures prevailed, and minute sub-division lessened the profits, landholders and cultivators had become equally impoverished, and the whole community had gone off to the Saugor Provinces, or had sought occupation in neighbouring districts. It was of no use to give advances for seed to those who remained, for no seed would germinate in the existing state of the soil. Works of public utility would afford the best means of employment, and the more the indigent were allotted tasks near their own homes the better for them. But he doubted whether it would not be beyond the power of Government, as it certainly was of the local authorities, to give adequate relief; and as for private charity, though the inclination to contribute was general, the amount subscribed was as a drop in the ocean compared with what was wanted. With a view of giving some impulse to cultivation, Mr. Rose had directed his Tehseeldars that, wherever the means of irrigation were such as to induce the mahajuns to lend money, the claims of the latter on the produce for repayment should be preferred to the State's demand. Such cases however he apprehended, were not likely to be many, for the soil was heat-bound, and extensive sowings could only be undertaken with a fair prospect of rain. The chances of the Rubbee in the Eastern part of the district were such that the native bankers had not been averse to giving the zemindars accommodation. But in the Western Pergunnahs no one would run the risk of lending a rupee; yet, in the matter of wealth and trustworthiness, maha-

juns and zemindars were on a par in the Eastern and Western Pergunnahs. From the difference, therefore, pursued by the monied men to the West of the district, he argued that no hopes were entertained of rain. Were Government, then, to allow advances from the public chest, they would be committing themselves to a speculation which native traders, usually keen enough when gain was concerned, considered too dangerous to attempt. At present it was too early to conjecture what the year's collections would be; the price of grain was so high that one-third of the average out-turn would secure Government from loss, and the prospect of the twenty years' settlement would make the malgoozars strain every nerve to prevent their estates from being sold or transferred.

**89. Mr. Rose's Second Report on Cawnpore.**—Two months later Mr. Rose reported the measures of relief that he had been able to organize under the discretionary powers granted to him (in common with all other District Officers) by Government. He had fixed a certain limit of expenditure for each of the famine-stricken pergunnahs, and had regulated the sum by the condition and the number of the people in each. His daily scale of relief was—

					Rs.
Bilhour,	...	...	...	...	35
Derapore,	...	...	...	...	35
Rasoolabad,	...	...	...	...	30
Akberpore,	...	...	...	...	25
Bhogneepore,	...	...	...	...	25
Ghatumpore,	...	...	...	...	15
Sheolee,	...	...	...	...	15
Total, ...					180

All applicants were received in the order of their coming, with the exception of a certain number of able-bodied labourers, who were enlisted at market rates for the work of digging only. This course was necessary, as those whom hunger cast upon Government for support were found capable of no greater exertion than that of carrying earth in baskets. The excavation of tanks was generally preferred to road-making or agriculture, as more economical, and more suitable for the exceptional nature of the season. Overseers were chosen from the better classes of villagers. They received a trifle more than those whom they superintended, and were not changed so long as the Tehseeldars were satisfied with their energy. The wages to the common work-people were first of all at the rate of 1 anna for a man,  $\frac{2}{3}$  anna for a woman,  $\frac{1}{2}$  anna for a child; but the scale was afterwards reduced to  $\frac{2}{3}$  anna for a man,  $\frac{1}{3}$  anna for a woman, and  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$  anna for a child, according to age. As times grew harder the able-bodied men, who had originally been hired at the market price, were restricted to one anna a day. This was the cost of half a seer of the cheapest grain, and less than this would not have kept up that degree of strength which enabled a man to get through his daily task. A reduction of the diminished rates in Pergunnah Bilhour to half and even a quarter of an anna for a man had no effect in deterring applicants. On the contrary, around each relief work labourers were assembling in larger numbers than could be engaged. The choice lay between a few mouthfuls a day and utter starvation, and it was no wonder that the pittance, however small, was eagerly sought after. Whatever number of persons could be taken on each day were admitted to work by a ticket signed and sealed by the Tehseeldar, and payment at evening could not be claimed unless the holder returned this ticket, and showed also a second, which was given by the Tehseeldar later in the day, when he had approved of the man's performance in his afternoon rounds. This double check made it certain that the money was bestowed on none but the actual work-people and, when the number of individuals assembled at a centre of relief were not more than double the number of those employed on any one day, it ensured work to every person for one day in two, because

the Tehseeldar, on receiving back the tickets from those whose toil was over, took care to distribute them for the following day amongst those who had for the last twenty-four hours been forced to remain idle. This system was found to answer well in all places except these where the applicants were out of all proportion to the money at the Tehseeldar's disposal. At Bilhour, for example, only eight hundred could be admitted at a time, and there were never less than five thousand clamouring for work. In such cases it was deemed better to employ a certain number to the exclusion of all the rest. The disadvantage of such a course was obvious but, in the absence of adequate funds, what remedy was there? The agricultural classes were the first to be dependent on the State; but the petty shop-keepers and artisans—whose means of earning a livelihood was too closely linked with theirs to admit of the one falling without dragging the other to its ruin—were soon grateful for assistance also. Nor in extending relief was it possible to discriminate between the inhabitants of the Collector's own district and strangers. In Pergunnah Bilhour three quarters of the destitute were natives of Etawah, Mynpoory, Furruckabad, and Agra. In Pergunnah Rasoolabad were many emigrants from Gwalior. The only persons rejected from the relief works were the infirm, the very young, and the aged. Their wants were not disregarded, but it was thought better to leave them to the care of private charity, especially as the native officials, following the example of Government, were beginning to subscribe handsomely. Of the general appearance of the district, and of the temper displayed by the sufferers, Mr. Rose thus writes in conclusion :—

"At no period, so far as I can learn, within the memory of the present generation has the country been visited with an equally severe calamity. In the famous *Chalisa* famine of 1783, which lasted for two years, the desolation, comparatively with the duration of each, is said to have been less extensive than that caused by the present drought. There was not, I am told, in 1783, that total absence of vegetation which has caused the present dearth of cattle and in milk;—the people then possessed a valuable article of food which is now wanting. In 1817 there was a scarcity of grain in the country, and the price of food was as high as it is at present; but there was then no extensive mortality from famine, because agricultural labour was not entirely stopped by the unproductiveness of the soil, and, although food was dear, the price of labour enabled the people to procure enough to support existence. The drought four years ago which caused a famine in Bundelcund, and extended to the Southern Pergunnahs of this district, was sufficiently severe, but its effects were confined within comparatively small space. To those who have not witnessed the melancholy change, it will scarcely be credible that an extensively cultivated and thickly populated country like the Doab could, by one year's drought, be reduced to its present state of waste and desolation. Flourishing villages, which last year contained from three to four hundred cultivators, are now occupied by half a dozen starving beggars; and I have travelled for 20 miles in the pergunnahs adjoining the Jumna, where there are no wells, without seeing a vestige of cultivation.

"It is to be feared that no favourable change can now be expected before July next; a fall of rain next month may reduce the price of grain, but the impoverished people will not have the means of purchasing food, however cheap, until the ensuing season of cultivation causes a demand for labour.

"I have not failed to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by my protracted stay in the interior of the district to make myself acquainted with the condition of the different pergunnahs and villages, and also to check the Revenue Officers, when I found them injudiciously pressing the Government demand. The Tehseeldars, however, I found had generally adhered to the instructions issued for their guidance at the commencement of the year, and had regulated the pressure of the demand by the produce and amount of rental collected by the malgoosar from the cultivators. Innumerable petitions, representing the ruin of their estates, have, of course, been presented, but the zemindars themselves admit that they have hitherto been treated with justice and leniency.

"It will be seen from the tenor of this report that the relief afforded, in its present scale, is inadequate to the wants of the people, but it must not on that account be considered valueless. Thousands have by it been saved from death by starvation, and the flood of emigration has been checked. The aid afforded, even if it should attain no other desirable end, will, at all events, evince to the people that Government are anxious to relieve their present unparalleled suffering, and the example thus set forth has, I know, been an inducement to hundreds to bestir themselves, on behalf of the starving poor, who never before thought of lending their aid in relieving the distress."

**90. Mr. Rose's Third Report on Cawnpore.**—In February, according to Mr. Rose's third report, the aspect of affairs was a little more cheerful, especially in



the Western Pergunnahs. There was more money to spend, and this circumstance probably accounted for the change. The amount of daily relief was, for—

					Rs.
Bilhour,	...	...	...	...	40
Rasoolabad,	...	...	...	...	40
Derapore,	...	...	...	...	35
Akberpore,	...	...	...	...	30
Bhogneepore,	...	...	...	...	25
Ghatumpore,	...	...	...	...	25
Sheolee,	...	...	...	...	15
Total,					210

The monthly charitable subscriptions had risen meantime from Rs. 100 to Rs. 500.

**91. Mr. Rose's Fourth Report on Cawnpore.**—Ill-health forced Mr. Rose to leave the district in April. His final report brings up the narrative to the end of March. Rs. 237 a day were then being expended on relief works, the slight increase being distributed amongst the various pergunnahs in much the same proportion as before. The fund of private contributions had reached the sum of Rs. 2,000. Mr. Rose considered that no larger outlay from the public treasury than that which he was making at the date of his departure would be wanted till the Rubbee had been gathered in. Then probably, in the Southern Pergunnahs of Akberpore, Bhogneepore, Ghatumpore and Derapore, provision would be needful on behalf of those who for a while had been busy in their fields, and who, when the grain was stored, would be dependent on the State for employment during the interval that would elapse until the rain fell. In the Pergunnahs of Sheorajpore, Bilhour, and Rasoolabad, he believed that all the destitute had found work.

**92. Alternation of Distress in the Northern and Southern Pergunnahs of Cawnpore.**—It is curious to notice the difference which had taken place in the Northern and Southern Pergunnahs of the district. The inhabitants had, so to speak, exchanged conditions, and the reason of the altered state of things was this. The Northern pergunnahs were the first to feel the drought. The Khureef there was a failure, and the cultivators, to whom this crop was the sole means of subsistence, were swept away during the summer months of 1837. The men of substance, who were able to support themselves and their cattle during the first six months of the drought, prepared small patches of land for the rubbee, and, as in the soil bordering on the Ganges the water lay tolerably close to the surface, they were able by incessant toil at the wells to raise sufficient produce for the bare maintenance of themselves and their families. In the Jumna Pergunnahs, on the other hand, occasional rain fell during the proper season, and the Khureef gave some return, and so prevented any considerable emigration or mortality in the autumn of 1837. The Rubbee sowings were extensive, but, water being deep in this part of the district, and no rain having descended after October, there was no possibility either of natural or artificial irrigation. Consequently the Rubbee perished, and the inhabitants of the South experienced in the spring of 1838 the extreme of hunger which had befallen the people of the Northern Pergunnahs a few months before.

**93. Mr. Rose's example enjoined on others, and his account of Cawnpore corroborated from various sources.**—I have described Mr. Rose's operations at some length, not only because his reports are the most detailed of any that I have come across, but also because of all the District Officers of that period he appears to have been most alive to its exigencies, and to have taken the best measures for mitigating distress. Not only did he receive the special thanks of Government for the valuable services he had rendered, but others were enjoined to follow his example. In such a crisis there could be no greater meed of praise than this, and so practical had he been in all his proceedings that it was found impossible to improve on his system. The accounts of distress, as given by Mr. Rose, are fully corroborated from other sources. So long as the richer zemindars had the means, they fed their poor neigh-



bours, and even went to the length of selling jewels and ornaments in order to raise money for the purchase of food. When their resources were exhausted, and the bunneeahs proved inexorable, the poorer classes resorted to the jungles, in the hope of securing a meal from some wild tree or other. The small thorny berry of the singárhár was in great request, as was also the bark of the wild fig-tree. The people dried and pounded what they gathered, and, with a little addition of meal, had the means of making a sort of chupattie that was just palatable. Women were ready to sell their children for two or three seers of wheat, whilst their husbands and brothers waylaid and plundered travellers in search of a mouthful. Gold and silver were parted with at half their ordinary value, and brass and copper were esteemed worth their weight in grain. Artizans disposed of their tools at a quarter their cost price. "You ask me to tell you," \* writes a correspondent of the *Englishman* on the 24th of March, "all about the famine at Cawnpore; but indeed no account nor description of mine could convey to you any adequate idea of the misery of the poor in this place and throughout its vicinity. At the beginning of the cold season the station literally swarmed with starving wretches, and now where are they? I believe I am within bounds when I say that in cantonments alone, but a short time back, from twenty to thirty died daily. The river, owing to the sluggishness of the stream, became studded with dead bodies, and we ceased to eat of its fish or drink of its waters. At last it became requisite to hire establishments, not merely for the purpose of taking the starved-to-death wretches to the ghâts for their being flung into the Ganges, but also to have a river establishment in constant play to push down the corpses below Gajmow. The Relief Society feeds about 1,500 daily, but then, owing to the villainy of those who have to serve out the food, in spite of the most energetic exertions on the part of the Superintendent, the attah was so adulterated with chunam and sand that heaps upon heaps have died from eating it, and now there is great difficulty in getting the poor to go to the alms-house. Kungla guards patrol the station all day long, not merely to give notice where the dead bodies are lying, but to drive the living to the refuge. A great number of poor have lately left the station to get in the scanty harvest. They will never return. Starvation will be their lot. Of grain there is an abundance in the province, but there is no labour for the poor, and consequently they have no money to buy food. The Calcutta people seem to be in earnest, but let them keep in mind that the famine in and about Cawnpore has been, is, and must continue, and that every rupee that can be raised should be sent up as soon as possible. Between Calpee and Agra it is perfectly dreadful. The dead are seen lying together by fifties. To add to the misery of the poor starving population, the small-pox is becoming rife at Cawnpore." Worse even than anything here related was the fact that persons who were too proud to beg, and had bartered all they possessed for food, were poisoning themselves and their families sooner than endure the pain of starvation. Death was imminent, and they hailed any course which enabled them to escape protracted agony.

**94. Relief Expenditure in Cawnpore.**—The following table shows the Collector's expenditure for relief from January to July, 1838 :—

		Men, women, and children relieved.	Cost in Rs.	
January, ...	...	86,718	...	4,065
February, ...	...	1,57,193	...	5,146
March, ...	...	1,30,410	...	6,244
April, ...	...	1,90,966	...	7,317
May, ...	...	1,93,186	...	9,376
June, ...	...	1,75,877	...	8,825
July, ...	...	47,172	...	3,031
		9,81,522	Rs. 44,004	

\* See *Friend of India*, for March 29th, 1838.

Besides the money expended under the orders of the Collector, the Magistrate relieved 2,47,084 destitute persons between November, 1837, and July, 1838, at a cost of Rs. 10,169, and gave over a further sum of Rs. 10,745 for the same purpose to the Cantonment Magistrate. No details are given about the latter sum, but at the Magistrate's rate of expenditure it would have fed some 2,61,090 persons. I have also ascertained that Government gave Rs. 2,000 to the Relief Society, and the funds of the Local Society itself amounted, as I have already shown, in January, February, and March to Rs. 2,000. For the remaining period of distress the subscriptions were probably on a moderate computation as much again; but, leaving this item out, the known amount of charity, public and private, bestowed in the district of Cawnpore was Rs. 68,918.

**95. Comparative Statement of Prices in Cawnpore from 1836 to 1839.**—I have not been able to trace any more detailed statements of the price of food than are contained in one of the statistical tables appended to Mr. Montgomery's Report of Cawnpore. The averages for the years quoted were—

	<i>Wheat.</i>		<i>Barley.</i>		<i>Gram.</i>		<i>Rice.</i>	
	C.	S.	C.	S.	C.	S.	C.	S.
1836,	...	24 12	32 3		28 12		9 0½	
1837,	...	19 0½	22 14½		22 1		8 8	
1838,	...	14 15	18 5		15 6		8 3	
1839,	...	20 2	32 0		26 2		8 5	

**96. Comparative Statement of Offences against Property in Cawnpore, from 1836 to 1839.**—The same Report gives the history of crimes against property for the same period :—

	<i>Burglaries.</i>	<i>Thefts.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
1836,	... 192	706	898
1837,	... 307	1,020	1,327
1838,	... 393	1,129	1,522
1839,	... 241	470	711

**97. Collections on Account of the Excise in Cawnpore, from 1836-37 to 1839-40.**—The Collections in all the Departments of Excise were for—

	Rs.			
1836-37,	...	...	...	1,11,462
1837-38,	...	...	...	86,502
1838-39,	...	...	...	78,904
1839-40,	...	...	...	94,407

Not until 1842-43 did the amount at all approach the results of 1836-37, which were themselves less than those of some of the former years.

**98. Receipts from Sayer in Cawnpore from 1837-38 to 1839-40.**—The receipts from Sayer were—

	Rs.			
1836-37,	...	...	...	1,22,093
1837-38,	...	...	...	82,393
1838-39,	...	...	...	78,676
1839-40,	...	...	...	94,570

The return to the sums of former years was as gradual as in the case of the Abkaree.

**99. Report of Mr. R. N. C. Hamilton on the Condition of the Agra Division.**—At the beginning of 1838, Mr. R. N. C. Hamilton, Officiating Commissioner of Agra, went on tour in his own Division. His report enters into such details that I cannot do better than let him speak for himself, and with him Captain Wroughton, a Surveyor, from whom he quotes largely :—

"On the 6th of January," writes the former, "I entered the Futtehghurh district, in charge of the Commissioner's Office, being then in attendance on the Governor-General. The first pergunnah I passed was Kanouj, the destitute state of which was most deplorable. The population bore evidence of famine; and had it not been for the means afforded them of obtaining a sufficiency for their support by working on the Grand Trunk Road, and a branch road under the superintendence of the Collector, the misery and mortality would have been beyond description. Wherever there were wells, by dint of irrigation some few patches of cultivation had been raised; but generally the prospects of the Rubbee harvest were unfavourable, nor did they appear brighter in the villages of Talgram and Bhojpoor, though in the bed of the Kalee Nuddee the crops seemed of good promise, and in the neighbourhood of Futtehghurh and in the Huzoor Tehseel cultivation had increased. There was a visible improvement in crossing the Ganges. The crops appeared to be up to the average, and the cultivated surface not much decreased. The appearance of that portion of Futtehghurh towards Allyghurh and Suheswan was also much improved, the signs of distress less, but the mortality among the cattle and the want of forage for their support caused the wells to be worked by men and women.

"Mynpoory was in a somewhat worse state. The pergunnahs which the road traversed were barren and parched, the crops in the ground stunted and light, and no appearance of any Khureef having been reaped; but towards and in Sirpoorah the cultivated area seemed much improved.

"I applied to Captain Wroughton, who had been surveying in the district, for information regarding the villages visited by him, and beg to transcribe an extract from his demi-official remarks:—

"I have the pleasure to send you a summary report on the state of the pergunnahs that have come under my notice during the current season's survey. You will kindly bear in mind that remarks of so general a nature cannot be correct in detail; indeed, I consider any inquiry into the existing state of the country, excepting such as may be based on careful ocular observancy, but valueless at best, it being the interest of every individual, wealthy or the reverse, to represent the matter in the most unpromising light. With this qualification I venture to give you such intelligence as I have been able to come at.

"My measurements up to this time, commencing on the 15th November last, have been progressing through the following pergunnahs of your district, viz., Etah, Sukeet, Kurowlee, Sirpoorah; 2nd Division Shekoabad and Giror, of Zillah Mynpoory; Khundowlee and Ferozabad of Agra.

"In ordinary seasons an assamee with one plough cultivates 40 beegahs (local 918 square yards per beegah), of which 20 beegahs may be considered wet and the remainder dry. In this season 15 beegahs of the former have been cultivated, and not any of the latter.

"The bunneehs more or less in all these pergunnahs, as is customary, have assisted the ryots with loans for seed which has been sown. But the drought continuing, and appearances being anything but favourable, no advances for subsistence were extended afterwards. The consequence has been that the assamees have neglected the sowings, which have perished, and multitudes of them have fled to other parts of the country, where report led them to contemplate a more promising state of affairs.

"Etah is in one general state. *All the cultivation is dependent* on irrigation, and, as this Division had some rain, grass for fodder is procurable, and the cattle in consequence are able to work at the wells, which have been kept incessantly going.

"The same holds good of Sukeet, excepting that grass is not so plentiful.

"Kurowlee is by no means in so favourable a state as the first-named pergunnah, the soil being chiefly "bhoor" or sand. The irrigation extent is somewhat short of ordinary years, while fodder is procurable with the greatest difficulty.

"In Sirpoorah, the water being nearer the surface, the irrigation cultivation is twenty-five per cent. above average seasons. The attention of the ryots having been confined to this description of tillage, the small quantity of rain did not permit them to prepare the 'kakee' lands. Fodder is pretty abundant here compared with the adjacent pergunnahs, and, as this pergunnah borders on the Turraie, the means of supporting the cattle is not unobtainable.

"One moiety of the 2nd Division of Shekoabad, or the North-East Division, is in a passable state—that is, there is about 25 per cent. increase on the wet cultivation beyond ordinary years; the other half, or the south-west quarter, is in a deplorable state, and I should say, from a rapid view of its condition, has not more than one quarter the ordinary extent of wet cultivation. In both sub-divisions there is no dry tillage whatever, and fodder in the shape of grass is not procurable. Numbers of cattle have departed. Water is generally throughout this pergunnah 20 feet from the surface, and the labour in raising it is extreme, and whether the wretched animals will last to see the crop arrive at maturity is problematical.

"Ghiror, of the Huzoor Tehseel, Mynpoory, is in a better state. The increase of wet cultivation here is full 25 per cent. There is however no dry cultivation, and though the cattle have generally speaking not died, the hot wind will certainly put them out, for even in working now their limbs bend under the shadow of a carcass. Grass is to be had, but is still extremely hard to procure, and when obtained, if I may say so, contains as much nutriment as rejected rope-yarns, and is beyond the masticating powers of any animal I am acquainted with, save and except a hungry Doab bullock.

"I must finish with Ferozabad, which belongs to the 1st Division of Shikohabad and Khundowlee. The last is perhaps a little worse off if possible than the first-named. At a rough hazard I should say that there is not more than one-half the usual wet cultivation, and not a vestige of the dry is visible, and even the former is in a most precarious state. Fodder is not procurable, men and cattle are dying in hundreds from downright exhaustion. Whole villages have been deserted, and there is no village, I believe, from which many of the cultivators have not fled—being driven away by want in its most distressing form. Such is my view of these pergunnahs, and if the remarks prove useful to you I shall be gratified."

"In the district of Muttra I was surprised to find such extensive waste. From Moorsam, passing through a few villages of Sonye, the centre of Byah, a few villages of Maat and of Mahaban, the crops were scanty, the soil dry, and cultivation only in the immediate vicinity of the pukka wells. I should not suppose that the produce on the irrigated land equalled an average, even when I saw it, and since then the difficulty of feeding cattle has greatly increased, as well as the labour of irrigation. Around Muttra the produce in the garden cultivation came up to perhaps ordinary years, but the people were almost in despair from the wells fast turning so brackish and salt as to destroy rather than refresh vegetation.

"All of the Areng and Goverdhun pergunnahs which came under my observation was an extensive arid waste, and for miles I rode over ground which had been both ploughed and sown, but in which the seed had not vegetated, and where there seemed no prospect of a harvest. The cattle in Areng were scarcely able to crawl, and they were collected in the village and suffered to pull at the thatch, the people declaring it useless to drive them forth to seek for pasture. Emigration had already commenced, and people of all classes appeared to be suffering from the drought and the high price of grain. From Goverdhun I passed by a short route through the Bhurtpore State to Futtehpore, by a road I had travelled some years ago, and observed that the agricultural condition of this territory was not a bit better than that within our own provinces. Passing from Futtehpore, through the pergunnahs of Jugnair and Myragurh, a great degree of desolation prevailed, though not so much as in Muttra, owing to the wells continuing good; but these are among the best of the Agra pergunnahs (Bar and Pinnahut are the worst), and from them the people had deserted their villages. The extent to which desertion and emigration had taken place in all the districts excites apprehension for the future prosperity of the villages, and will require the utmost care of the local officers to counteract. In many all but the semindar and his immediate family, the aged who could not travel, and the bunneehs, had moved off; some had taken their cattle into Meerut, on the right bank of the Jumna, or to the Turraie from the Doab. Fodder had been imported from Meerut by those who could afford to make purchases; the price, however, latterly had passed the means of those who had not a larger income than the ordinary inhabitants of a village, one churra being at some places 16 and 12 seers for the rupee.

"Whilst with the Governor-General, His Lordship inquired of me to what amount I calculated the revenue would fall short this year, and I observed that I considered the total collections would not exceed two-thirds of the entire demand on account of the five districts in this division—viz., Muttra, Agra, Furruckabad, Mynpoory, and Etawah. The continued and increased severity of the season will, I fear, cause this to have been an over-estimate. No rain has fallen, the crops which are now standing do not exceed twelve inches in height, the ear is small and scanty, and the grain light and withered, so that the produce of an acre will be small, and the loss saved only by the high prices which must keep up.

"In a season of such unprecedented calamity it is a noble sight to view the thousands who are saved from death by the generosity of the British Government. In this respect we have set an example to surrounding States of which but little advantage has been taken. Yet they have done something, though trifling. In Bhurtpore baked cakes are distributed at each of the gates daily to as many as apply, as far as the amount (five maunds each gate, I believe) will go. In Dholepore and at Baru one day's food is given to every traveller, but he must pass on; and food is distributed to the poor of the territory as in Bhurtpore, though I know not the limit. In Gwalior I am not aware that any sort of assistance is afforded by the State; but the inhabitants of that country have the fertile tracts of Malwah to emigrate to, and in the adjacent States of Bhopal and Saugor grain is abundant; but in Malwah the fall in the prices of opium has ruined many of the growers and some of the wealthiest speculators, who seem not to have a prospect as cheering even as their rash competitors in Calcutta, for to them no gratuity under any name will be given, and their speculations, like the market, will be left very properly to find their level. Had a good and open communication existed for wheeled carriages between Agra and Malwah, the grain, which is abundant there, and is selling at fifty and even sixty seers the rupee, might have reached its market. The Lieutenant-Governor did in September bring the subject of this road to the notice of the Supreme Government, in connection with the Post Office routes and traffic with Bombay, and if the Board would assist by their influence in having the Ghats made passable, we might hope to benefit by the fertility of Malwah when we are suffering in these parts."

**100. Detailed Account of the Famine in Furruckabad.**—Symptoms of distress manifested themselves in Furruckabad quite as soon as in Cawnpore. The cotton and indigo crops were specially affected by the drought, and seed was only to be obtained at an increase of one hundred per cent. over the previous year's prices. As early as August the Sudder Station was full of starving villagers, and the bunneehs were lamenting the raids on their store-pits, whilst it was only by great promptness on the part of Mr. Robinson, the Magistrate, that order could be restored. Here, as

elsewhere, an extra Police establishment had to be allowed, the total cost of which between August, 1837, and July, 1838 was Rs. 7,342. Of the crimes which came under their cognizance some idea can be formed from the fact that during that period 3,439 burglaries, robberies, and thefts occurred, of which 179 were attended with violence. "To promise general tranquility," wrote Mr. Robinson, "or anything like tranquility till food is obtainable for the starving population I do not pretend. It is very true that grain, though dear, is not at famine price, but the cheapness or dearness of food matters little to men who have no means of procuring it except robbery. This is the actual condition of the labouring population, and till these men can obtain employment and subsistence the present outrages cannot be put down by the ordinary strength of the Police." Government at once admitted the claim on its charity by putting Rs. 1,000 at the Magistrate's disposal. This gave but temporary relief, and in the second week of September a further sum of Rs. 1,000 was asked for and granted. Mr. Robinson at this time was paying away Rs. 50 daily for labour on Public Works. "Yet even this," writes Mr. C. Lindsey, the local historian of those days, "was unavailing to grapple with the fearful destitution that prevailed; for although a large number of persons found employment on the roads, yet, in spite of all palliations, the streets were crowded with perishing creatures, to whose miseries were now added the sufferings resulting from excessive cold. To such a height did the distress arise in December, that Mr. Robinson felt himself constrained to make an application to Government to place in his hands the sum of 2,000 Rupees per mensem for the next three months, which he considered would include the crisis of the distress, as after that period the Rubbee harvest would, it was expected, come gradually into the market, and the weather become more temperate. The promptitude and liberality with which this request was acknowledged reflects the highest credit on the generous and humane feelings of the Government, inasmuch as a ready permission was accorded to the Magistrate to make disbursements from the Public Treasury, *to any amount without limit*, for the employment of the destitute on works of public utility. In communicating this exceedingly gratifying intelligence, the Secretary to Government (a gentleman whose sterling merits have since raised him to the highest office in the Agra Presidency), wrote as follows: 'This expenditure is sanctioned, not with a view to the profitable outlay of capital, but as a criterion by which to judge of the real state of distress that is prevailing.' Private charity was not withheld. The European community subscribed on an average 600 Rs. a month, and relief was dispensed by a committee composed of several of the residents. Their operations were limited to assisting those who, from age, infirmity, or sex, were the greatest objects of compassion. The old *Shahzada's Kotee*, a large building with a spacious enclosure, was occupied as an asylum, and each day a member of the committee proceeded thither, and caused the provisions to be weighed and served out in his own presence. At first money was given, but it was afterwards found to be a better plan to distribute rations. The native community in the city subscribed nearly 1,500 Rupees a month, which was, in like manner, distributed by one of their number according to a regulated scale. The Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor, in a letter to the Magistrate, expressed his commendations of the liberality displayed by the Native Relief Society, and his gratification at their exertions. The laudation was wound up by a donation of a thousand Rupees. These regular subscriptions were independent of much casual charity, the amount of which there were no means of estimating. But it may here be stated that the sum of 6,000 Rupees\* was handsomely contributed by the Committee formed in Calcutta for the relief of sufferers by famine in these Provinces, although this succour did not arrive until the severity of the calamity had begun to abate. Some idea of the vast amount of suffering population that had flocked into the station may be formed, when it is stated that, although nearly a thousand persons received daily employment and support from private subscriptions, and about the same number from the Government fund, yet the applicants for employment on the roads generally exceeded by one-third the number that could

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\* Rupees 8,000 were in all allotted to this district. See *infra*, para. 103.

be employed. The city and cantonments were filled with starving families; and hundreds of people were glad to give up their children to any one who would take them at from eight annas to four rupees a child, and many begged of people to take them for nothing. When the Government offered relief to the people in the shape of wages for labour, about 1,500 men were employed in the neighbourhood of the station under the voluntary superintendence of several residents. When the labourers were removed to a greater distance, a certain number of hired native overseers were allotted to each gang of workmen in the proportion of two to every hundred, and a jemadar to superintend the whole. The work executed was checked and pronounced upon by the European Officers of the Executive Engineer. The large horde of unfortunates who had collected in the vicinity of the town, attracted by the indiscriminate yet inadequate alms distributed by individuals, independently of the Native Relief Society, was broken up, and the people sent off in gangs of 500 to the various pergunnahs, where local employment was found for them. Two gangs of a thousand each were employed in constructing two important roads leading towards Cawnpore and Mynpoory, and a third gang of the same strength was kept at the station."

**101. Amount Expended in Furruckabad for Relief.**—The following table shows the amount spent by Government in relief to the able-bodied, together with the number of persons employed during the famine. It is the only authentic statement, month by month, that I have been able to discover for any district.

	<i>Total expended.</i>	<i>Number of persons</i>
1837.	<i>Ra.</i>	<i>relieved.</i>
August, ...	... 494	9,848
September,...	... 1,825	35,568
October, ...	... 1,884	36,990
November, ...	... 1,375	21,965
December, ...	... 1,553	25,632
1838.		
January, ...	... 6,845	1,38,778
February, ...	... 13,884	2,73,468
March, ...	... 27,595	4,76,346
April, ...	... 20,591	3,59,041
May, ...	... 25,913	4,59,045
June, ...	... 33,609	5,30,691
July, ...	... 21,392	3,50,532
August, ...	... 6,046	1,06,493
Total Ra.,	... 163,006	28,24,397

The plan at first adopted for feeding the labourers was to give them ration tickets, which they presented to the Bunneeah, and in return for these the latter furnished grain, and made his claim on Government according to the number of tickets that he could show daily. This measure, however, was found liable to great abuse. The bunneeahs were as ready to adulterate then as now, and the starving folk who depended on them constantly found half their dole to consist of sand or powdered bones. In April, therefore, Government took the Commissariat into its own hands. The account of private charity for the support of those who, from age or infirmity, could not help themselves, stands thus :—

	<i>Total expended.</i>	<i>Persons relieved.</i>
1837.	<i>Ra.</i>	
August, ...	... 303	6,942
September, ...	... 891	22,593
October, ...	... 942	23,589
November, ...	... 810	20,173
December, ...	... 898	22,430

	<i>Total expended.</i>		<i>Persons relieved</i>
1838.	Rs.		
January, ...	...	925	22,411
February, ...	...	553	12,322
March, ...	...	596	14,608
April, ...	...	1,706	37,364
May, ...	...	2,900	64,821
June, ...	...	4,996	78,484
July, ...	...	2,136	46,075
August, ...	...	1,135	22,066
City Fund.—September, 1837, to March, 1838, ...	...	5,842	1,53,147
Total, Rs. ...		24,133	5,47,025

Besides these sources of relief, there were also the works undertaken by the Road Fund Committee, the whole expenditure on which amounted to Rs. 15,636. Employment in these cases was limited to able-bodied men, who received higher wages in acknowledgment of their greater powers of endurance and labour. In this way about a thousand a day are said, at one time, to have been provided for. "In May, 1838," concludes Mr. Lindsay, "Mr. Robinson ventured to discharge the additional police horsemen he had entertained, and from the circumstance of the harvest having been gathered in, and the country being quiet, he hoped to be able to relieve the treasury of the burden of the remaining extra establishment very shortly; but in this he was disappointed. The rains held off, and agricultural operations had commenced to a very slight extent. The consequence was that the destitute poor, from whom public employment had been withdrawn, had no means of subsistence, and they resorted to plundering the mango-groves and grain-shops, with the avowed object of getting into jail. The Government support had therefore to be revived, and it was not until the end of August that the prospects of the season were sufficiently promising to justify the final discharge of the whole extra establishment." Such are the particulars that I have been able to collect for Furruckabad. Yet of this district the Commissioner of Agra, writing on the 8th of June to the Board, remarked that it had suffered less than any other in his division. Notwithstanding this assertion, he felt it his duty, in the same letter, to advocate an instant remission of Rs. 3,83,085 out of a total jumma of Rs. 12,92,337, the pergunnahs where the crops had failed most signally being Jhutteeah, Kanouj, and Tirwah. Suspension, he urged, was of no use, as the sums suspended would never be recovered. If, then, Furruckabad, with a relief expenditure of nearly two lakhs, and balances, as we shall presently see, of more than seven, suffered less severely than any other district in the Agra Commissionership, what must have been the loss to Government in other places concerning which the statistics are not so detailed?

**102. Relief sent to the North-West from Calcutta, Bombay, and Berhampore.**—The Calcutta Relief Committee, of which mention has been made above, had its origin in a public meeting, held at the Town Hall on the last day of February, 1838. The object of its members was "To raise\* and distribute funds to purchase food for the aged and infirm, the infant and the female—for all, indeed, who had not strength to labour." A spirit of liberality was at once evinced by those present, Natives as well as Europeans, and at the end of March about Rs. 60,000 had been collected. A month later the sum had increased to more than a lakh, and appears eventually to have been little short of a lakh and a half. The latest sum total given in the *Friend of India* † is Rs. 1,39,033; but, from the final Report of the Committee, ‡

\* See leading article in the *Friend of India* of March 8th, 1838, entitled "Famine in the Western Provinces."

† See issue of June 7th, 1838.

‡ See the figures quoted by Colonel Baird Smith in Section II., para. 42, of his Report.



published in the *Bengal Hurkaru* of the 23d July, 1838, I find that Rs 1,46,000 had been distributed in the following proportions :—

					Rs.
To Agra, ...	...	...	...	...	27,000
„ Cawnpore,	...	...	...	...	19,000
„ Etawah,	...	...	...	...	19,000
„ Muttra,	...	...	...	...	18,000
„ Mynpoory,	...	...	...	...	16,000
„ Humeerpore and Calpee,	...	...	...	...	13,000
„ Futtehghurh,	...	...	...	...	8,000
„ Banda,	...	...	...	...	8,000
„ Allyghurh,	...	...	...	...	6,000
„ Delhi,...	...	...	...	...	4,000
„ Futtehpoore,	...	...	...	...	4,000
„ Boolundshuhur,	...	...	...	...	2,000
„ Kurnaul,	...	...	...	...	2,000

Appeals for assistance were also made to the districts of Bengal, with what results I have not been able to find out, except in the case of Berhampore, where Rs. 6,596 were subscribed. Bombay contributed Rs. 15,000.

**103. Rain in February, 1838: The Famine arrested in the Delhi Territory, and in the Meerut and Rohilcund Divisions.**—An opportune fall of rain came to the rescue of the Delhi Territory, and the Meerut and Rohilcund Divisions, in the beginning of February, 1838, and thus providentially lessened the area of the famine tract. The relaxation, too, of the new Settlement for Rohilcund, induced the agricultural classes to second with their utmost energy the kindness of nature. In the Eastern pergunnahs of Bareilly and Shahjehanpore the harvest was scanty, but in Moradabad and the upper part of the Doab it proved quite equal to the average. The Districts to the south of the Ganges did not benefit by any large influx of grain, for the means of communication in those days was too defective to admit of exportation on a grand scale; but, as soon as prices fell in Rohilcund, the majority of emigrants turned their steps in that direction, and by timely recourse to that region, many a person saved his life who would not have been able to command the means of existence had he stayed at home.

**104. Progress of the Famine during the Spring of 1838.**—Meanwhile in other places the famine was growing worse from week to week. A Relief Society was organised at Agra in February, and the average daily number of paupers supported by charity during that month was 3,800, and the cost Rs. 2,483. The strain on the Committee's resources proved too great, and as they anticipated that there would be double the number of applicants in March, they applied to Government for a gratuity of Rs. 5,000, which was at once sanctioned. Grants of Rs. 2,000 each were made at the same time to the Cawnpore and Furruckabad Relief Societies. Special works for the employment of the destitute were authorized in Agra, Banda, Humeerpore, Futtehpoore, Etawah, Goorgaon, and Rhotuck. In the first of these districts the labour was chiefly devoted to the formation of a strand road along the river front of the town, from which it was hoped that the trading community would derive convenience, whilst the general appearance of the place would be much improved. In the other districts the attention of the local officers was principally given to the construction or repair of tanks. Judging by the impression made on Colonel Wheler, who was an eye-witness of the famine, the scene in Furruckabad and Agra must have been awful. "Brahmins," writes his enthusiastic biographer, Major Conran, "who had before rejected their own cooked food if the defiled Christian had come too near, were now seen by us stealing the scraps from our dogs, and mothers sold their infants to the despised foreigners, or left them a prey to the wolves, which fattened on the spoil. Society was entirely disorganized, and horrors of every kind pervaded

“ the land. Here was the great sphere of Wheler’s devoted efforts. Aided by our coun-  
 “ trymen’s subscriptions, which were called forth by his appeals and by the stimulus  
 “ of his example, he also collected the castaway infants and children, and saved  
 “ many lives, hereafter to form under his personal training the nucleus of the now well-  
 “ known Futteghur Mission. Awful were the sights amidst the crowds accumulated  
 “ in the famine-stricken cities of the Doab; those who witnessed them will never for-  
 “ get the sickening odour that came from that reeking mass of misery, and still more  
 “ fearful were the revelations of deepest-dyed vice; yet amidst all Wheler but felt  
 “ impelled thereby to greater zeal in his labour of love. In the height of the famine,  
 “ having organized arrangements for succouring the helpless in Futteghur, Wheler,  
 “ having been ordered with a wing of the 34th to Agra, carried thither the same  
 “ single purpose, and in that yet wider sphere, and amidst equal suffering, he continued  
 “ his Christian efforts. Agra was now the focus of misery; here the famine had culmi-  
 “ nated in the concentration of tens of thousands (more than 300,000, besides the usual  
 “ inhabitants), attracted from throughout the Doab in the hope of aid from the  
 “ Government, until this mass of pestilential humanity created an epidemic which swept  
 “ away from two to three hundred a day for months. Here, again, Wheler was  
 “ the presiding spirit, infusing fresh energy into the little band who were already  
 “ engaged in the work. Here, too, numerous orphans, rescued and trained in Christian  
 “ nurture, became the nucleus of Christian villages which honorably endured the ordeal  
 “ of the mutiny.” The truth is, it was simply out of the question for human agency  
 to cope with the evil. Famine had gained the upper hand, and, with all its energy  
 and its expenditure, what Government did was small in comparison to what it was  
 obliged to leave undone. Independently of some four thousand helpless creatures fed  
 by the Relief Committees, Government was giving daily employment to about 77,500  
 human beings in Agra at the end of March. Yet, despite all this assistance, we read  
 that deaths from hunger and disease were occurring at the rate of 150 a day, that the  
 streets of the cantonments resembled one vast charnel-house, and that the air was  
 noisome by reason of the unburied dead. Even in the middle of June, though rain  
 had fallen, there were 73,604 able-bodied and 40,000 infirm paupers dependent on  
 charity for their daily bread.

**105. Condition of Boolundshuhur.**—The sufferings of Boolundshuhur were  
 caused mainly by the large number of emigrants who poured in from Etawah and  
 Mynpoory on the one side, and from Marwar and Hurriana on the other. In all  
 these districts the calamity was felt at an early period, and emigration was the first  
 resource of the starving multitude. As long as there was food enough they stayed,  
 and then moved onwards to Rohilcund, in the hope of avoiding the scarcity which they  
 left behind them. Dadree, Dunkour, and Secundrabad were the pergunnahs which  
 were most affected. The majority of cultivators in these were Goojurs, and to the  
 proverbial indolence of this caste it only needed to add the scanty means of irrigation,  
 and the proximity, comparatively speaking, of the suffering tracts in the South-West  
 to account for the prevailing distress. By the exertions of the district officers relief-  
 houses were established at headquarters, and at the principal Tehseelees, and the  
 natives were very liberal in contributing towards these institutions. To whatever  
 funds were thus raised Government gave a grant-in-aid; but, in the absence of all  
 records, the exact amount cannot be ascertained. The tradition that succour was  
 accorded is all that now exists. The policy of demanding labour in return for relief was  
 enforced here as elsewhere, and the digging of tanks appears to have been the most  
 general employment. The mortality is said not to have been great, for the measures  
 of Government enabled every worthy object of charity to be sure of his daily meal.  
 Gram was as dear as eight seers for the rupee.

**106. Condition of Allygurh.**—The events of this period, so far as they  
 affected Allygurh, are dismissed by Mr. Hutchinson in a very few lines, and, besides  
 his report, I know of no other records which throw light on the early history of this  
 district. “ In the year 1837,” he writes, “ occurred a famine, the disastrous effects of

which will long be remembered in this district. Sumbut Chouranwe is an era from which most of the poorer classes reckon time, and to which they refer all their misfortunes. The Government granted a remission of revenue to the extent of Rs. 87,561\* for Fuslee 1245." To judge by the increase of crime, there must have been a considerable amount of distress. The collections, also, on account of Excise show a marked falling off from the returns of former years. I give below Mr. Hutchinson's figures :—

				Burglaries.	Thefts.	Total.
A. D.						
1836,	...	...	...	519	1,237	1,756
1837,	...	...	...	473	1,229	1,702
1838,	...	...	...	722	1,935	2,657
1839,	...	...	...	456	1,012	1,468

ABKAREE.						Rs.
A. D.						
1836-37,	...	...	...	...	...	15,373
1837-38,	...	...	...	...	...	13,687
1838-39,	...	...	...	...	...	11,095
1839-40,	...	...	...	...	...	10,282

The receipts of 1836-37 were not, I may add, again equalled till 1842-43. The Zemindars, so long as their means admitted, appear to have been energetic in affording assistance. One Thakoor, by name† Chundun Singh, of Somna, stands out in pre-eminently bright colours, and his memory is still cherished amongst the poor of Allygurh and Boolundshuhur for the good that he did. It is credibly reported that he distributed one hundred thousand maunds of grain in the neighbourhood of his estates during the incidence of the famine.

**107. Condition of Futtehpore.**—Colonel Baird Smith has included Futtehpore within the limits of the famine tract, and in token of severity has shaded the whole of the District on his map as darkly as Cawnpore. The records of the time, however, show that he was either mistaken or acted on insufficient information, for the inhabitants of Futtehpore were unquestionably better off than their neighbours. The Khureef of 1837 and the Rubbee of 1838 suffered from the drought, but did not wholly perish. Whatever was saved commanded high prices. Yet, notwithstanding this, comparison shows that the average value of wheat and rice was lower in 1838 than in 1837. The Collector constantly affirmed that the high prices had counter-balanced the effects of partial failure, and had enabled the cultivators to pay their rents and the zemindars their revenues. This of course is no conclusive proof against famine; but, when it is viewed in connexion with subsequent remission to no greater extent than Rs. 49,624, an expenditure on account of relief works amounting only to 7,368,‡ and a subvention from the Calcutta Committee of Rs. 4,000, there is strong ground for the conclusion that Futtehpore suffered lightly in comparison to other districts. Moreover, crime never assumed an undue proportion, nor was the State's income from Excoise much disturbed. The following table gives the details of relief in connexion with special works. The labour was chiefly directed to the making of tanks, and the remuneration ranged from 1 anna for a man to  $\frac{1}{2}$  anna for a child :—

\* This is not quite correct. The remissions were—

In 1245 Fuslee,	...	...	...	...	Rs.	87,086
In 1246 Fuslee, on account of 1245,	...	...	...	...	"	26,083
Total,	...	...	...	...	"	1,13,169

See *infra*, para. 114.

† I am indebted to Luchmun Singh, Deputy Collector of Boolundshuhur, for this information.

‡ This included the pay of some sowars and burkundases, who were employed for a few days in keeping the peace during March.

<i>Sudder Station.</i>			<i>Persons.</i>	<i>Rupees.</i>
April,	...	...	18,300	973
May,	...	...	39,273	2,143
June 1st to 23rd,	...	...	48,852	2,647
<i>In various parts of the District.</i>				
May,	...	...	17,691	938
June 1st to 23rd,	...	...	8,433	450
<i>Hutgaon.</i>				
June 5th to 20th,	...	...	1,049	58
Total,			1,33,598	7,209

**108. Condition of Banda.**—Measures of relief were first adopted in Banda in February, when application was made and sanction given by Government for unlimited disbursement from the treasury. The able-bodied were forthwith informed that there was work in abundance for them, and the subordinate native officers were instructed to send into the Sudder Station all the infirm and aged who had not the means to support themselves. Not a single deserving applicant was refused. It proved eventually that the cost to Government had been trifling, Rs. 1,677 only having been spent by order of the Collector during the whole season. The smallness of this sum was attributed to the fact that the autumn crops in Banda were more plentiful than in any other neighbouring district. From here, as indeed also from Futtehpore, exportation of grain took place to some extent, and, though corn was dear at home, the cultivators of Banda were not altogether without a livelihood. The recipients of private charity were more numerous, and consisted either of persons from a distance, who, owing to emaciation and weakness, were unable to labour, or else the helpless of the district, together with the casual dependents of the zemindars. In all these cases no return for maintenance could be exacted, and as many as 1,600 a day at one time were under relief, the funds being supplied partly by benevolent persons on the spot and partly by the Calcutta Committee.

**109. Condition of Humeerpore.**—The distress in Humeerpore was of a more aggravated kind, and broke out earlier than in Banda. In truth, the district had not recovered the blow dealt it in 1833-34, when it was again visited by drought. On the previous occasion the West of the district suffered most; now, on the contrary, the greatest severity was in the East. "By the former," says\* Mr. W. Muir, "35 villages were totally desolated in Julalpoor, and by both 72 in Calpee and Humeerpore were laid waste and left without an inhabitant." At the end of November, 1837, the Government, acting on the representations of the Collector, gave instructions that the Tehseeldars should not be hard on any one, either rich or poor, but should suspend month by month whatever sums were deemed proper with reference to the existing state of respective villages. "It is preferable," observed the Board, in conveying the wishes of Government to the Commissioner of Allahabad, "to direct suspension of a lump sum at once on account of either the Khureef or Rubbee." The same order was extended to Calpee, where great privation was being felt; and in both cases the injunction was promptly obeyed. These are the only instances in which the Government records absolutely show that this policy was carried out; but, as the order to this effect was given generally to all Commissioners, there is no reason to doubt that it was universally put into practice. On the 7th of December, Rs. 2,000 a month were requested for gratuitous distribution, but Government declined at this early stage to authorize such payments, on the ground that the charge of the helpless was best left to private beneficence, though if necessary Government would supplement private funds, not because it was bound to do so, but because such a course

\* See his Settlement Report on the Calpee Pergunnahs, para. 31.

might stimulate the liberality of individuals. Still the distress continued to increase, and the emigration to Saugor and other neighbouring places was considerable. Government was therefore obliged to intervene actively; and on February the 9th, it empowered the Magistrate to employ the destitute on works of public utility, at rates which would allow nothing more than the barest means of subsistence. The scale was fixed at 1 anna a day for a man,  $\frac{2}{3}$  anna for a woman, and  $\frac{1}{4}$  anna for a child. The work both at Calpee and in Humeerpore was principally on tanks, roads, and wells. The opportunity was also taken to repair various Thannahs and Tehseeldarees, and to construct one or two serais. As soon as it was known that employment was to be had, the poor flocked to the scenes of labour, and even those who had emigrated came back in large numbers in the hope of sustaining life nearer home. Many of the applicants at Calpee were men from the Doab, Jalaon, and other neighbouring districts, and also the wives and children of artizans who still continued to ply their trades in the town. After a time a process of weeding took place, for at first no person's application was refused. Those who had wandered from the Doab were induced to return on the intimation that work was being supplied in the vicinity of their own villages, and the emigrants from Native States, when ascertained to be such, were discarded. By this means the daily numbers, which had swelled in the interval between the 15th and 24th of February from 140 to over 6,900, were reduced to an average of about 2,900 in March, and 3,000 in April. At a later date foreigners were, by the orders of Government, admitted to work on the same conditions as British subjects. The entire amount disbursed by Government for these operations amounted to Rs. 46,694.

**110. Instance of Native Stupidity in Humeerpore.**—The history of the famine in Humeerpore contains one of the most remarkable instances of native stupidity that it has ever been my fortune to meet with. One of the Tehseeldars, entrusted with the management of the relief works in Pergunnah Punwaree, failed during eight successive days in March to employ a single pauper, though a multitude was clamouring at his door for bread. The omission only became known at headquarters when he had submitted his weekly statement; and on being asked why he had acted thus on his own responsibility, he gravely excused himself by saying that "the days in question were holidays!"

**111. Condition of Kumaon.**—Although not a fertile country, Kumaon had so far usually had grain enough for home consumption and to spare for exportation to the Bhooteas, the Teree Rajah's country, and the plains. But in 1837, the drought was as unprecedented in the hills as elsewhere, and the Khureef crops, which consisted chiefly of wheat, partially failed. Early in 1838, the zemindars began to dread the worst results, and resolutely kept back their grain, and not even the offer of a rupee for 10 or 11 seers, which was a higher price than had ever obtained before, would tempt them. It became therefore a matter of serious consideration how to feed the troops, for the garrison at Almorah alone consumed from 15 to 20 maunds a day. In despair of being able to prevail on the country-folk in any other way, the Commissioner at last told them to name their own terms, and intimated that he was ready to receive corn in payment of revenue. He even sent agents into the interior with money in their hands. Yet despite every device the people remained obdurate; for they had got the idea into their head that there were to be two or more successive years of famine, the influence of which would extend to the hills, and that all they had must be husbanded for the evil day. In quarters too on which Government had hitherto depended for supplies it had been found more profitable to trade with the plains. The grain-sellers of Pergunnah Palee, for instance, who usually traded with Almorah, had transferred their dealings to Rohilkund for the nonce. Under these circumstances, it became necessary for the local authorities to resort to coercion, and the Commissioner compelled every zemindar to sell a certain portion of grain at his own price. Meanwhile, in Gurlihal, the Rubbee crops presented a splendid appearance—removing thereby the apprehension which had arisen during the previous autumn, when attah had fallen

from 80 to 35 seers for the rupee. If the inhabitants of these regions would have given of their abundance to Almorah, there need have been no further anxiety. But unfortunately the men of Gurhwal dreaded the Kumaonees, and would not risk their property in a distant market. Coolies were the only means of transport between one place and another, and therefore the cost of carriage was dear. There was also the chance of being plundered on the road; and, to crown all, these simple-minded villagers did not value money, but were conservative enough to prefer their old system of barter, and to exchange their corn for sugar, tobacco, and cloth, with the pedlars from the plains, and for salt and borax with their neighbours in Bhootan. On the 4th of June, the Commissioner reported that the wheat in the vicinity of Almorah was a failure, and that hail had destroyed much of the harvest in some parts of Kumaon, though, generally speaking, the crop in the interior was fair. On the 28th of June he wrote in great distress to the Commissioner of Rohilcund to send him food immediately, as the inhabitants of Almorah were on the verge of starvation. His exertions to procure grain within his own jurisdiction had been utterly unsuccessful. Accordingly a supply of corn was sent him from Bareilly at an expense of about Rs. 4 a maund for carriage. On the 30th of July, the Commissioner intimated that there did not seem to be any grain at all in the province. Even the zemindars were in great want, for the high prices had induced them to export every available seer to the plains. He hoped that they would soon be relieved by the ripening of the "kungnee," which was much eaten by the hill people, and which promised to be ready in a fortnight or three weeks; but till then he wanted further assistance from below. More provisions were therefore despatched. Meanwhile the rain came to the rescue, and very soon all fear of scarcity was at an end.

**112. Incidental information concerning other parts of the Famine Tract.**—Such is the detailed information that I have been able to collect concerning various districts in the famine tract. As to the others, it is useless to treat of them in separate paragraphs—for the simple reason that I have not found anything more regarding them than a passing remark in the official letters of the period, and specially in the Despatches from the Governor-General to the Court of Directors. I have already shown for instance in writing of Boolundshuhur, that at an early date there was a great inrush of starving people from Marwar, Hurriana, Etawah, and Mynpoory. There is no surer index than this that the homes which the exiles had left were being subject to grievous hardships. The grants-in-aid of the Calcutta Committee constitute another trustworthy test, and from the list of these it appears that not only Etawah and Mynpoory, but also Muttra, Delhi, and Kurnaul, were sufferers. The remissions of land revenue, as will be presently seen, help to establish the same conclusion. The evil plight of Etawah, whose population depended entirely on the Khureef for their food, was reported\* early in the year by the Commissioner of Agra. Except in certain villages of Pergunnahs Phuppoond and Belah, the autumn crop had failed. On the 10th of February, the Collector of Muttra announced a similar disaster to the crops in Pergunnahs Nohjheel, Kosee, Suhar, and Areeng of his district. Rohtuck, owing to the impossibility of procuring water from wells, fared worse than Panniput or Goorgaon. The largest tanks were dry, grass was not to be had, and the whole country, except in the neighbourhood of the canal, was a scene of desolation. In the Western division of the Delhi territory the crops had nearly everywhere perished. In the Southern division the aspect of affairs was a shade less gloomy. In Pergunnah Nob, with the exception of the villages on the Kotila and Chundenee Jheels, where large excavation works were instituted, there was great failure of the Khureef. The lighter soil of Hutteen made two or three showers which fell produce tolerable crops. In Hodul and Pulwul there was fearful distress. In Poonahana, Ferozepore, Taroo, and Bahoruh, the rain had been more plentiful, and consequently the harvest more remunerative. In Sonuh, Jarsa, Rewaree, and Shah-

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\* On the 31st of January, 1838.

jehanpore, there were evident signs of want. In Palee the Khureef was indifferent, but the prospect of the Rubbee good. Extraordinary prices prevailed, and these enabled the Malgoozars to liquidate part of the Government demand. In the Northern division a little Rubbee was grown by means of irrigation. On May the 16th, the Collector of Pillibheet wrote to the Board that the Khureef, which usually yielded at the rate of 12 annas of the year's out-turn, was only a 6½ anna crop. At the same time the tidings came from Zillah Shahjehanpore that the cultivation had been so scanty as materially to influence the prospects of the revenue. The Collector admitted that his district had not suffered as much as many, yet he thought it advisable that remissions should be made to the headmen, on the understanding that the ryots participated in the relief. The pergunnahs which suffered most were Shahjehanpore, Powasn, Baragaon, Negohee, and Julalpore.

**113. Colonel Baird Smith's Estimate of the Suffering in this Famine.**—Colonel Baird Smith has devised an ingenious method of ascertaining what divisions the famine affected most severely, by giving the revenue of each in averages for quinquennial periods, which extend from ten years prior to the famine to ten years after it. The results as arranged in tabular form are these :—

Divisions.			From 1827-28 to 1831-32.	From 1832-33 to 1836-37.	From 1837-38 to 1841-42.	From 1842-43 to 1846-47.
			Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Meerut,	...	...	52,28,807	56,54,624	68,81,540	69,05,136
Rohilcund,	...	...	64,12,554	58,58,664	55,18,641	63,53,941
Agra,	...	...	70,56,480	75,01,686	62,55,285	70,34,606
Allahabad,	...	...	91,63,217	87,87,969	75,16,670	84,00,698
Benares (Goruckpore and Azim- gurrh only),	...	}	17,92,438	24,43,719	29,95,416	84,99,065
Delhi, ...	...	...	...	27,86,912	32,70,727	...

"From a study of this Table," he continues, "some clear inferences may be drawn as to the comparative intensity of the general pressure. It is well known that remissions of the Government demand, especially under prolonged settlements of the revenue, are made only in cases of urgent and pressing necessity. Average pressure is presumed to be provided against in the terms of the Settlement, and District Officers act under a heavy sense of personal responsibility when they propose large remissions. They now\* act generally with an intimate, and, probably in 1837-38, they also acted with a fair knowledge of the real condition of their people,—so that the amount of remission of public demand proposed for each district, and the loss of revenue consequent thereon, may be taken as an approximate test of the intensity of the local pressure. So estimated, the Agra Division—including the Districts of Agra, Muttra, Etawah, Mynpoory, and Futtehgurh—exhibits results surpassing those of any other division. The average annual revenue of the division prior to the famine was in round numbers Rs. 75,02,000, or nearly £750,000. In the five years following the famine, it fell to Rs. 62,55,000, or £625,500,—thus showing

\* i. e., in 1861, A. D.

"an annual loss of Rs. 12,47,000, or £124,700, or a total loss in five years of  
 "Rs. 62,35,000, or £623,500. Further, however, the lapse of five years by no  
 "means obliterated the influence of the famine on the revenue of the State. In the  
 "following five years, the average annual revenue was still nearly Rs. 5,00,000  
 "below the standard prior to the famine, and in those years a further loss of nearly  
 "25 lakhs, or £250,000, took place. At this present time the revenue continues to  
 "show a difference from the above standard of about three and a half lakhs, so that  
 "about Rs. 45,50,000, or £455,000, must be added for the loss in the thirteen years  
 "intervening between 1846-47 and 1859-60. The stamp of this terrible calamity  
 "has, therefore, remained uneffaced in this Division by the lapse of two-and-twenty  
 "years, and the State has received from the districts forming it less revenue by an  
 "aggregate amount of the almost incredible sum of Rs. 1,32,85,000, or £1,328,500,  
 "than it would have done had it been possible by any expedients to have warded off the  
 "catastrophe. The above, it should be noticed, somewhat under-rates the loss; inas-  
 "much as credit is given for increase of revenue due to resumptions of rent-free  
 "lands, lapses of estates, and the various miscellaneous items, which, in the course  
 "of 22 years, have swollen the apparent land revenue. It also somewhat over-rates  
 "it from not taking account of reductions of demand due to other causes than the  
 "famine, so that on the whole it is probably not far wrong. It is well that in deal-  
 "ing with measures to remedy calamities so disastrous, some definite conceptions should  
 "be formed of the vast interests involved, and few illustrations could be more impressive  
 "than this, which shows that within a single division agricultural property, certainly  
 "not less than from 8 to 10½ millions sterling in gross value, was entirely annihilated.

"Nearly equal in order of intensity stands the Allahabad Division, includ-  
 "ing the districts of Allahabad, Futtehpore, Cawnpore, Humeerpore, and Banda.  
 "Here the loss in the first five years following the famine was Rs. 12,70,000, or  
 "£1,27,000 annually, or in all, Rs. 63,50,000, or £6,35,000. In the succeeding  
 "five years, however, the loss was sensibly less than in the Agra Division—being  
 "Rs. 3,88,000, or £38,800 per annum, or in all, Rs. 19,40,000, or £194,000. The  
 "Division has not yet completely recovered itself, and its revenue is still about  
 "Rs. 2,00,000 or £20,000 per annum, below the standard previous to the famine. The  
 "whole loss of revenue in this Division may therefore be computed at Rs. 1,08,90,000,  
 "or £1,089,000,—representing a destruction of agricultural property which may be  
 "valued at from six to eight millions sterling according to the proportion which the  
 "revenue is assumed to bear to the gross produce of the land. Regarding this  
 "proportion opinions differ; but for purposes of calculation I take it to be as 1 to 8.

"Rohilcund shows very moderate traces of suffering, and even these were  
 "nearly obliterated within the five years after the famine. The total loss in this Divi-  
 "sion did not exceed probably about Rs. 18,00,000, or £180,000, and one mil-  
 "lion sterling may be taken to represent the value of produce lost. The revenue in  
 "the second period of five years, after the famine was about 5 lakhs per annum above  
 "the anti-famine standard, and it has continued rather to rise than fall ever since.

"The Meerut Division shows not only no signs of permanent suffering, but  
 "marked proofs of great and steady progress. In the first five years after the famine,  
 "its revenue rose to over Rs. 7,00,000, or £70,000 per annum, and in the next five  
 "years to about Rs. 12,50,000 above the standard before the famine. It has  
 "remained nearly constant ever since. These results fully confirm the belief that, in  
 "1837-38, the Meerut Division scarcely suffered at all. A trace of pressure in Boo-  
 "lundshuhur, and somewhat severer suffering in Allygurh, represent the full influence  
 "of the famine; and as I find from the records of the Allygurh District that the  
 "whole amount of remissions deemed necessary by the Collector to mitigate the suf-  
 "fering was only Rs. 87,000, the calamity could evidently have been but lightly felt."



I do not attempt to decide whether Colonel Baird Smith's calculations are even approximately accurate. His estimates are based on conjecture, and as such, they must be taken for what they are worth, it being remembered that they are the work of an intelligent man, whose mind was concentrated on his subject at the time he wrote. The statistics relating to the famine of 1837-38 are far too defective to warrant any absolute conclusion of the loss either to Government or the individuals. Under these circumstances, I prefer to leave Colonel Baird Smith's computation as it stands, and shall confine myself to an enumeration of the sums spent or remitted by Government, and of the funds contributed by private persons, concerning which substantial evidence remains.

**114. Estimated amount of the Remissions of Land Revenue due to the Famine.**—In a foot-note to paragraph 58 of the Second Part of his Report, Colonel Baird Smith observes:—"It is officially stated that, before February, 1838, £600,000 of revenue were remitted, and the process, as we know, continued long after." I do not know where he procured this information, for my own enquiry has failed to elicit any proof whatever of the assertion. Neither in the newspapers nor the Government records of that period can I find any such statement as he alleges, and the whole tenour of the Board's orders seems to me against the policy of allowing any remissions at all at so early a stage. I can only conclude that Colonel Baird Smith has mistaken remissions for suspensions. The latter mode of relief was undoubtedly advocated and put into practice before the end of 1837. But the Board never held out any prospect of remission till May or June, and, even when they had convinced themselves of the necessity of this remedy, they could only direct Collectors to "suspend balances with a view to immediate remission as soon as the orders of Government were received." This was the instruction given to the Collector of Furruckabad, when, in his letter of June the 8th, he advocated a remission of Rs. 3,83,085—a sum which the Board did not under the circumstances think adequate, and therefore increased to Rs. 6,32,955. My own estimate of the loss to Government is mainly based on the statistics of the Sudder Board of Revenue, which ought to be accurate so far as they go, though there is external evidence to show that they are not exhaustive. The following table exhibits the amount of remissions and net balances for the North-West Provinces on account of the Fuslee year 1245, corresponding with A. D. 1837-38. It has been compiled from entries in the Board's Proceedings for May, 1840, and April, 1841; and, in the face of such authority, I do not think there can be any ground for questioning the accuracy of the figures:—

*Detailed Tabular Statement of Remissions and Net Balances for 1837-88 A. D.*

DIVISION.	Districts.				Remissions.		Net Balances.	
					1245 Fuslee.	1246 Fuslee.	1245 Fuslee.	1246 Fuslee.
					Ra.	Ra.	Ra.	Ra.
MEERUT.	Meerut, ...	...	...	...	18,979	...	2,177	...
	Moozuffernuggur, ...	...	...	...	39,286	...	1,594	1,434
	Seharunpore, ...	...	...	...	...	1,03,264	1,03,324	...
	Dehra Doon, ...	...	...	...	...	25	56	31
	Boolundshuhur, ...	...	...	...	...	1,05,921	1,28,739	19,278
	Allygurh, ...	...	...	...	87,086	26,083	39,679	9,900
	Total, ...	...	...	...	1,45,351	2,35,293	2,75,569	30,637
AGRA.	Agra, ...	...	...	...	10,02,767	...	15,152	11,892
	Muttra, ...	...	...	...	...	3,03,790	3,51,258	32,439
	Furruckabad, ...	...	...	...	790	...	7,20,968	7,03,685
	Mynpoory, ...	...	...	...	101	72,830	5,00,274	4,09,804
	Etawah, ...	...	...	...	8,76,641	6,431	1,23,920	1,07,261
	Total, ...	...	...	...	18,80,299	3,63,051	17,11,572	12,65,081
ROHILKUND.	Bareilly, ...	...	...	...	...	...	1,56,136	1,51,003
	Shahjehanpore, ...	...	...	...	50,501	1,23,362	1,27,379	287
	Pilibheet, ...	...	...	...	...	...	1,15,480	1,08,543
	Moradabad, ...	...	...	...	6,836	...	1,52,268	1,50,608
	Bijnour, ...	...	...	...	1,528	89,541	90,828	1,104
	Budaon, ...	...	...	...	...	...	2,26,199	2,24,533
	Kumaon, ...	...	...	...	...	132	1,232	29
	Total, ...	...	...	...	58,865	2,13,035	8,69,522	6,36,107
ALLAHABAD.	Allahabad, ...	...	...	...	...	...	1,263	1,263
	Futtehpore, ...	...	...	...	49,624	...	5,909	6,965
	Cawnpore, ...	...	...	...	...	1,00,824	10,50,377	9,22,290
	Banda, ...	...	...	...	...	...	6,695	5,753
	Humeerpore, ...	...	...	...	3,94,777	...	25,535	18,782
	Total, ...	...	...	...	4,44,401	1,00,824	10,89,779	9,55,053
BENARES.	Benares, ...	...	...	...	394	...	4,471	4,001
	Mirzapore, ...	...	...	...	751	...	11,716	1,679
	Jounpore, ...	...	...	...	...	9,199	9,554	346
	Goruckpore, ...	...	...	...	...	208	5,727	5,508
	Ghazeepore, ...	...	...	...	203	24	12,136	5,121
	Azingurh, ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Total, ...	...	...	...	1,348	9,431	43,604	16,685
DELHI.	Delhi, ...	...	...	...	...	7,542	9,783	1,404
	Goorgaon, ...	...	...	...	...	3,36,631	3,42,459	4,024
	Paneeput, ...	...	...	...	...	20,303	21,295	362
	Hissar, ...	...	...	...	4,28,144	...	...	...
	Rohtuck, ...	...	...	...	5,02,645	...	...	...
	Umballa, ...	...	...	...	...	...	9,132	3,271
	Bhutty Territory, ...	...	...	...	53,414	...	720	720
	Total, ...	...	...	...	9,84,103	3,64,476	3,83,389	9,781
SAUGOR AND NEER- BUDDA TERRITORY.	Saugor, ...	...	...	...	...	...	593	523
	Jubbulpore, ...	...	...	...	...	42,870	42,870	...
	Hoshungabad, ...	...	...	...	...	24,013	24,013	...
	Total, ...	...	...	...	...	66,883	67,476	523
AJMERE.	Ajmere, ...	...	...	...	...	...	10,653	9,868
	Total, ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
NIMAR.	Nimar, ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Total, ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Grand Total, Co.'s Ra., ...					35,14,367	13,72,993	44,51,564	29,23,705

From this it will be seen that the aggregate of remissions was Rs. 48,87,360, and the net balances Rs. 29,23,705. The history of the latter it is impossible to trace; but I am inclined to believe that, the greater part would be written off in time as irrecoverable.

In the above table I have confined myself to the Board's mention of remissions made either during 1245 or subsequently on account of that year in 1246, because with this limitation there is a tolerable degree of certainty that they were caused by the drought. But there are other items spoken of elsewhere, the authority for some of which is equally indisputable, whilst it is possible that others have been exaggerated or wrongly attributed to the famine. For instance, Mr. Rose, whose local experience leaves no room for doubt, in his Settlement Report of Cawnpore tells of much larger\* loss of revenue for that district than is given by the Board's tables. His figures are as follows :—

					Rs.
1837-38,	...	...	...	...	10,18,639
1838-39,	...	...	...	...	4,41,307
1839-40,	...	...	...	...	2,65,298
Total,					17,25,244

If we deduct Rs. 1,00,824, the amount allowed by the Board, there will still remain Rs. 16,24,420 to be added to the account. Again, we know that Mynpoory suffered severely. Yet the whole of the remissions, as given by the Board, is Rs. 72,931, though, on July the 7th, the Commissioner intimated that in his opinion a remission of Rs. 7,66,138 would be requisite. What was the ultimate order in this case I have not been able to discover, but it seems not unlikely that the Commissioner's recommendation would have weight with the Government, and that Rs. 6,93,207—the balance, after the remission recorded by the Board is taken into account—would be relinquished. So, too, I think it probable that the arrears of Rs. 6,32,955 for Furruckabad, as mentioned a little time ago, would be abandoned, although the Board's statistics relating to 1245 only show a remission of Rs. 790. Again, Colonel Baird Smith says that the remissions to the Agra District in the first year following the calamity were at least Rs. 22,00,000. There would be, therefore, on Colonel Baird Smith's authority, a sum of Rs. 11,97,233 remitted, irrespectively of that which the Board's tables show. In Ajmere, Rs. 2,152 were eventually abandoned. If all these sums are admitted, the account would then stand thus :—

					Rs.
Remissions according to the Board's Tables,	...	...	...	...	48,87,360
Further remissions in Cawnpore,	...	...	...	...	16,24,420
Probable remissions for Mynpoory,	...	...	...	...	6,93,207
Probable remissions for Furruckabad,	...	...	...	...	6,32,165
Possible further remissions in Agra,	...	...	...	...	11,97,233
Remissions in Ajmere,	...	...	...	...	21,552
Total,					90,55,937

The land revenue for the North-Western Provinces for the year 1837-38† was Rs. 3,59,85,696.

\* Mr. Montgomery's Statement of Remissions differs a little from Mr. Rose's,—

					Rs.
1837-38,	...	...	...	...	10,15,999
1838-39,	...	...	...	...	4,38,749
1839-40,	...	...	...	...	2,61,221
Total,					17,10,969

† See the Parliamentary Returns relating to the Indian accounts for that year.

**115. Enumeration of the Sums known to have been Spent by Government in Grants-in-Aid and on Special Relief Works.**—Only an approximate notion can be formed of the grants which Government gave in aid to the funds of the various charitable societies, and of the money which it spent on special relief works. I have ascertained the following particulars, but the list is manifestly incomplete :—

		Rs.
Subvention to the Agra Relief Society,	...	5,000
„ Cawnpore Ditto,	...	2,000
„ Furruckabad Ditto,	...	2,000
Special Relief Works at Furruckabad,	...	1,63,006
		Rs.
„ Delhi Division,	... 1,07,199*	
„ Meerut Division,	... 37,996*	
„ Rohilound Division,	13,366*	
„ Allahabad Division,	1,20,659*	
„ Grand Trunk Road,	97,856*	
		3,77,076
Total,	...	5,49,082

This table only takes account of one district, and that, according to the Commissioner's Report, the least afflicted in the Agra Division. In writing † after the event to the Court of Directors Lord Auckland observed,—“The districts which suffered most severely are those which compose the Division of the Agra Commissioner. In these the amount of expenditure in measures of relief, and in the temporary increase of Police establishments which were necessary, and of the loss sustained in the failure of the revenue, is far greater than the sum of those items for the aggregate of the remaining districts under the Government of these Provinces.” Unfortunately, however, no details are given, and I can trace no mention of the outlay for the whole of the division. Colonel Baird Smith remarks,—“I find it difficult to credit some of the statements of expenditure on relief works. I find it estimated in the Agra District only, and apparently on an official basis, at Rs. 13,20,000.” With information so vague, it is quite impossible to say what Government really did spend.

**116. Enumeration of the Sums known to have been Contributed from Private Sources.**—Our knowledge of the amount collected from private sources is equally unsatisfactory. I can only vouch for the following items :—

		Rs.
Contributions from Bombay,	...	15,000
„ Berhampore,	...	6,596
„ Calcutta,	...	1,46,000
Furruckabad Road Fund,	...	15,636
„ Private Relief Fund,	...	14,133‡
Collected in Cawnpore,	...	2,000
Total,	...	1,99,365

This does not take into consideration local subscriptions for relief-houses in Boolundshuhur, Banda, Cawnpore, and Agra, which we know were in operation, but concerning which, so far as I am aware, no complete accounts have been preserved.

\* See No. 4 of 1840, from the Governor-General to the Court of Directors.

† See No. 1 of 1839, dated 9th of February.

‡ The whole sum expended on private charity was Rs. 24,133; but of this amount Rs. 8,000 came from Calcutta, and Rs. 2,000 from Government.

**117. Statement of Prices, average and exceptional, which obtained during the Famine.**—No general record of prices exists. The following table contains all that I can learn on the subject:—

<i>Average during 1837 and 1838.</i>				S.	Ch.
Futtehpore,	...	...	...	20	13
Allygurh,	...	...	...	20	0
Agra, ...	...	...	...	17	6
Cawnpore,	...	...	...	17	0

<i>Highest Prices during the Famine.</i>				S.	Ch.
Allygurh,	...	...	...	18	0
Allahabad,	...	...	...	17	8
Cawnpore,	...	...	...	13	8
Furruckabad,	...	...	...	12	8
Muttra,...	...	...	...	12	0
Kurnaul,...	...	...	...	12	0
Agra, ...	...	...	...	11	8
Banda, ...	...	...	...	10	0
Almorah,	...	...	...	10	0
Boolundshuhur,	...	...	...	8	0

**118. Colonel Baird Smith's Estimate of the Mortality and of the Tract of the Famine.**—Colonel Baird Smith estimates\* that "the total population affected by the famine of 1837-38 must have been between eight and nine millions, and that the population of the districts within which the intensity of suffering was greatest and the mortality highest must have been roughly about five millions." The area of the famine tract he guesses to have been from 20,000 to 25,000 square miles, and he doubts whether the general mortality could have been less than 800,000. On these points I have been unable to obtain any trustworthy statistics.

**119. Advantage derived from Canals.**—Wherever a canal was in operation the demand for water was greatly in excess of that of former years, upwards of 400,000 acres in all having been rescued from the effects of drought by this means. The following table shows the number of acres irrigated, and the value of the Khureef and Rubbee crops that were raised, together with the receipts of Government:—

	<i>Acres irrigated.</i>	<i>Value of crop.</i>	<i>Share of Government.</i>
		Rs.	Rs.
Western Jumna Canals, ...	3,05,464	1,46,28,000	14,62,800
† Eastern Jumna Canal, ...	96,417	49,10,503	4,91,050
	<u>4,01,881</u>	<u>1,95,38,503</u>	<u>19,53,850</u>

The first column includes about 60,000 acres devoted to cotton and indigo, but this does not materially affect the calculation, for the produce of such lands would in the existing state of the market furnish the means of buying food equivalent at least to what they would have yielded if sown with grain crops. I have not been able to discover what was the out-turn of this irrigated land, but taking into account the circumstances of its cultivation, I think it would be safe to assume an average yield or purchasing power of twelve† maunds to the acre. We should then have a total

\* See his Report, Section II., Para. 53.

† See *Calcutta Review*, Volume XII., 1849, Article III., Pages 94 and 115.

† This is fully warranted by the returns of 1860-61, when the Eastern and Western Jumna Canals together gave an average of 14½ maunds, or about 1,172 lbs. of wheat to the acre. The present proportion in England is much more than this, the yield being estimated by the best authorities at from 28 to 33 bushels per acre. (See *Saturday Review* for April 16th, 1868, "Agricultural Statistics.")

supply of 48,22,572 maunds, or 19,29,02,880 seers, which, at the rate of a seer a day amongst a man, a woman, and a child, the ordinary famine dole, would maintain 10,59,905 men, as many women, and as many children for six months of a hundred and eighty-two days.

120. The Board declines to allow Tuccavee.—In conformity with the practice observed on former occasions, the Commissioner of Agra asked in the middle of June for tuccavee to enable the cultivators in his division to buy seed and bullocks. There was every prospect then of a favorable season. The Board however declined, saying that they were ready to accept a jumma for the coming year\* much below the standard, should such a measure prove necessary, but that they could not hear of advances, as the system would make the agriculturists rely too little on themselves. It will be noticed that by this decision they initiated a policy essentially different from that of their predecessors in 1804. I may add also that, despite numerous applications, they persisted in it to the end.

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\* The Agra Commissioner followed this intimation up on June 30th by asking for the jumma of the Agra district to be reduced during 1246 Fuallee from Rs. 16,88,676 to Rs. 12,66,507. The Board answered that it was too early then to listen to the proposition.

## SECTION VI.

### FAMINE OF 1860-61.

**121. First Signs of the Famine. Precautionary Measures taken by Government.**—The famine of 1860-61 was the natural result of the dry and unfavourable weather which the North-West had experienced since the middle of 1859. There had been more or less failure in the crops of this and the succeeding years, and consequently there was little grain in store when the crisis came. Up to the 13th of July, 1860, scarcely a drop of rain had fallen in the Doab. Accordingly on the 18th of that month, Mr. G. Edmonstone, the Lieutenant-Governor, issued this Memorandum by way of precaution to all Commissioners:—

“The prospects of the season are so very unfavourable at the present time that great distress may be apprehended among the poorer classes of the people, especially if within the next week or ten days there should not be an abundant and general fall of rain.

“As it is, the intelligence which he has received leads the Lieutenant-Governor to believe that, while no hope whatever remains of a rice crop being raised, the ploughing has been very limited, and the sowings of the more common and less remunerative Khureef crops have been even less extensive.

“It has been brought, moreover, to the knowledge of the Lieutenant-Governor that in some parts of the country, more particularly in Western Rohilkund, and in parts of the Meerut Division, the people are unable to procure food sufficient for healthful sustenance, and have been driven, as they were in the disastrous years of 1837-38, to the use of mango-stones as an article of food.

“These are said to be selling at the rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  maund for a rupee, while the price of wheat is ranging, in parts of Rohilkund and Meerut, at from  $11\frac{1}{2}$  to 14 seers per rupee.

“From the neighbourhood of Agra, from Allahabad and Futtehpore, accounts little less alarming of the want of rain and the dearness of the necessaries of life have been received.

“It is impossible to look forward without deep concern to the serious and general distress which the continued want of rain must inevitably produce, or to the crime which cannot but be anticipated as the natural and certain consequence; and it becomes the duty of the Government to devise measures which shall give suitable employment to the poorer classes of the population, and so keep them from starvation and from crime.

“It is hoped that the various works which are in progress under the direction of the Road and Ferry Fund Committees may afford the means of giving occupation to many, and that in those districts which are traversed by the Ganges Canal the excavation of irrigating channels (which is to be carried on extensively during the present season) will provide employment for more. There can be no doubt that the officers belonging to the Departments of Irrigation and of Public Works will pay ready attention to the representations of the District Officers, and receive into their labouring gangs as many people as they can furnish with suitable employment.

“But if these means (as is quite possible) should be found insufficient, it will be necessary to undertake the execution of works in each district, with the special object of alleviating the distress that may prevail; to provide for the due control of the gangs that may be employed on them, and for the regulation of the special expenditure so to be incurred.

“There are few districts in which there are not many works the completion of which would be highly beneficial to the people, and the selection may be safely left to the discretion of the Commissioner, acting in concert with the Magistrate of each district, subject to report for the information of the Government.

“If, therefore, the prospects of the season should not improve within a week or ten days, and the necessity should arise, each Commissioner is hereby authorized to provide, in the manner above indicated, for giving employment to all those who are in need, taking care that the particular work shall be of real utility and benefit to the district, and that a fair measure of labour shall be obtained for the wages which may be given. The rate of daily remuneration need not probably exceed  $1\frac{1}{2}$  anna for each man, 1 anna for each woman, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  anna for each child under 12 years of age.

“A small establishment must be attached to each labouring gang, for the purpose of keeping nominal lists of all who are employed, making daily payments, and keeping careful accounts of expenditure, as well as for the purpose of directing and controlling the labour.

“A copy of this list, which will show the number and the names of all men, women, and children who are employed, and the amount as well as details of the daily expenditure will be forwarded at the close of each day to the Magistrate, together with a report showing the quantity of work accomplished.

" These daily returns will be useful as a check on the monthly accounts, the punctual submission of which each Magistrate will require.

" At the close of every month a brief report of these operations, and a statement of the whole outlay incurred during the month, will be forwarded to the Commissioner for submission to Government.

" The officers of the Irrigation Department and the several Executive Engineers will be requested to co-operate with the local officers in giving employment to the destitute classes of the population; and it is to be understood that no special work as above described is to be undertaken unless the officers above named and the Road and Ferry Fund Committees shall be unable to provide labour or sanctioned work to a sufficient extent.

" The Commissioners will be held responsible that the strictest possible economy shall be enforced, consistent with the object in view, that the expenditure shall be closely supervised, and that it shall continue only so long as the necessity may exist."

At the same time the Board of Revenue were warned that suspension of the Khureef instalments might be unavoidable, even if remissions did not ultimately become necessary. Under these circumstances, the Lieutenant-Governor recommended to them the expediency of calling for all information which would facilitate their proceedings in case the collection of the revenue was affected. The Board were not slow to act in the matter, and on the same day (July 18th) addressed a confidential letter to all Collectors and Commissioners, in which they desired them to watch the prospects of the season, and to procure information relative to the expected out-turn of the crops and the condition of the people, and to report in detail. District Officers were enjoined to observe secrecy in their proceedings.

**122. Deceptive Fall of Rain in July.**—Before this Circular was issued, tidings had already been received of abundant rain in Meerut, in the Southern districts of the Meerut Division, and here and there in Rohilcund, and within a few days following equally welcome reports were sent in from other parts. The meteorological returns for the week ending July 20th show that the fall was extensive, and a week later (on July 27th) the Board intimated to Government that the prospects of the season continued to improve daily, and that they no longer entertained fear of any general distress. The sequel was to prove that they had committed the same error in judgment as their predecessors did in 1803. Yet it must be admitted that the conclusion was justifiable at the time it was made. Previously to the date on which the Board wrote there had been a steady downpour of rain, and there was every likelihood of more. The tardiness with which the wet season had set in was an additional reason for expecting that it would continue. The clouds were lowering over the whole face of the country. Enough rain had fallen to moisten the ground thoroughly and enable the seed to germinate; it needed but a succession of grateful showers to bring the harvest in general to maturity. But in August, with the exception of the week from the 11th to the 17th, little rain fell, and in September next to none. The result was a great disparity in the out-turn. "In no two districts,"\* observed the Central Relief Committee long after the event, "was the failure of the annual crop approximately equal, nor was the same *status* even found to prevail either over the same district, or indeed throughout the same pergunnah. One village which had been blessed with abundant crops would be found adjoining another where scarce a grain of corn had ripened. This the members of the Committee witnessed with their own eyes to be the fact in some of the distressed pergunnahs of the Agra District. This characteristic *status* naturally led to extraordinary conflict of opinion. Those who had seen the best villages, or parts of the district or country, scarcely believed or would be convinced of the pressure of famine which prevailed among the worst; while, again, such as had witnessed the sufferings of the poor in the worst quarters were ready to imagine them to be universal. This contrast was further exaggerated by the natural effect produced by the famine prices to which grain and provender went up: for where the crops were good, they were worth three or four times the money value

\* See their final report to Government, North-West Provinces, Proceedings, No. 376, March 29th, 1862.



" for which they would have sold in ordinary years. The possessors therefore of such crops were actually benefitting by the scarcity, while where there was no produce, the sufferings of the people, who could neither get grain to eat nor provender for their cattle, except by paying prices treble and quadruple what would have supplied their wants in ordinary years, were aggravated four-fold." Towards the end of October however the high price of grain and the depressed state of the lower classes in the larger towns brought home to the minds of the European community the fact that a great calamity was imminent. The earlier sufferings of the rural classes appear either not to have been heeded or not to have been known. The revenue was still being paid, and it had been ascertained that in some quarters the crops had been up to the average; and it was difficult to reconcile these facts with the existence of any wide-spread distress. Even the emigration of villagers from Muttra, Allygurh, Boolundshuhur, and Mynpoory, did not at first serve to dispel the delusion. A few there were who for some time had had apprehensions of what might be coming, and chief amongst these was the Lieutenant-Governor. His proceedings as far back as July have already been recorded. But subsequently, when the majority of his officers were sanguine about the future, he himself by a sort of intuition seems to have been aware that greater trouble was in store than any which they had already seen. As week after week of drought ensued, he plainly foresaw that the Khureef, far from making up for former shortcomings, would in itself be too scanty to maintain the population. There were the strongest reasons too for fearing that from the parched condition of the ground the sowings for the Rubbee would be limited. A personal inspection of the Allygurh, Muttra, and Boolundshuhur Districts in November, added to the reports which he received from other quarters, confirmed his suspicions that throughout the Meerut Division, and in many parts of the Agra and Rohilcund Divisions, thousands would soon be begging their bread. He accordingly obtained the sanction of the Imperial Government to a proposition for setting aside five or six lakhs to be distributed in the form of wages amongst those of the destitute who were willing and able to labour on special works.

**123. Principles on which Government determined to assist the able-bodied.**—The principles by which Government announced that it would be guided in affording relief were these: *1st*,—That none but the very old, the very young, and the infirm, who were absolutely unable to work, should receive food gratuitously. *2nd*,—That work should be concentrated as much as possible, so as to facilitate supervision and check. *3rd*,—That only those works of permanent utility should be undertaken which were capable of being completed within a short time. *4th*,—That as the object was to save people from starvation, and not to attract those who could get employment elsewhere, the rate of daily wages should be kept at the lowest possible scale. The proportion generally adopted was—

					A.	P.
For a man,	...	...	...	...	1	6
For a woman,	...	...	...	...	1	0
For a child,	...	...	...	...	0	6

By these limitations it was hoped that the faults of 1837-38 might be avoided. On that occasion, enormous expenditure was incurred, and Government had little to show for its money in the end. Besides this, those who most needed charitable assistance were not always the persons chosen for employment. Henceforward the distinction between those who could and those who could not labour was to be rigidly observed, and in the case of the former a good day's work was to constitute the only title to State relief. It was felt that even a child of six years old could carry a basket of earth, and must do so on condition of being fed. The object of Government appears to have been thoroughly attained, for I find in February, 1863, the Secretary of State\* intimated that the works undertaken from public grants seemed in his

\* See his despatch to the Governor-General in Council dated February 29th, 1863.

opinion "to have been well calculated to secure the double object of affording the "greatest practicable relief to the suffering poor, and of obtaining the best possible "return to Government for the outlay which they sanctioned."

**124. Early Operations in the Mohun Pass and other Centres of Employment.**—The special relief works which were taken in hand during the early days of the famine were: *1st*,—The road between Roorkee and Deyrah, through the Mohun Pass. *2nd*,—The road between Ghurmookhtesur and Delhi, by way of Haupper. *3rd*,—The excavation of the channel of the Futtehghurh branch of the Ganges Canal. *4th*,—The excavation of the Boolundshuhur branch of the same Canal. *5th*,—The Hindun River diversion. These great undertakings were contiguous to the scenes of the most severe suffering, and as such the people had easy access to them. Proclamations in Hindee and Oordoo concerning the road to be made between Roorkee and Deyrah were widely distributed in November, but emigration to the spot did not begin until the middle of December. The first batches which arrived came from Saharunpore. Wretchedly wan and hunger-stricken were these poor creatures, who would have died on the road had it not been for the gratuitous support which Government officials were ordered to afford them. When they arrived at the rendezvous many were in the last stage of exhaustion, and could do but little at first to earn a livelihood. For the first month the engineers reported that the price at which the work was done was very high. Earth-work which under ordinary circumstances was accomplished at the rate of Re. 1-6 per 1,000 cubic feet cost treble that sum, and the most sanguine person did not expect that the value would ever be less than Ra. 2 per 1,000 cubic feet, whilst the Lieutenant-Governor acknowledged that he should be satisfied if an average of Ra. 3 per 1,000 cubic feet was maintained. When once the fact was generally known that employment was to be had, the people flocked rapidly to the scene of labour. By the end of January the maximum numbers of 10,000 and 3,000 had been reached on the Roorkee and Ghurmookhtesur Roads respectively, and it was found necessary for a while to increase the numbers. As soon as the excavation of the Futtehghurh branch of the Ganges Canal was announced, applicants streamed in at the rate of some six or seven hundred a day. Towards the end of February there were employed daily—

On the Deyrah Road, about	...	...	16,400
Delhi and Ghurmookhtesur Road,...	...	...	1,200
Hindun diversion,	...	...	2,000
Futtehghurh branch of the Ganges Canal,	...	...	3,500
Boolundshuhur branch of the Ganges Canal,	...	...	2,500
			<hr/>
			25,600
			<hr/>

About this time, too, Government found it needful to authorize the reconstruction of the Strand Road at Agra, and to make various clearings and levelling round the fort of that place. Irrigation works were started near Futtehpoore Seekree, and a road to the railway station made at Shekoabad. Various smaller works were also instituted in and about Agra, and the cost of some defrayed from local funds and of others from grants made by the Central Relief Committee. So generally indeed was employment to be had that the Collectors of Mozuffernugger and Meerut reported early in March that no beggars were to be seen in their districts. Later in the season sums were set apart by Government for the construction of the Budaon and Bareilly Road, and for the continuance of irrigation works in Rohilound for which it had been found impossible to provide funds from the Department of Public Works Budget for 1861-62. The emigrants on their arrival at the relief works found huts either in building or ready for their habitation, and merchants on the spot to supply grain. For purposes of work, the people were usually congregated into gangs of about 500, over each of which were various officers, who regulated payment and exercised the necessary super-

vision. When those who had been employed on special works were fit for full work, they were drafted off either to the railways or to the Irrigation Department, where employment was plentiful. Here they received full wages for a full day's labour, and the number thus employed was reckoned by Colonel Baird Smith in April at from 40,000 to 50,000 a day. The entertainment of such persons however is not strictly an item of famine expenditure.

**125. Measures of Relief Adopted for the Helpless.**—But besides providing for the able-bodied, it was necessary to take into consideration the multitudes of inform, old, and very young persons who in a season of scarcity are most dependent on the State. In their behalf Magistrates were desired to invite subscriptions and donations, and Government undertook to double whatever was obtained. Early in January the following sums had been promised in the Meerut Division :—

			<i>Monthly Subscriptions.</i>	<i>Donations.</i>
			Ra.	Ra.
Saharunpore,	...	...	780	...
Roorkee, ...	...	...	1,050	...
Mozuffernugger,	...	...	...	...
Meerut, ...	...	...	850	2,265
Boolundshuhur,	...	...	500	...
Allygurh, ...	...	...	700	1,500
Total, ...			3,880	4,265

At the end of the month the following sums, including the Government equivalent, had been received and expended :—

			<i>Received.</i>	<i>Expended.</i>
			Ra.	Ra.
Saharunpore, ...	...	...	2,412	545
Mozuffernugger, ...	...	...	3,346	283
Meerut, ...	...	...	9,430	2,216
Boolundshuhur, ...	...	...	1,476	776
Allygurh, ...	...	...	7,266	584
Total, ...			28,930	4,404

For this there had been relieved during the month—

			<i>Persons.</i>
In Saharunpore, ...	...	...	17,640
In Mozuffernugger, ...	...	...	3,182
In Meerut, ...	...	...	25,864
In Boolundshuhur, ...	...	...	11,896
In Allygurh, ...	...	...	16,455
Total, ...			74,537

Within the same month there were relieved in Agra by the Local Relief Committee 17,586 helpless persons, at a cost of Ra. 795, and in Muttra 21,600 persons, at a cost of Ra. 487. During February relief in Muttra was extended to 52,200 persons, at a cost of Ra. 1,249, and in March to 110,039 persons, at a cost of Ra. 1,723. In Rohilcund it had been found necessary to distribute Ra. 1,043, in payment of food

and blankets, between October and the end of January. But the distress was not general until later. There were relieved during February—

	<i>Persons.</i>	<i>Rupees.</i>
In Bareilly, ...	15,378, at a cost of	921
„ Budaon, ...	2,706, „	156
„ Bijnour, ...	25,379, „	877
„ Moradabad, ...	13,291, „	900
Total, ...	56,754	Total, ... 2,854

The returns for March are wanting. Those for April were—

	<i>Persons.</i>	<i>Rupees.</i>
In Bareilly, ...	35,899, at a cost of	2,600
„ Budaon, ...	71,466, „	3,001
„ Bijnour, ...	115,882, „	3,054
„ Moradabad, ...	99,822, „	5,689
Total, ...	323,069	Total, ... 14,344

**126. Central Relief Committee organized at Agra.**—A Central Relief Committee was established at Agra, having Local Committees in all the affected districts in correspondence with it. Its first meeting was held on January the 9th, and the members sat subsequently once a week as long as the famine lasted. It is no small praise to those who composed it, both officials and non-officials, that in the midst of their other avocations they gave close and unwearied attention to this extraordinary duty for a period of many months. That they administered funds amounting in the aggregate to more than ten lakhs at a cost of only Rs. 498 is the best proof of their disinterested service. They showed themselves from the very commencement to be prompt in grappling with the distress, and the large funds which they ultimately collected made them very successful in diminishing the misery of the poor. They started by appealing to the Civil and Military Officers in all the more prosperous Districts of Bengal; they inserted advertisements in all the principal newspapers of India; they induced Mr. H. B. Harington, the Legislative Member of Council for the North-Western Provinces, to assist in obtaining funds from Calcutta; they applied with success to the sister Presidencies of Madras and Bombay and to the Central Provinces; and they ended by inviting the aid of the Lord Mayor of London, who warmly seconded their efforts, and realized for them altogether a round sum of £30,000. As soon as subscriptions began to pour in, they called upon Magistrates for reports of their districts, and allotted money in proportion to the distress. Relief seems to have been applied but slowly at first, not so much from any fault of the Central Committee, as from hesitation on the part of the Magistrates in asking for remittances. Thus I find that in January there were sent only—

	<i>Rs.</i>
To Meerut, ...	1,000
„ Boolundshahr, ...	1,000
	<u>2,000</u>

And in February—

	<i>Rs.</i>
To Kosee (Muttra), ...	300
„ Roorkee, ...	2,000
„ Muttra, ...	1,000
„ Allygurh, ...	1,000
„ Boolundshahr, ...	1,000
„ Budaon, ...	2,000
„ Meerut, ...	1,000
	<u>8,300</u>

In March the returns show a better understanding, for the disbursements had more than trebled those of the previous month. The Committee sent—

	Rs.
To Deyrah, ... ..	500
To Etah Local Relief Fund, ... ..	2,000
To Revd. J. Barton, for Orphanage, ... ..	2,500
To Bijnour Local Relief Fund, ... ..	3,000
To Mynpoory Ditto, ... ..	2,000
To Furruckabad Ditto, ... ..	3,000
To Bijnour Ditto (2nd remittance), ... ..	3,000
To Budaon Ditto, ... ..	2,000
To Agra Ditto, ... ..	2,000
To Muttra Ditto, ... ..	4,000
To Futtehghurh Orphanage, ... ..	500
To Sirdhana Institution, ... ..	500
To Boolundshuhur Local Relief Fund, ... ..	500
Miscellaneous, ... ..	35
	<u>25,535</u>

In virtue of the contributions which it gave to the Local Committees' Funds, Government demanded that one or more of its officers should belong to each such Committee, and that the Committees should so far be under its control as to accept certain fundamental rules of action which it ordained. This was necessary to ensure uniformity. In practice however there was much latitude allowed, and the local experience of the District Officers was the best safeguard against waste or abuse of funds. The relief given by these Committees consisted almost universally in the distribution of cooked food.\* This plan was found on the whole to answer well, and few complaints were received. In most places none but Brahmins were employed as cooks. In Moradabad Brahmins were only used for preparing the food of the higher-caste folk, and for the Hindoos of inferior caste and for Mahomedans the cooking was done by contract—a plan which it was said at the time proved both more economical and more popular. Full details of the whole system are given in Colonel B. Smith's memorandum, which I have quoted *in extenso* in Appendix IV. As funds allowed, and instances of distress accumulated, the Committee extended its operations till there were kitchens in almost every tahseelee of the suffering districts. The check on these could not be as constant as at head-quarters, but a flying visit every now and then from a European Officer caused matters to be managed tolerably well.

**127. Provision for Purdah-nusheen Women.**—The Purdah-nusheen women formed a class whom it was very difficult to provide for with the certainty that the kindness of Government was not abused. In Agra the most respectable of the City Panches were employed to make a house-to-house visitation and ascertain who were worthy objects of charity. This done, one day's wages and a sufficient supply of cotton were given to every woman, with the intimation that if on or before the following morning she returned the cotton in the shape of thread, she would receive another day's wages and cotton sufficient to employ her for another day.

**128. Mr. John Strachey's Measures of Relief.**—Although Mr. John Strachey's plan of employing such of the poor as were able to do some but not a full day's work was devised and put into execution later, it may not be out of place to refer to it here. In his note† on the measures adopted for the relief of the poor in Moradabad he makes this mention of his operations :—

"On the 31st May 2,372 persons were employed in the poor-house in various simple occupations. The working paupers, as already mentioned, are divided into parties, each containing two hundred persons, and each having its separate enclosure and sheds. One or more paid servants superintend the operations of

\* There were two exceptions to this practice. At Delhi money was doled out, but this plan was found liable to great abuse. At Futtehghurh uncooked rations were given, but the system had this objection, that many recipients were dependent on others for the preparation of their meals.

† See Selections from the Records of Government, North-Western Provinces, Part XXXVI, Article I.

each party, and instruct the paupers in their work. Much of the work of superintendence is however done by inmates of the poor-house itself. All working paupers are expected to be present in the places assigned to them at 6 o'clock every morning. They work till 11 A. M.; they then rest for about two hours, and during this time they receive their food. They then again work till 4 P. M., when the employment for the day is ended. In the morning each person has a certain task allotted to him. Thus in the rope manufactory a certain quantity of *babur* is given to each person, sufficient for the day's work. Each woman employed in spinning receives in the same way a basket containing cotton-wool, which she is expected to return in the evening spun into thread."

"The following statement shows the nature of the work carried on in the poor-house on the 31st May, and the numbers employed in each occupation:—

Nature of Work.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
Cotton-spinning,...	...	414	...	414
Cloth and Newar manufacture,	28	16	5	49
Durree Ditto,	9	15	...	24
Rope-making, ...	445	302	213	960
Grinding corn, ...	1	303	...	304
Road-making, ...	237	33	47	317
Building sheds and occupations connected with poor-house, ...	276	28	...	304
Total, ...	996	1,111	265	2,372

"These operations were undertaken without any idea of profit, and even if they had been carried on at a loss, they would not the less have been expedient. But in a merely economical point of view the results have been very satisfactory. It is not possible for me at present to give detailed accounts of expenditure and receipts, but the following statement is believed to be approximately correct. It will serve to give an idea of the results of the operations carried on during the month of May. It must be understood that this statement shows only the expenditure incurred in the work-shops. The whole of the charges for feeding the paupers employed, and for the ordinary expenses of the poor-house, are separate. It would equally have been necessary to maintain these paupers had no work been performed; consequently the last column of the following statement represents a real, and not an imaginary, profit. As however a considerable part of the articles prepared were not actually sold during the month, but were in store on the 31st May, the entries in columns 5 and 6 are subject to future correction. There is no reason for supposing that the receipts will be less than the amount given in the statement, but should they fall below the estimate it will not the less have been shown that, even on purely economical grounds, the employment of the pauper is desirable. We may consider that during the month of May the expenses of the poor-house were less by Rs. 712-1-3 than they would have been if no work had been carried on.

"Statement showing the Expenditure and Estimated Receipts on account of the Moradabad Work-house for May, 1861.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Nature of Employment.	Articles prepared or work performed.	Quantity of articles prepared.	Expended on account of Work-house for raw materials, &c.	Estimated value of articles prepared.	Estimated profit.
		Mds. S. C.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.
Rope-making, ...	Rope, ...	475 9 12	494 15 2	768 2 3	273 3 1
Cotton-spinning, ...	Cotton thread,	28 38 5½	396 1 0	481 2 6	85 1 6
Durree-making, ...	Durrees, ...	43 in No.	32 14 3	48 8 0	15 9 9
Newar-making, ...	Newar, ...	Mds. S. C. 0 24 7	10 1 10	10 9 0	0 7 2
Cloth-making, ...	Coarse cotton cloth, ...	75 pieces,	43 3 3	47 3 3	4 0 0
Grinding corn, ...	Flour, ...	...	8 12 5	148 4 2	139 7 9
Road-making, &c., ...	Repairs to road and earth-work.	...	4 12 0	199 0 0	194 4 0
Total Rs., ...	...	...	990 11 11	1,702 13 2	712 1 3

**129. Miscellaneous Relief Works.**—"There were also," writes Sir G. Couper in the Administration Report of 1860-61,\* "other works, hardly to be called public works, which might result in local benefit, such as tanks, embankments, small irrigating cuts, and such like, and to such a portion of the general relief funds was applied, after it had been satisfactorily ascertained that there were many who, though not so physically infirm as to claim admission to a poor-house, and not unable to do some work, were still not in a position, for whatever reason, to proceed to the sites of the large public works which were in progress. It was directed that the local work should generally be of such a nature as to help in the prevention of future distress from drought in the locality; that no larger grant should be made for any one work than Rs. 5,000; and that no application for a grant in aid of any local work should be entertained by the Central Committee which had not been approved by the Commissioner of the Division. It was further directed that the persons employed on these minor local works should receive no money wage, but food, just as if they had applied to the poor-house for relief. It was pointed out that, unless this rule were enforced, the result would be to withdraw the people then engaged in the public relief works, such as the Roorkee Road and branch canals, and to withhold others from going to them, as no native who could obtain an anna and a half a day within easy reach of his own door would go to a distance for a like or even for a larger wage, were that allowable; and the acceptance of cooked food was moreover a fair test of distress which it was necessary to maintain on general grounds, no less than on the particular ground adverted to." With the exception of Agra and Etawah, those works were confined entirely to the districts of the Meerut Division. The expenditure, which was under the control of the Local Committees, amounted eventually to Rs. 29,918.

**130. Deputation of Colonel Baird Smith to the scene of the Famine.**—On 28th January, 1861, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce called the attention of the Government of India to the depressed state of trade between Calcutta and the large native marts in the North-West Provinces. "It is considered," the Secretary wrote, "that these markets have during the last two or three months taken from Calcutta a third to a half only of the ordinary quantity, and up to the present time there appears no indication of any early improvement in the demand." As the stagnation was popularly ascribed to the partial failure of the Khureef, and the aggravation of present scarcity by the threatened deficiency of the cold-weather crops, the Chamber recommended that an officer should be deputed to proceed to the North-West, with a view to reporting on the actual state of the districts affected. The Government at once admitted the expediency of such a course, and on February 2nd Colonel R. Baird Smith, C.B., received his orders to conduct an enquiry on the spot. The points to which his attention were specially called were as follows: I quote from the letter of instructions †:—

"Whether, besides the famine, there are any other causes which have conduced to the depressed state of trade between Calcutta and the large marts in the Upper Provinces which has manifested itself during the last two or three months.

"What is the actual state of the districts directly affected by the failure of the crops, and to what extent it is likely that trade may be permanently injured in those districts by depopulation, arising either from death or from emigration.

"To what extent it may be expected that trade in the other districts of the Upper Provinces will be affected by increase of population owing to emigration from the distressed districts, as well as by the prosperity which should follow the increased prices that are being obtained for the surplus grain now in course of exportation from those districts.

"What is the extent of the supply of grain available for the distressed districts.

"In addition to these points, the President in Council would wish to receive from you a confidential report on the prospects of revenue and expenditure as affected by the famine, and with this view the

\* See paras. 264, 265.

† See letter No. 221, dated Fort William, February 2nd, 1861, from W. Grey, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, to Colonel Baird Smith.

local authorities will be requested to furnish you with every information which you may desire to have regarding the ordinary receipts and disbursements of the districts concerned.

"Your report should also embrace a review of the measures which you find in progress for the relief of the population of the distressed districts, whether by expenditure from the general revenues upon large public works, or from local funds upon minor works, or by the grant of direct relief in the form of food to those who are unable to work. The extent to which private charity has been exercised to alleviate the distress should also be noticed.

"A further and a very important point to which the Government would wish your enquiries to be particularly directed, is the extent to which it may be practicable and wise to push forward works of irrigation in the Upper Provinces, with the view of giving the means for fertilizing a larger area, and thus making more effectual provision against the recurrence of future seasons of drought."

**131. Extent of Colonel Baird Smith's Tour.**—On February the 12th Colonel Baird Smith arrived at Benares, and, travelling by way of Mirzapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Goorsuhaigunj, Furruckabad, and Mynpoory, he entered the famine tract on the 10th of March. The districts which he had traversed were troubled by the irruption of numerous bodies of starving villagers wandering hither and thither in search of food or work, but were not themselves affected by the drought. Between the date of crossing the boundary and April 23rd he passed through a considerable part of the Districts of Agra, Allygurh, Boolundshuhur, Delhi, Goorgaon, Meerut, Moradabad, Mozuffernugger, and Saharunpore, and just glanced at Muttra, Goorgaon, and Bijnour. During the greater part of May he seems to have been occupied with writing the first section of his report at Roorkee, but the last few days of that month and the first twelve of June were devoted to inspecting the head-works of the Ganges Canal near Hurdwar, and the operations at the Mohun Pass in the Lower Himalayas. On the 12th of June he was again at Delhi, and, having completed all necessary personal enquiries, he left the famine tract on the 13th, and arrived at Calcutta ten days later. His object was to see as much of the worst parts of the suffering districts as he could, and certainly within the time it would not have been possible for many men to have made so long a tour or put so much on record as he did. His communication with English officials of every description and with natives was constant. His inspection was always conducted in the day-time. Indefatigable himself, he hoped that everybody with whom he came in contact would do their best to supplement his efforts by their own knowledge. The result of his investigation is a succinct history of the famine during the time that he was on the scene,—that is to say, till the middle of June,—and a computation, inaccurate in many respects, of the loss which Government and individuals suffered in the end. His account is not exhaustive, because it was finished before the relief operations were concluded; and certain parts of the country—to wit, Ajmere and Budaon—have not been noticed by him, for the reason, I imagine, that he did not extend his travels beyond the districts that I have mentioned.

**132. Limits assigned to the Famine by Colonel Baird Smith.**—The physical differences of climate, surface, and peculiarities of subsoil, caused Colonel Baird Smith to divide the famine into three great parts. These were: *1st*,—The Western Section, including all the country between the right bank of the Jumna and the zigzag line which separates Sirhind, Thanesur, Paneeput, Delhi, Goorgaon, and Muttra, from the districts or Native States which adjoin them to the West and South-West. *2nd*,—The Central Section, or all that part of the Doab which lies between the Sewalik hills on the one side and the North-Western limits of Futtehgurh and Mynpoory on the other, with the exception of Pergunnahs Moostuffabad and Shekoabad in the latter district, which suffered severely. *3rd*,—The Eastern Section, or all the British territory between the Himalayas, the Ganges, and Oudh, with the exception of Bareilly, Pilibheet, and Shahjehanpore, which escaped. A shaded map (Chart No. II. in Colonel Baird Smith's Report) shows the various degrees of suffering. Paneeput, Thanesur, and, on the whole, Sirhind, were lightly afflicted in comparison to the districts on the opposite side of the Jumna. But from Delhi downwards to the point



at which the river flowed out of the famine tract, the pergunnahs on either bank suffered awfully. It is in these regions that the darkest shades predominate, and according to Colonel Baird Smith, no tract was marked black within which the distress of the people was not very intense. The south-east corner of Mynpoory and parts of Budaon, Bijnour, Mozuffernugger, and Saharunpore, and a narrow strip of Sirhind running parallel with and near to the Jumna, witnessed perhaps equal, but certainly not greater, misery. The Western Section, with the exception of the Trans-Jumna Pergunnahs of Muttra and Agra, does not properly come within the scope of my enquiry, as it was administered in those days by the Government of Lahore. Nevertheless, wherever I quote from Colonel Baird Smith's Report, it must be remembered that his figures relate to the whole famine tract. At this distance of time it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to decide with any degree of accuracy what deduction should be made for the part of the Punjab that was affected. The statistics which I shall quote on the authority of the local administration and other reports of course refer to these Provinces only.

**133. Progress of the Famine during the Spring of 1861.**—From what I have already said it will doubtless have been perceived that the population throughout the whole of the Meerut Division and in the western half of the Agra Division were the first to be attacked by the famine. With the exception of Bijnour, where there was lack of food as early as October, there was no great distress in Rohilcund till the middle of February, and it was not till then that measures of relief were generally organized. On the 18th of March Mr. W. Roberts, the Commissioner, wrote to Government that the districts which had experienced a deficiency of the Khureef, and had bad prospects for the Rubbee, were Bijnour, Moradabad, and Budaon. He expected that Bareilly and Shahjehanpore would give their usual out-turn, and though charitable assistance would be requisite in Bareilly, the necessity for this was due, not to local failure of crops, but to the influx of emigrants from the Doab and other parts of Rohilcund, and to the poverty-stricken condition of some of the non-agricultural classes. The fear of future calamity indeed appears to have come more home to the minds of the people than to the authorities at an early date, for I find that many poor persons moved away to the Terai Pergunnahs and to the East in the very beginning of the cold season, and this timely emigration probably softened the blow for those who remained. Others too of the ryots, who could not sow their lands in the autumn, turned their plough-cattle into beasts of burden, and conveyed grain from Shahjehanpore and Oudh into Bijnour and Budaon. The latter district is said to have owed much of its subsequent troubles to a strong West wind which blew unremittingly for the first two weeks of February, and did incalculable harm. Till its advent the chances were in favour of there being no famine. The Khureef had been good. Rain had fallen in the Huzoor and Datagunj Tehseelees in January, and a plentiful Rubbee was expected. The wind blighted the whole face of the district, and famine of the most appalling kind followed in its train. Late in February, Mr. Carmichael, the Magistrate, wrote of the region to the West of Suheswan:—

"With the exception of those villages which are in the very Khadir of Ganges, and in which the moisture of the soil has allowed of Rubbee sowings here and there, you come across whole tracts of country totally uncultivated, villages half deserted, cultivators dead, dying, or absconded, the poor women and children (it is piteous to behold these, for they appear to be deserted by the men) in the jungles picking the prickly thorns called 'gokroo,' and grubbing up grass for the sake of the seed of it. I counted as many as fifteen poor women in one spot so employed, and all along the banks of the Ganges you see them in parties of eight or ten. The stuff—for it can be called by no other name—when they have collected it, is like so much dust; and I am credibly informed that after a whole day's labour two chittacks is the amount of grain which is sifted from this mass of dust."

In Goonoor, which borders immediately on this tract, the state of things was little better, for the pergunnah had suffered more or less from drought for the previous twelve months. In Ajmere and Mhairwarra there was trouble also. The rains of 1860 did not commence till July the 20th, and the fall only averaged eleven inches. In August there was no continuous down-pour, but merely light and partial showers, and in September no rain at all fell. Except in the Southern pergunnahs of Mhairwarra and

in isolated parts of Northern Ajmere, the tanks, on which the agricultural prosperity of the country so entirely depends, were never once filled, and even the most favoured reservoirs were empty at the end of September. The result was that the Khureef failed in a great measure; the bajra and jowar perished utterly, and the hopes of the people for food rested on the Indian corn planted in the irrigated lands. To add to the confusion, the wells in Ajmere, Rajghur, and Beaur became exhausted in many places, and as the drought extended over the Northern and Western States of Rajpootana no help could be expected from over the border. On the 12th of January the prices of food in Ajmere were—

Wheat, ...	...	8	to	8½	seers for the rupee.
Barley, ...	...	10½	to	11	„ „
Atta, ...	...	6½	to	7	„ „
Gram, ...	...	11	to	12	„ „

Through fear of their own harvests proving insufficient, the neighbouring States of Jeypore,\* Kishengurh, Tonk, and Harrowtee stopped the export of grain or forage; and it was reported that restrictions had been adopted in Marwar also, though not by order of the Durbar. Meanwhile all these States were importing from Ajmere and Mhairwarra, in neither of which had any prohibition been made. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner requested that he might levy an embargo on the grain within his own jurisdiction, as otherwise there would shortly be a scarcity of food. This plan however the Government declined to sanction, as its policy everywhere throughout the famine was to induce the free transport of grain. A plentiful fall of rain throughout the country, with the exception of Pergunnah Beaur and some villages of Saroth and Rajghur, gave an impulse to the Rubbee, and consequently lessened the anxiety for the future. But I cannot doubt that there was great distress in parts for some months. The well-to-do classes were prompt in devising measures for their poorer brethren's support. The citizens of Ajmere contributed Rs. 6,000, and those of Nyanuggur Rs. 2,000. The Chiefs of Mussooda, Sawur, and Tautowlee voluntarily undertook to repair old works of irrigation and construct new ones at their own expense; and the Chiefs of Joonea, Khwas, Sholean, Jeithpoora, and Kyrot, with the same object in view, applied for and received advances to the amount of Rs. 5,000. A similar sum was allotted from the local funds to improve the Sheopoor and Pakhuree Ghâts, of which the former leads from Nyanuggur over the Araballa range into Meywar, and the latter connects Nyanuggur with the Mussooda, Bhinaee, and Kehree Pergunnahs of Ajmere. Government also gave a grant of Rs. 3,615 for the construction of a road from the mouth of the Pokhur Pass to Ajmere which gave employment to 15,545 persons during May, June, and July. After the last-mentioned month only a slight amount of relief was found necessary.

**134. Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of the number of Emigrants.**—The following is the summary which Colonel Baird Smith gives of the population and acreage within the famine tract as defined by him in Chart No. II:—

SECTION OF FAMINE TRACT.	POPULATION		AREAS OF CULTIVATION IN ACRES.		
	Of the Districts, or parts of the same, in the Section.	Of the very bad parts of the Section.	Production in ordinary years.	Unproductive, or nearly so, during the famine period.	Balance productive.
Eastern, ...	2,856,000	970,000	2,724,000	926,000	1,798,000
Central, ...	5,353,000	2,258,000	5,054,000	2,026,000	3,028,000
Western, ...	4,879,000	2,220,000	4,515,000	1,505,000	3,010,000
Total, ...	13,088,000	5,448,000	12,293,000	4,457,000	7,836,000

\* Jeypore and Marwar were induced at a later period to take off all restrictions on exportation.

Of these numbers he adduces reasons for believing that there emigrated before the end of April from

The Western Section, about	...	...	...	120,000
Central Section, about	...	...	...	255,000
Eastern Section, about	...	...	...	125,000
				<hr/>
				500,000

The tide set mostly towards Oudh, Central India, and the Allahabad and Benares Divisions, which were not touched by the scarcity till extra mouths rushed in to be fed. One-tenth of the wanderers is reckoned to have flowed into foreign States, six-tenths into our own districts outside the famine tract, and three-tenths wandered from some parts of the tracts to others. To these should be added the 160,000 persons who Colonel Baird Smith believed had emigrated into canal villages within the famine tract, and who otherwise would have perished or extended the limits of distress.

**135. Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of the number of Persons supported by Government.**—I now come to Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of those who relied on Government for support. His calculation was based on general information, the details of which he considered were approximately correct. At the time he wrote the first section of his Report, the accounts of the several districts had not been submitted, and they are not now to be had in their entirety. His figures therefore are the most trustworthy that I can procure. He reckoned that at the end of April 143,500 persons in all were being employed daily on special relief works. The items in the sum are these :—

	<i>Approximate number of people daily employed.</i>			
The road from Roorkee to Dehra, crossing the Sub-Himalayas,				18,000
The road from Hanper to Ghurmooktesur,	...	...	...	7,500
The Hindun River diversion,	...	...	...	4,000
The Futtahgurh branch of the Ganges Canal,	...	...	...	6,000
The Boolundshuhur branch of the Ganges Canal,	...	...	...	4,000
Works at Agra,	...	...	...	18,000
Road from Shekoabad,	...	...	...	4,000
Irrigation works near Agra,	...	...	...	2,000
Works at Delhi,	...	...	...	15,000
Works in Delhi District,	...	...	...	15,000
Road from Delhi to Muttra,	...	...	...	8,000
Irrigation works in Goorgaon,	...	...	...	5,000
Works in Rohtuck,	...	...	...	3,000
Works in Hansi,	...	...	...	4,000
Works in Hissar,	...	...	...	3,000
Various petty works in districts of the North-Western Provinces, some rather large, some small,—averaging say 1,500 per district,	...	...	...	16,500
Ditto ditto in the Punjab,	...	...	...	10,500
				<hr/>
Grand Total employed daily on all kinds of special relief works,				143,500

**126. Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of the number of helpless Persons receiving relief.**—Besides these there were 80,000 helpless persons receiving food daily in 26 Central and 75 District Relief-houses, making in all 223,500 State paupers. And I may remark that this number does not conclusively indicate the proportion of sufferers maintained at the public cost. Mr. Rose's experience in Cawnpore in 1837-38 was that the able-bodied labourers, by taking turn and turn about (for the numbers on each work were limited), made the aggregate of individuals supported during the month more by about one-third than the aggregate of those who received wages during the same period. Colonel Baird Smith evidently entertained the same view, for he writes:—

"A curious custom\* was found to have very general prevalence among the work-people whereby a sort of rotation of relief was established. Families whose meagre home resources were not wholly exhausted adopted the plan of dividing themselves into two sections,—one going to the work for a certain time, while the other remained at home. After a time the working section returned to the village to which the whole belonged, and the party hitherto employed there took their turn on the works. In this way, and by perfectly spontaneous action, the relief was spread over a sensibly larger surface than it could otherwise have covered, and the daily employment of 18,000 people would thus represent the actual relief of probably 26,000 or 26,000. The trait is a pleasant one, too, in reference to the people themselves, as it shows they did not willingly sink into even that degree of pauperism implied by the receipt of subsistence wages, but were ready to do the little they still could for themselves."

If we admit the force of this argument, the number of persons daily dependent on Government rises to about 280,000.

**127. Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of the starving Persons who stayed at home.**—There is one more element wanting in the calculation—I mean the number of those who struggled on at home without other relief than the remission of the land revenue. Colonel Baird Smith estimated their number at this time at a quarter to half a million. The above details therefore show that, under the most moderate computation, at least a million and a quarter of persons, out of a population of 13,088,000, were at the end of April suffering severely in consequence of the famine.

**128. Increased number of Paupers in June.**—Colonel Baird Smith reports that the recipients of public charity were still more numerous in June. There were then from 130,000 to 140,000 helpless poor under daily relief, and there was an increased tendency on the part of the able-bodied to congregate wherever special relief works were in progress. The reason is obvious. Continued scarcity had by degrees incapacitated more of the able-bodied, whilst those who had returned to their own villages for a time to out and store the harvest had, when this work was done, no present means of subsistence. Sufficient rain had not fallen to enable them to prepare their fields for the Khureef; consequently many came back upon the State in the interim for support.

**129. General Results of the Relief Operations to the end of July.**—Up to the 31st of July 1861, 9,486,887 persons had received food at the poor-houses, at a total cost of Rs. 4,65,374. If we distribute the relief equally over the previous 150 days which constituted the period of greatest suffering, we have then a total average daily number fed of 63,245, and a daily expenditure of Rs. 3,102. The following table shows in what proportion the relief was distributed over the North-West:—

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\* See his Report, Section II., para. 8.

Name of District.	Local Donations and Subscriptions.			Miscellaneous Receipts.			Contribution from Agra Central Relief Committee.			Government Contributions sanctioned.			Total Income during the period.			Expenditure.			Daily average of Expenditure.			Daily average relieved.	Number of poor people relieved.
	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.	Ra.	As.	P.		
Dehra Doon, ...	2,012	15	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,398	9	6	3,411	9	0	1,914	8	3½	62	9	6	221½	33,261
Saharunpore, ...	7,959	5	2	101	5	0	...	...	...	6,364	15	9	14,425	9	11	15,248	1	7	437	1	2	1,540½	231,066
Muzaffernugger, ...	2,464	2	9	9	9	9	...	...	...	3,404	3	4	5,877	15	10	5,296	3	8	174	4	10	710½	106,615
Roorkee, ...	4,858	10	11	37	5	0	2,000	0	0	3,726	8	6	10,620	7	6	11,898	2	4	363	14	2	1,436	215,402
Meerut, ...	13,498	0	5	2,850	0	2	37,100	0	0	19,563	15	8	78,049	14	6	81,317	0	8	2,566	6	7	7,375½	1,106,269
Boothlandshuhur, ...	6,207	2	3	5	8	0	12,500	0	0	3,188	3	2	21,900	13	5	22,036	6	10	629	3	4	3,974½	596,132
Allypore, ...	7,863	0	0	577	10	2	24,500	0	0	8,265	8	6	45,471	15	8	47,503	9	9	1,555	12	4	5,479	821,855
Matra, ...	16,227	4	10	...	...	...	8,000	0	0	5,300	12	10	29,528	1	8	26,359	14	2	875	0	11	8,315½	1,247,321
Agra, ...	33,307	15	9	96	3	0	40,000	0	0	1,357	9	3	74,761	12	0	73,375	6	10	1,935	12	1	6,600	990,033
Mynpoory, ...	2,350	0	1	145	14	7½	27,000	0	0	...	...	...	80,873	14	7	29,664	11	10	908	9	9	4,604½	690,713
Etawah, ...	335	8	0	...	...	...	2,300	0	0	986	3	2	3,621	11	2	2,673	9	11	99	12	2½	360½	54,101
Furruckabad, ...	5,526	5	6	138	3	0	14,500	0	0	...	...	...	20,164	8	6	19,191	9	10	469	2	0	2,157½	323,563
Etah, ...	2,097	3	3	190	14	2	23,000	0	0	...	...	...	25,288	1	5	18,455	10	7	598	6	11	4,852½	727,871
Bijnour, ...	6,564	1	3	319	6	2	21,000	0	0	5,600	10	6	23,484	1	11	31,858	15	1	1,046	4	5	6,243½	936,489
Badaon, ...	2,771	15	0	3	0	0	15,000	0	0	1,717	6	0	19,492	5	0	18,026	6	11	590	4	8	2,768½	415,224
Bareilly, ...	5,391	8	2	74	4	3	...	...	...	5,391	8	2	10,857	4	7	9,024	5	9	297	2	2	974½	146,129
Moradabad, ...	14,413	3	0	5,135	6	3	22,000	0	0	12,268	11	0	53,817	4	3	51,529	14	5	1,609	11	9	5,631½	844,782
Total, ...	1,33,848	5	10	9,684	9	6½	2,48,900	0	0	78,534	13	4	4,71,649	6	11	4,65,374	10	5½					9,486,837

Up to the same date 6,129,923 persons had been employed on special relief works, at a cost to the Imperial Treasury of Rs. 6,15,989. The outlay on the different works is shown in greater detail below :—

		Total number of Persons employed.	Total Expenditure.		
			Rs.	As.	P.
Roads,	Roorkee and Deyrah, ...	2,951,424	2,50,686	0	3
	Ghurmoorkhesur and Delhi, ...	272,330	53,400	15	2
	Ajmere to Khokur Pass, ...	15,545	1,408	6	1
	Budaon and Bareilly, ...	91,651	9,354	14	7
Canals,	Futtehgurh Branch, ...	1,086,206	1,03,386	13	9
	Hindun Channel, ...	433,498	33,487	5	10
	Boolundshuhur Branch, ...	752,973	82,799	4	4
	Irrigation Works, Rohileund, ...	80,877	7,100	2	2
	Works in the station of Agra, ...	445,419	74,365	7	4
Total, ...		6,129,923	6,15,989	5	6

**140. Progress of Events subsequently to July.**—The favourable nature of the season during and after July enabled the cultivators to make preparations for the autumn crops, and from that time the number of paupers began to diminish, though only very slowly, as the statement in Appendix V. will show, for it was not till October 31st that Government felt justified in withholding its support. On that day, when it had become evident that in all quarters\* rain had abundantly fallen, and that in consequence the poor-houses, the public works, and the out-kitchens had been almost deserted, all relief operations were stopped, with the exception of those on the Futtehgurh Branch of the Ganges Canal. The expenditure which was incurred in the interval on account of existing distress was considerable, as much as Rs. 76,409† having been paid away for food to the helpless, and Rs. 2,98,305 for labour. The latter sum gave occupation to 1,375,076 persons during August, September, and October,—the total number of persons who received employment throughout the course of the relief works being 7,504,999.

**141. Impossibility of ascertaining the extent of the Mortality.**—

It is out of the question to give any reliable account of the mortality which resulted from the famine. No general register of deaths was kept at the time, and even if there had been such a record, the knowledge that it was framed amid confusion and panic would very much weaken its claim to accuracy. Isolated statements indeed have been made, and such as they are I will repeat two or three of them; but I think that they must be received with caution. Thus, in the Meerut District it is reported that 109 deaths had occurred up to January 22nd, and, later, Colonel Baird Smith was told that 7,000 persons had died previously to May from starvation; but, as he remarks, “many among these are from other causes than actual starvation.” The population of the district at this time was a little more than a million. To the returns of Mr. Colledge, Collector of Boolundshuhur, he is inclined to give more credence, on account of the care with which they had been compiled. The result which they show is a mortality of over 24,700, or about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the population. But even this state-

\* See Appendix VI. for a comparison of the rain-fall in 1860 and 1861.

† I arrive at these figures by subtracting the respective amounts spent to end of July (see para. 139) from the total expenditure (see Appendices V. and VII.). Thus—

Rs.	Rs.
5,41,783	9,14,294
4,65,374	6,15,989
<hr/> 76,409	<hr/> 2,98,305

ment, admittedly the best of a bad lot, depends on nothing more than oral testimony for its worth, and if this is the case it would be a mere waste of time to multiply examples. In this matter we must be content to know that excessive mortality\* did ensue, but what was its amount even those who were living amid the suffering had no adequate means of estimating.

**142. Object to which the Agra Central Committee devoted its superfluous Funds.**—Such munificent contributions had poured in upon the Central Relief Committee† that they had still a large surplus in hand after all the expenses of feeding the hungry had been defrayed. After some deliberation, they adopted the wise plan of making grants to each district, to be distributed amongst the indigent agriculturists, in order that they might have wherewithal to purchase seed, grain, and plough-cattle. Whatever was assigned for the former purpose was bestowed as a free gift, whilst it was left to the discretion of Collectors to say in what cases and on what conditions a refund of money lent for the purchase of stock should be demanded. The measure, in fact, took the place of the tuccavee which had always been given in the early days of our Government after a famine; and as the funds were at hand, and might legitimately be spent in enabling the village communities to recover their position, Government was by so much the gainer. In this way the following sums were allotted :—

			Rs.	Rs.
Saharunpore,	...	...	20,000	
Mozuffernugger,	...	...	25,000	
Meerut,	...	...	50,000	
Boolundshuhar,	...	...	50,000	
Allygurh,	...	...	30,000	
				1,75,000
Muttra,	...	...	50,000	
Agra,...	...	...	20,100	
Mynpoory,	...	...	20,113	
Etah, ...	...	...	30,000	
				1,20,213
Bijnour,	...	...	20,000	
Moradabad,	...	...	10,000	
Budaon,	...	...	15,000	
				45,000
				3,40,213

**143. Colonel Baird Smith's Estimate of the Loss owing to the death of Cattle.**—If Colonel Baird Smith's estimate of the value of the cattle which died is correct, these advances were small compared to the loss which the villagers actually sustained. His opinion, formed in May, 1861, when there ought to have been ample opportunities of judging, was this :—

"From every section of the famine tract I receive intelligence of growing mortality among these animals, and the gravest fears are expressed in consequence. In the Meerut District, it is believed that fully one-half of the farming cattle have already died, and it is known that the rate of mortality is increasing. Such a state of things implies great paralysis of work in the bad tracts, whatever the nature of the season may be, and may well cause very deep anxiety. Ordinarily the farmer maintains cattle for

\* Sir Arthur Cotton estimates the mortality at 2,00,000 at the very least (see page 5 of "The Famine in India," a lecture delivered before the Social Science Congress in Manchester, October 13th, 1866).

† The Committee received from England,	...	...	Rs. 3,07,440
" " Calcutta and Bengal, ...	...	"	4,19,125
" " Madras, ...	...	"	42,768
" " Bombay, ...	...	"	57,264
" " N.-W. Provinces, ...	...	"	99,040
" " Mhow, Central India,...	...	"	2,939
			Rs. 9,28,576

his wells and ploughs with other work at the rate of about one pair for each four acres under cultivation ; and as the section of the Meerut District over which the drought has almost annihilated the crops is about four-tenths of the whole, the total number of bullocks for farming purposes at the beginning of the pressure was probably about 80,000 pairs. Of these, 40,000 pairs, more or less, are reported to have gone, and of the remainder the mortality is now said to be greater than ever. Even the loss believed to have been already sustained however in this single district cannot be replaced but at an outlay of at least ten lakhs of rupees, or £100,000.

"As very nearly the same general proportion of bad tracts to good runs throughout the Central Section districts, the loss to the agricultural community there in cattle only can scarcely be less, and may possibly be more, than about fifty lakhs, or £500,000.

"In the Eastern Section the loss is probably much less, from the large extent of forest or river valley pasturage available, but in the Western Section, where no such advantages exist, the mortality has been even greater than in the Doab; and the accounts I have received from the Delhi districts are truly deplorable, as the increasing losses of cattle there are described as causing extensive abandonment of villages by the people. The entire loss therefore from this cause is not likely to fall under about 75 lakhs of rupees, or £750,000."

This estimate however I believe to be exaggerated. In other points I shall be able to show that Colonel Baird Smith, either from insufficient data or through hastiness, formed inaccurate conclusions; and though there are no definite statistics in this instance by which to contradict his calculation, I do not believe that the Central Committee, with a balance still in hand of Rs. 2,86,270 \* after the grants for seed and cattle had been made, would have refrained from still greater advances if the destruction amongst the cattle had been such as Colonel Baird Smith estimated it to be.

**144. Colonel Baird Smith's Estimate of the Loss in Agricultural Produce.**—His conjectures as to the loss of agricultural produce are still more astounding.† On this point he says:—

"The total loss of agricultural produce in the Central Section may therefore be approximately calculated at from 90 to 100 lakhs of Rupees, or £900,000 to £1,000,000. To a very large section of the people in the famine tract the loss has been absolute, as the small patches of cultivation they may have been able to maintain would barely suffice for their own sustenance.

"Turning now to the Eastern Section, I find that the actual loss of produce in the Moradabad District is estimated at nearly four millions of maunds,—an ordinary year's production being about seven millions, and that of the present year only three. The numbers indicate a loss of property to the community during the famine period of nearly 40 lakhs of rupees, but that loss has not fallen wholly on the district, inasmuch as the smaller quantity of produce obtained has been sold at famine prices, and the actual loss is about twelve lakhs, or £1,20,000. This loss has, however, been very unequally distributed, and the bad sections have in reality suffered to a much graver extent than this average statement would indicate. Their great loss has been balanced by the greater gains of their neighbours in the better sections, and about 20 lakhs, or £200,000, would probably be a moderate estimate to make of the loss in the aggregate area of the worst section of the district. Bijour might similarly be taken at 18 and Budaon at 15 lakhs, making the whole loss for the Eastern Section between 45 and 50 lakhs, or from about £450,000 to £500,000.

"In the Western Section, and more especially in its southern parts, I fear the loss will prove to be much greater. I have not yet the means of making any estimate for the part north of Paneeput, but south of Delhi fully two-thirds of the area cultivated in ordinary years has failed this year to yield any produce at all. The loss thus sustained throughout the four southern districts or parts of districts may be computed at about 60 lakhs, or £600,000. The northern districts will raise this to about £800,000, but I doubt much if this represents the full loss west of the Jumna, as, though not so hard pressed as the others, I am aware that in Rohtuk, Hansi, and Hissar, serious losses have been caused by the drought."

"If the aggregate of these losses throughout the famine tract be taken at three millions sterling, it will, I believe, be under the truth, and a verification of the approximate accuracy of this estimate may be obtained from independent consideration."

**145. Total Cost to Government of Special Relief Works.**—I am more fortunate, however, in having returns as to the cost of the special relief works undertaken by Government. On this subject Colonel Baird Smith wrote in May, 1861:—

"The pecuniary burden has however been a heavy one on the State. It is estimated that the entire cost of special relief works, great and small, throughout both provinces, will not be less than about £250,000."

Now, according to the table which he himself gives of the persons employed daily in April on special works, it will be found on separating the items that about 59,000

\* Rs. 2,70,000 of this sum were eventually constituted into a fund for supporting and launching into life those who had become orphans in the famine.

† I have not the means of testing his calculations, and therefore I leave him to speak for himself.



persons were employed in the Punjab, and 84,500 in the North-Western Provinces. The entire outlay for the North-West under this head we now know to have been Rs. 9,14,294.\* The Punjab works cost Rs. 3,25,106.† These two sums together make Rs. 12,39,400—rather less than half Colonel Baird Smith's estimate.

**146. Total Loss to Government by Remissions.**—Again, after dealing with the question of loss in agricultural produce, Colonel Baird Smith writes :—

"The whole remissions of the Government revenue in aid of landed proprietors who have borne the loss just indicated (loss of produce and cattle) will amount altogether to about forty lakhs of rupees."

The following table shows that, for the North-Western Provinces, where the famine tract was larger, and the suffering proportionately more extensive than in the Punjab, the balances for the year of distress were rather less than 13½ lakhs, or about 11 lakhs more than the balances in course of liquidation or adjustment in an ordinary year :—

District.	Land Revenue for 1860-61.	Collected.	Balance.	PORTION OF BALANCE POSTPONED.	
				Indefinitely.	For a period.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Saharunpore, ...	10,93,066	8,73,766	2,19,300	1,39,442	400
Mozuffernugger, ...	11,36,769	10,02,674	1,34,095	1,03,116	31,531
Meerut, ...	17,85,176	15,54,054	2,31,122	61,983	1,69,139
Boolundshuhur, ...	11,35,602	10,21,867	1,13,735	84,094	...
Allygurh, ...	18,32,750	17,54,455	78,295	2,815	17,672
Muttra, ...	16,52,346	16,04,110	48,236	...	16,336
Agra, ...	16,16,502	14,46,892	1,69,610	1,22,595	...
Mynpoory, ...	11,30,853	10,24,432	1,06,421	64,458	3,097
Bijnour, ...	11,93,302	10,41,105	1,52,197	...	1,30,336
Moradabad, ...	13,14,059	12,71,877	42,182	2,155	6,253
Budaon, ...	9,23,579	8,94,471	29,108	...	8,201
Total, ...	1,48,14,004	1,34,89,703	13,24,301	5,80,658	3,82,965

Of this balance the Secretary to Government wrote in the Administration Report of 1861-62 it was expected that "above half will eventually be recovered, and the remainder will be remitted." I have traced the fate of these balances, and the following table shows that no more than Rs. 2,34,646 have so far been remitted :—

*North-Western Provinces.—Revenue Balances on account of Famine of 1860-61.*

District.	BALANCE REMITTED.		Balance Realized.
	Amount.	Under the Orders of Government.	
Saharunpore, ...	37,149	1148A., 22nd February, 1865.	This is not ascertainable either from Board's or Government Secretariat Records.
Mozuffernugger, ...	10,607	847A., 28th August, 1865.	
Meerut, ...	23,267	{ 1006A., 6th September, 1862.	
Boolundshuhur, ...	19,332	{ 36A., 11th January, 1864.	
Allygurh, ...	34,623	{ 972A., 30th August, 1862.	
Muttra, ...	2,213	{ 365A., 16th March, 1863.	
Agra, ...	64,339	{ 427A., 29th April, 1864.	
Mynpoory, ...	11,561	{ 925A., 22nd August, 1862.	
Bijnour, ...	22,518	{ 858A., 22nd July, 1863.	
Moradabad, ...	5,093	{ 1354A., 12th December, 1862.	
Budaon, ...	13,944	{ 972A., 30th August, 1862.	
		{ 1302A., 8th December, 1862.	
		{ 1137A., 2nd October, 1863.	
		{ 991A., 19th October, 1865.	
		{ 688A., 15th August, 1866.	
Total Rs., ...	2,34,646		

\* See Administration Report for 1861-62, paragraph 113.

† See Supplement to Punjab Gazette of 13th February, 1862, paragraph 4.

‡ Original remission was Rs. 11,891; of this, Rs. 2,559 were realized before the Government order sanctioning the original remission was received by Collector.

In the Punjab the remissions amount to Rs. 6,74,526. Instead therefore of 40 lakhs, less than 9½ have been relinquished by Government. I give these examples, not the least from a desire to detract from Colonel Baird Smith's labours, which were immense, but merely to show that his calculations cannot be accepted as conclusive in every instance. Were all his deductions correct, I should not hesitate to declare that the famine of 1861 was the greatest that the North-Western Provinces ever experienced; but honestly I believe some of his figures are open to dispute, and that the calamity which I am now describing, instead of being the heaviest, was the least severe of the four great ones which have devastated these Provinces within the last century.

**147. Condition of the Abkaree.**—The collections on account of Abkaree are invariably a good means of testing the prosperity of the people. The consumption of excisable commodities rises in times of plenty, and diminishes under the anticipation or pressure of want. It is not surprising therefore that there should have been a falling off in 1860-61 in the Meerut, Agra, and Rohilcund Divisions, but nothing could more significantly prove the local character of the famine than the increased receipts in the other parts of the North-West. So great indeed was the rise in the Allahabad and Benares Divisions that the accounts of the year only show a loss of some Rs. 70,000 in all. The following abstract contains the demands and collections for 1859-60 and 1860-61:—

	DEMANDS.		COLLECTIONS.	
	1859-60.	1860-61.	1859-60.	1860-61.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Meerut, ... ..	2,54,635	1,76,267	2,48,356	1,65,516
Kumaon, ... ..	14,154	5,008	14,154	4,014
Rohilcund, ... ..	3,60,400	3,26,968	3,11,444	2,62,147
Agra, ... ..	3,61,733	3,00,409	3,54,050	2,48,478
Jhansie, ... ..	82,055	87,992	81,454	76,119
Allahabad, ... ..	5,39,330	5,68,838	5,33,777	5,62,271
Goruckpore, ... ..	2,24,526	2,32,655	1,97,593	2,21,800
Benares, ... ..	5,45,784	6,17,145	5,34,001	6,09,598
Jubbulpore, ... ..	2,36,544	2,91,161	2,36,127	2,89,347
<b>Total, ...</b>	<b>26,19,161</b>	<b>26,06,443</b>	<b>25,10,956</b>	<b>24,39,290</b>

**148. Recapitulation of Loss and Expenditure of all sorts.**—To sum up the amount of known loss, we have the following well-ascertained statistics:—

	Ra.
* Expended in the distribution of food, ... ..	5,41,783
* Ditto in advances for the purchase of seed and cattle, ... ..	3,40,213
* Ditto in minor relief works, ... ..	29,918
Ditto by Government only in public relief works, ... ..	9,14,294
Remission of revenue, ... ..	2,34,646
<b>Total, ...</b>	<b>20,60,854</b>

There can be no doubt from these figures that better means of communication and greater promptness in anticipating the effects of the drought and improved organization for dealing with the distress had made famine a much less awful calamity than it was in 1837-38.

\* For the details of these sums, see Appendix VII.

**149. Offences against Property.**—The following table shows the state of crime before, during, and after the famine:—

*Tabular Statement showing the amount of Dacoities and Robberies, Burglaries and Thefts, including Cattle-thefts from 1860 to 1862.*

DIVISIONS.	Districts.	Dacoities and Robberies.			Burglaries.			Thefts, including Cattle-thefts.			Remarks.
		1860.	1861.	1862.	1860.	1861.	1862.	1860.	1861.	1862.	
MEERUT.	Meerut, ...	7	13	6	435	568	307	1,158	1,691	1,067	
	Allypore, ...	2	9	5	533	755	534	841	1,108	1,058	
	Saharanpore, ...	10	4	10	317	314	295	650	840	646	
	Muzaffernugger, ...	7	3	7	105	188	190	397	470	366	
	Booldandahur, ...	5	14	10	317	544	325	875	1,406	888	
	Dehra Doon, ...	0	0	0	5	15	36	42	57	221	
	Total, ...	31	43	38	1,712	2,334	1,687	3,963	5,572	4,241	
AGRA.	Agra, ...	13	17	22	684	663	831	1,554	1,393	1,369	
	Muttra, ...	6	7	4	370	217	202	495	400	224	
	Furruckabad, ...	5	4	17	303	417	571	362	461	676	
	Mynpoory, ...	4	8	9	267	256	187	339	458	399	
	Etawah, ...	3	2	2	80	81	238	205	347	270	
	Etah, ...	0	14	11	0	288	333	0	698	517	
	Total, ...	31	52	65	1,704	1,922	2,362	2,955	3,757	3,455	
ROHILKUND.	Bareilly, ...	1	1	3	584	702	306	2,133	1,640	1,105	
	Bijnour, ...	1	9	4	239	450	369	516	757	533	
	Moradabad, ...	4	1	6	448	409	282	1,697	1,743	1,192	
	Budaon, ...	7	8	9	409	375	389	1,760	1,694	1,177	
	Shahjehanpore, ...	6	0	5	555	562	390	587	617	919	
	Total, ...	19	19	27	2,235	2,498	1,736	6,693	6,451	4,926	
ALLAHABAD.	Allahabad, ...	4	2	5	113	95	138	353	331	414	
	Cawnpore, ...	16	18	29	324	442	235	568	653	633	
	Futtehpoore, ...	4	7	15	183	186	352	162	242	214	
	Banda, ...	0	5	5	154	124	114	446	309	0	
	Total, ...	24	32	54	774	854	839	1,529	1,535	1,581	
BENARES.	Benares, ...	3	2	3	156	225	275	512	630	629	
	Goruckpore, ...	10	5	5	631	403	185	1,107	801	538	
	Azimpore, ...	7	9	11	401	520	473	590	595	560	
	Jounpore, ...	2	3	5	186	277	501	267	261	557	
	Mirzapore, ...	10	5	7	142	44	194	379	176	294	
	Ghazepore, ...	15	16	17	331	403	646	402	444	502	
	Total, ...	47	40	48	1,847	1,872	2,247	3,257	2,907	3,080	
JHANSIE.	Jhansie, ...	Nil.	13	3	Nil.	30	34	Nil.	278	212	
	Humeerpore, ...	Nil.	3	3	Nil.	51	118	Nil.	181	223	
	Jaloun, ...	Nil.	2	4	Nil.	63	72	Nil.	102	286	
	Lullutpore, ...	Nil.	24	14	Nil.	44	42	Nil.	298	273	
	Total, ...	Nil.	42	24	Nil.	188	266	Nil.	809	994	
AJMERE.	Ajmere, ...	Nil.	52	33	Nil.	112	78	Nil.	904	528	
	GRAND TOTAL, ...	152	280	289	8,372	9,780	9,342	18,397	21,935	18,805	

From this it will be seen that offences against property, though more numerous in the Meerut, Agra, Rohilound, and Allahabad Divisions during 1861, were only seriously disproportionate to the returns of 1860 and 1862 in the Districts of Meerut, Allygurh, Boolundshuhur, Bareilly, Bijnour, and Cawnpore.

**150. Greater order in 1860-61 than in 1837-38.**—There are other points too which it is pleasant to notice in connection with this famine. The beginning of trouble in 1837-38 was marked by a spirit of lawlessness and freebooting throughout the country. Neither the stores of the merchant nor the grain in transit was safe from attack. The starving people forgot all rights of possession, and violently laid their hands on their neighbours' supplies. In almost every district a larger police force had to be entertained, and this item added in no small degree to the burden of Government. In 1860-61 there was no such outbreak, and I believe I am right in saying that it was not found necessary to engage a single extra constable to preserve the peace of the North-West Provinces. Offences against property were, as we have seen, more frequent, but the returns show that the crime was generally of a petty nature. It is probable that the general good conduct is attributable in some measure to the Mutiny, the moral effects of which were doubtless still vividly impressed on the minds of the masses. Colonel Baird Smith allows some weight to this plea, but believes that much more was due to the healthier condition of native society.

**151. Famine not so much due to absolute scarcity as to inability of Poor to purchase Food.**—Another remarkable circumstance in the history of this famine is that there was never a general want of food, but only a lack of the means of purchasing it. In 1837-38 the store of grain on hand was large, and the failure of the crops almost universal. On this occasion there was little laid by, but the deficiency in the harvest was very partial, and beyond the famine tract to the South and East there was plenty. Even in the Mohun Pass, where there was a larger congregation of destitute than on any other individual relief work, and where, from the nature of the locality and the distress in its vicinity, it might have been expected that articles of food would have been hard to procure, there was never any shortcoming\* on the part of the dealers except during the first five or six weeks, when all were new to the undertaking, and for a few days at the beginning of May, when the numbers increased rapidly, owing to the sudden return of villagers who had absented themselves for a while in order to gather their spring crops. On the 31st of December, 1860, Mr. H. G. Keene, Magistrate of Boolundshuhur, wrote that, owing to a fall of rain in Poar and Khatowlee Tehseelees, and the means of irrigation available in Thannah Bhowun, there would be a fair crop in those parts. On the 12th of February Mr. G. F. Harvey,† Commissioner of Agra, intimated to the Lieutenant-Governor that the yield of the Rubbee would be considerable in Agra and Muttra,—an opinion with which, by the bye, the Lieutenant-Governor by no means coincided. In the same letter the Commissioner further said :—

“ Having held the post of Officiating Magistrate and Collector of Agra, and subsequently of Allygurh, during 1837-38, I have no hesitation in stating that nothing at all comparable to the previous suffering and distress felt in those years exists at present, and that emphatically nothing which can be correctly called a *famine*, will add to the present agricultural distress, *unless* the periodical rains of the coming season are withheld, or are greatly deficient in quantity.”

On the 5th of March, 1861, Mr. F. Williams,‡ Commissioner of Meerut, reported that there was then no scarcity of food, that prices were falling and that in two-fifths of the cultivated area of his division there would be an average Rubbee crop. This

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\* See paragraph 7 of No. 257, of 25th November, 1861, a letter from Mr. W. Duthoit, Assistant Magistrate, in charge of the poor on the Deyrah and Roorkee Road, to Commissioner of Meerut, quoted in Proceedings of Government, North-Western Provinces, in Public Works Department, of 22nd March, 1862.

† See his letter No. 158, of 12th February, 1861, North-Western Provinces, in *Government Gazette* of 27th February.

‡ See his letter No. 68 to Government in *Government Gazette* of April 23rd.

happy circumstance he attributed to the exertions of the officers connected with the Ganges and Eastern Jumna Canals, who had been most zealous in making new water-courses. He added :—

“ The experience of this year has fully proved that though the rain crop, even with abundant irrigation, may be scorched by a burning sun and brazen sky at a season when there should be cloud moisture, “ a fully average spring crop may be as certainly grown with irrigation only, without one drop of rain, as “ it should be in the most favourable weather.”

On the 13th of March, Mr. W. Roberts,\* Commissioner of Rohilcund, informed Government that in many pergunnahs the produce was good, and that the prices of grain, particularly of barley, had fallen since the cutting of the Rubbees had commenced and the new corn had been brought to market. At the same time he admitted that in the unirrigated parts of his division the produce was *nil*, and the suffering intense.

**152. Price of Grain during the Famine.**—The following table shows the average price of wheat† over the famine tract for each month, and the monthly and general average in each district (for which returns exist), during the whole period of distress.

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\* See his No. 46 in *Government Gazette*, May 14th.

† For the details of this and other grains, see Appendix VIII.

Tabular Statement of the average cost of Wheat in the Districts of the North-Western Provinces.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
	August, 1860.	September, 1860.	October, 1860.	November, 1860.	December, 1860.	January, 1861.	February, 1861.	March, 1861.	April, 1861.	May, 1861.	June, 1861.	July, 1861.	General District Average.
Stations.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.
1 Saharunpore, ...	0 11 12	0 13 2	0 9 9	0 10 12	0 9 12	0 8 8	0 8 4	0 10 2	0 14 8	0 14 8	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0 9
2 Meerut, ...	0 11 8	0 11 8	0 9 8	0 10 4	0 10 0	0 9 0	0 11 0	0 11 8	0 14 8	0 14 8	0 16 0	0 15 4	0 12 0
3 Allypurb, ...	0 12 4	0 10 8	0 11 4	0 12 4	0 10 8	0 10 4	0 0 0	0 12 0	0 15 8	0 14 0	0 14 8	0 15 8	0 11 8
4 Moradabad, ..	0 10 0	0 9 4	0 9 0	0 10 12	0 9 8	0 9 8	0 10 0	0 11 8	0 16 8	0 14 12	0 15 0	0 15 4	0 11 12
5 Bareilly, ...	0 10 10	0 11 14	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 9 11	0 10 10	0 11 4	0 13 2	0 14 6	0 15 0	0 16 14	0 18 2	0 10 15
6 Budaon, ..	0 10 0	0 9 8	0 9 0	0 9 8	0 9 0	0 8 6	0 9 1	0 12 8	0 15 10	0 16 4	0 16 13	0 18 0	0 11 15
7 Muttra, ...	0 9 12	0 9 0	0 10 12	0 10 12	0 0 0	0 9 12	0 11 4	0 12 0	0 13 12	0 14 0	0 14 0	0 15 0	0 10 13
8 Agra, ...	0 10 0	0 9 12	0 11 0	0 11 8	0 10 8	0 10 8	0 11 0	0 12 0	0 13 12	0 14 12	0 14 4	0 15 0	0 11 14
9 Furruckabad, ...	0 11 0	0 13 4	0 14 4	0 14 8	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 14 4	0 14 12	0 16 12	0 19 4	0 17 4	0 17 4	0 14 14
Total, ...	2 16 14	2 17 12	2 4 5	2 10 4	2 1 15	2 9 8	2 6 1	2 29 8	3 15 4	3 17 0	3 4 11	3 9 6	2 25 1
Average over the famine tract for each month, ...	0 10 12	0 10 13	0 9 5	0 10 0	0 9 1	0 9 15	0 9 9	0 12 2	0 15 0	0 15 3	0 13 13	0 14 6	0 11 10

**153. Estimate of Persons fed by Imported Grain and by the Crops raised on Land irrigated by Canals.**—The importation of grain during the spring of 1861 was enormous. The countries to the south of the Chumbul had been blessed with rain, and had contributed largely of their superfluity. From the east it was said that before the end of March three millions of maunds had passed upwards, and the Grand Trunk Road was still blocked with carts. At the famine rates of 8 chittacks for a man, 5 for a woman, and 3 for a child, this was enough to feed 659,340 men, as many women, and as many children, for six months of 182 days. The whole out-turn of grain for the year from the land irrigated by canals in the North-Western Provinces was 82,64,320 maunds,\* or 33,05,72,800 seers. At the same scale of subsistence and for the same period as above, this amount represents 18,16,334 men, as many women, and as many children rescued from starvation. The value of sugar-cane, indigo, cotton, tobacco, opium, and miscellaneous crops grown on canal lands during the same period was Rs. 58,87,517. This sum, at 17½ seers for the rupee (the average of inferior grains during the year), would throw 10,30,31,547 seers into the market, and at 13½ seers (the average of inferior grains for the period from October, 1860, to February, 1861, inclusive, when prices were highest) would represent the value of 7,94,81,479 seers. The whole population of the famine tract was about thirteen millions.

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\* See Appendix IX.

## SECTION VII.

### DROUGHTS OF 1865 AND 1867.

**154. Drought of 1865.**—I ought not to leave wholly unnoticed the fears that were entertained in these Provinces at the beginning of 1865. Certain portions of the North-West, more especially Ajmere and its neighbourhood and the country to the South of the Jumna, were then supposed by many to be on the verge of famine. In Meywar wheat was selling at 5 seers for the rupee in December, 1864, and at 11 and 12 seers in Ajmere and Allahabad. The merchants were disinclined to sell, the Government talked of facilitating the means of carriage so as to encourage importation, and the Durbar of Rewah was induced to suspend the levying of transit taxes on grain till the Rubbee was gathered, so as to allow of supplies being brought from Jubbulpore, where wheat was selling for 32 seers. The usual instructions were given to the Collectors to be on the alert and report progress. But what perhaps gave most cause for general anxiety was the announcement that the Lieutenant-Governor had foregone the greater part of his cold-weather tour, from a desire, as it was thought, not to add to impending troubles. When a timely fall of rain had taken place in the first half of January, and men could judge more dispassionately of the state of affairs, it was then seen that the previous apprehensions had not been sufficiently well-founded. It proved indeed on investigation that nowhere had there been extraordinary difficulty in enforcing payment of the revenue, and that only villagers of the higher castes, who were too lazy and too proud to dig wells, had been affected to any appreciable extent by the drought. Even in their case the suffering was limited to a smaller degree of comfort than usual, and not to a total lack of sustenance.

**155. Drought in Kumaon in 1867.**—In March, 1867, great fears were entertained for the Rubbee in Kumaon and Gurhwal. For two or three years previously the high prices in the plains had given an unwonted stimulus to exportation in the direction of the plains, and one or more unfavourable seasons in some parts of the province had diminished considerably the hoards on which the people were accustomed to rely in time of want. There had been a total cessation of rain since September, though snow fell in February, the ground had only been moistened a little. Grain was selling in Almorah and elsewhere at prices ranging from 10 to 13 seers, and it was conjectured that the crops would be from one-third to one-half below the average. The Commissioner accordingly asked for an advance of Rs. 30,000 to himself for the purchase of grain, and Rs. 10,000 to the Military Department at Almorah. By this precaution he hoped to lay in a sufficient stock before the rains set in, and prevented the transport from the plains. Both advances were sanctioned. On the 25th of March tidings came to Almorah from Gurhwal that in less than a fortnight many villages would be absolutely without food, and that in case of the worst Government must be prepared to supply at least 8,000 persons with food for three months, at a cost of about Rs. 25,000, and to allow a large suspension on the forthcoming Rubbee instalments. It was also intimated that the sooner special works of relief were undertaken the better. The suffering was greatest in the Southern puttees. In consequence of this information, the Commissioner asked for Rs. 20,000 more, and suggested that the Government of India should double the amount of any private subscriptions which he might collect in behalf of the distressed poor, adding that he did not think gratuitous assistance was wanted, but simply such provision as would meet the wants of those who had not the means of procuring food for themselves. To both of these requests Government acceded. At the end of March, so great was the difficulty of ensuring supplies at Petoragurh that Government gave orders to withdraw the detachment of troops usually stationed and the question was mooted whether similar relief should not be extended to Almorah also. On the 12th of April the Board sanctioned the suspension of the kists for May and June in certain puttees of Kumaon. Fortunately for the province, the weather took a favourable turn at this point: the rain set in early, and the country soon recovered itself.



## SECTION VIII.

### THE LESSON OF PAST FAMINES.

**156. Improbability of another general Famine.**—To judge by the history of the last ninety years, it is most improbable that a general famine will overtake the North-West again without giving due notice of its coming. The whole burden of this narrative goes to show that such a calamity is gradual in its approach. In 1783, in 1803, in 1837, and in 1860, it was not the drought of one season, but of several, which caused the mischief. During the preceding years the rain had been less than usual throughout the country, and at last, by way of climax, came a year in which hardly any at all fell. The testimony of former days, too, gives strong grounds for inferring in what places the effects of drought are likely to be worst. Except in 1783-84, Oude has always escaped, and the distress of the province in that year was as much attributable to the presence of starving emigrants as to failure of the crops. Warren Hastings himself admitted that the misery, though great in Lucknow, was considerably less than on the other side of the Ganges. Azimgurh has never been touched, and Goruckpore only slightly, their immunity being in all likelihood due to the superior fertility of the soil and the abundant means of irrigation which these districts possess. Within the present century the Benares Division appears never to have had a drought of importance, and Rohileund, though it has suffered, has had no distress at all comparable to that of the Doab. The conclusion therefore is that the tract between the Ganges and the Jumna, and certain outlying tracts beyond the latter river, specially Banda, Humeerpore, and the Southern Pergunnahs of Agra and Muttra, run the greatest risk of enduring want hereafter. The facts elicited in the present enquiry incline me to think that the line of the Jumna will always be most affected by an unfavourable season. Through the greater part of its course this river flows in a deep and rocky bed, which prevents its waters from oozing out to the benefit of the surrounding country. Wells, to be effective in its vicinity, must be deep. Add to this that the soil is naturally poor, and many of the inhabitants along its banks are indisposed to honest labour, and the consequences can easily be imagined. It is well to know by past experience what part of the country is most liable to famine, and to be assured that starvation on a large scale never takes the people unawares. But I myself cherish confident hopes that the North-West will never again be subject to such extensive ravages as we read of in old days. The era of great famines is, I believe, at an end in this part of India. The area of the famine tracts in 1837-38 and 1860-61, though not identically the same, were about equal in extent. In the former year Government certainly lost upwards of 65 lakhs, and probably 90½, and in the latter rather more than 9 lakhs (I include the Punjab in both cases), by remission of revenue. In the interval the means of communication had wonderfully increased. In 1837-38 the Grand Trunk Road was metalled continuously no further than Allahabad. Nothing worthy the name of a road existed in the direction of the Central Provinces, and the intercourse between one district and another was of the most primitive and limited description. What the state of things was may perhaps be better conceived when I mention that, metal and repairs included, the whole sum expended by Government on roads for the year ending April 30th, 1837, was Rs. 65,195! In 1860 the aspect of the country was perfectly different. A network of district roads had sprung into existence; the railway had come up to the edge of the North-West; a considerable length of the Ganges Canal had been completed; steamers were plying incessantly on the Ganges; and the granaries of Jubbulpore, Oude, and Bengal were all accessible by land. Since those days the railway has reached Lucknow, Jubbulpore, and Delhi, and will shortly be unbroken to Bombay and Lahore; so that not only is the whole tract of country for which we must yet have apprehensions pierced by the best of all possible highways, but it has all its

parts linked together, and is in immediate connection with the corn-growing provinces on its borders. Such resources being at the disposal of Government, it will henceforth only have to concern itself with the distribution of supplies within the tract of distress; for the nearer that food can be brought to the homes of the starving, the better in the end for the State.

**157. Comparative immunity of the Industrious Castes from Starvation.**—As was natural to expect, the industrious classes have always fared best in a season of drought. Jats, Kachees, Koormees, and the like, have found the means of subsistence when others have perished. At the works in the Mohun Pass in 1861, Chumars alone, not to mention other men of low degree, were in an immense majority. The Jats of Meerut lived by agriculture in 1826, when men of higher caste were fain to satisfy their hunger with roots and berries. No district suffered worse than Cawnpore in 1837-38, and in those pergunnahs where the misery was greatest more than half the cultivators were Brahmins or Rajpoots. In Pergunnahs Dadree and Duncour, of Zillah Boolundshuhur, which were most awfully devastated both in 1838 and 1861, Goojurs\* formed the bulk of the population. The mode of life of this tribe is notoriously inconsistent with the idea of steady, earnest toil. Neither they nor the high-caste Brahmin† or Rajpoot have ever known what it was to put their shoulder to the wheel, and even want cannot teach them to throw off their indolent habits or their foolish pride. The Rajpoot will stay at home sooner than go forth to beg, or undertake work which he considers derogatory; and it cannot be doubted that this feeling of caste has in time of scarcity caused many to perish by a lingering death in the privacy of their own houses. In case of a future emergency, one of the most difficult problems for Government to solve will be how to deal with such men as these. It may be a hard matter, but surely not an impossible one, to devise some congenial sort of occupation by which these haughty indigents may win their bread. It is foolish to despise their prejudices altogether, but yet some way must be found of reconciling their support with the principle which demands labour in return for food.

**158. High Prices tell in favour of the Government and against the Poor.**—Great stress has often been laid by revenue authorities in time of drought on the circumstance that prices were high, and that therefore little or no injury was likely to accrue to the State. The constant repetition of this fact seems to have had the effect of blinding men's eyes to the force of the calamity. Enhancement of prices so far benefits the agricultural classes that it lessens the chance of their falling into arrears despite the diminution in their crops, whilst it secures Government against the losses which might follow an unfavourable season. It prevents the necessity of suspension or remission, or makes it possible for Government to relinquish less of its claim than it could otherwise have done. But it does not help to feed the hungry. On the contrary, it reduces the purchasing power of every sort of property, and thereby brings the poor man more quickly to the verge of starvation. Hence that which may be a cause of profit to the State must be in the long run prejudicial to the individual, and if the condition of the people at large is tested by this standard alone, there is great risk of miscalculating their sufferings. Indirectly, indeed, high prices may be of some avail to a starving community, if they tempt speculators to import quickly from abroad. Their profit will then lie in under-selling the dealers. But, unless the amount thrown into the market is considerable, this cannot be done, and large supplies can only be brought into a famine tract when roads are good and numerous and waterways accessible. Even in 1861, when transport was comparatively easy, the want of

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\* Goojurs, more than any other class of natives perhaps, will not accept improvements unless they are thrust upon them. Canal water is what their wretched, barren villages want, and so far the boon has been denied to them, for the principle hitherto pursued has been to construct canals through fertile tracts, in order to make them profitable.

† There is one notable exception. I believe that, in some parts of Cawnpore, Brahmins will put their hands to the plough with a will. This shows that there is not a universal prejudice on the part of the caste against labour. In the Kangra Valley, too, high-caste men are ready to perform some of the manipulations connected with the manufacture of tea.

organization caused the high-roads to be blocked up at an early period of the famine. Previously to this year the only chance of saving life lay in emigration. Yet this is at best but a sorry remedy, for mortality is sure to ensue amongst emigrants whose physical strength has been impaired by hunger before they started on their wanderings.

**159. In case of Famine, some of the able-bodied Poor should be employed in keeping Communication open.**—During the continuance of a famine, and especially of one which has its origin in scarcity and not in high prices, free communication between one place and another is most essential. This matter has hitherto never been sufficiently attended to, and though there has often been difficulty\* in deciding on what sort of work the destitute could be occupied with the greatest benefit to the State, the necessity of efficient country roads seems to have been overlooked in the eagerness to initiate special relief works of great magnitude. It is very doubtful whether the congregation of large numbers at various centres is a wise course in time of famine. There is always the risk of sickness, epidemic, or a failure in the Commissariat arrangements, and it is impossible to calculate the harm that may arise in a few days from any one of these causes. On the other hand, the more that men can be kept at their own houses, the better chance have the local authorities of ascertaining the amount of relief that will be wanted, and the better for the land when the drought is over, for labour must then be instant and plentiful. When men in sheer despair of subsisting at home begin to roam, there is no saying whither their steps will lead them, or where by their presence they may add to distress which it was hard enough to cope with successfully before the strangers arrived. It is not enough to trust to the railway, the Grand Trunk Road, the navigable rivers, and the canals, for the distribution of supplies. From one and all of these the food should be carried off through a multiplicity of channels and by various means till it comes closer to the dwellings of the poor. The efforts of many of the applicants for relief should certainly be devoted to keeping up the roads which brings the grain nearer to their doors, so that there might be no yielding of embankments, no breaking down of bridges, no wearing out of metal, and consequently no block in the traffic at the critical moment. In the event of another famine, if merely the imperial and district metalled roads of the North-West were kept in a thorough state of repair, it would then be seen how much labour might be employed advantageously to the State, and profitably to the interests of the husbandman.

**160. Cases in which it is advisable to employ the able-bodied Poor on special Relief Works.**—Such a system of employing the destitute necessarily implies considerable supervision, and hitherto it has not always been found possible to ensure efficient overseers. This difficulty may perhaps be less hereafter, for there is at the present time an inclination to have more sub-divisions of districts in the North-West, and wherever there is a sub-division there is at once an opportunity for localizing relief operations. In such a crisis Tehseeldars and Honorary Magistrates might be made more generally useful than they have been as yet. But, with all the assistance which they may be able to render a Collector, there will still, for a variety of reasons, be need here and there of large relief works. Emigration cannot be wholly stopped; the desolation of a tract of country may be so complete as to throw the inhabitants of whole villages out of work, and withal the roads may be good enough to require only small gangs to keep them in fair order. Under such circumstances, the remedy must be in proportion to the evil, and it only remains for the local authorities to show all due care in managing the assembled multitudes. Each day the number

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\* It would be a wise plan to have a list of works carefully prepared in every district, so that in case of famine it might be clear how the starving should be employed. The list might include a scheme for a canal, or a series of dams in ravines, or a set of ducts from jheels. The object would be to have each possible undertaking well defined on paper, so that at the critical period valuable time should not be consumed in discussing what was to be done. There would be little or no difficulty in making rough surveys, estimates, and plans of the works projected; and copies of such papers should be deposited with the Government, so that it might be thoroughly aware of its districts' wants.

of labourers will differ, and at certain periods it will seem from the gradual diminution as though the brunt of the calamity was over. The hope of securing something from the Rubbee crops has generally induced many to return to their homes in April and May, but as soon as the grain has been stored they are certain to come again upon the State for support till the setting in of the rains. A partial fall of rain also constantly induces the villager to go back to his fields and chance another sowing, it may be a second, or even a third, in the same season. The sanguine way in which the natives infer that one shower out of proper season is the precursor of many more is one of the most remarkable characteristics connected with the history of famines. But their departure should never be reckoned on as final till there are the most unmistakable signs of the drought being at an end. It should always be borne in mind that nothing but continuous rain can stop a widely-extended famine. When once the ground is moist enough for the plough, the money-lender may see his way to making an advance; and until self-interest induces the keenest of speculators to open their purse-strings, it would be madness of Government to think about tuccavee.

161. Most of the Famines during the present Century have been caused apparently by the limited circulation of Money more than by total absence of Food.—To judge by the price of wheat, scarcity has often during the present century been aggravated into famine by the inability of the poorer classes to purchase food rather than by the total absence of grain. Certainly a more general circulation of money would have lessened the distress in many instances. There has no doubt on such occasions been less than the people would have ate had they been able to obtain their daily bread at its ordinary cost; but, allowing for the reduction in numbers caused by emigration, I much question whether many of those who remained could not have supported life if they had had money enough to induce the merchants to part freely with their stores. In 1803-4 there was no district worse off than Furruckabad, and yet wheat\* never fell below 20 seers for the rupee, whilst the average price during the famine appears to have been about 28 seers. Ten years later the average was  $20\frac{1}{2}$  seers in Agra. In 1818-19 the highest price in the same district was 17 seers for the rupee, and in Allygurh  $19\frac{1}{2}$  seers. It is true that in Cawnpore the rates went up to  $9\frac{1}{2}$  seers about this time, but the Collector gave a reason for this abnormal value in the fact that exportation to the East was considerable. In 1825-26 the average price of wheat in Agra, Allygurh, and Cawnpore was about 20 seers. In 1837-38 the average in the worst localities of the famine tract was, on a moderate computation, about  $12\frac{1}{2}$  seers; and it is notorious that, despite the irregularity of several previous seasons, the dealers' pits† were well filled in the early days of distress. In February, 1861, prices fell as low as  $7\frac{1}{2}$  to 8 seers for a few weeks in Saharunpore only, but the average throughout the famine tract was in round number  $11\frac{1}{2}$  seers for the rupee. The gradual diminution in the quantity of wheat to be bought with a rupee between the years 1803 and 1861 appears to me to be roughly in proportion to the change which had been taking place meanwhile in the purchasing power of money,‡ If this be granted, the poor man who in 1861 received  $11\frac{1}{2}$  seers for a rupee fared as badly as his ancestor did in 1803 with 28 seers. He did not fare worse, because his wages have been growing with the century. But though wheat is the standard that I have chosen as being the staple which regulates the cost of other things, and in fact the only commodity of which the old records make any mention in relation to price, it is not the crop on which the poor man depends for his food. Barley, joar, and bajra are what he chiefly consumes. The relative proportion of the inferior grains to wheat is, even in times of scarcity, as three to two, or thereabouts. The period in the last famine when wheat was dearest was between October, 1860, and

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\* I take wheat as the standard, as other grains rise and fall in price with it.

† See Final Report of the Agra Central Relief Committee, paragraph 11 (Proceedings of Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 376, March 29th, 1862).

‡ I have not the book with me to refer to, but I remember that Mr. Keene says somewhere in his "Indian Administration" that prices have been rising at the rate of one per cent. per year during the present century.

February, 1861, for it averaged then about  $9\frac{1}{2}$  seers for the rupee over the whole tract. The average of barley, joar, and bajra during the same time was  $13\frac{1}{2}$  seers. These, then, being the current rates, it may be asked why a common villager, capable of earning from Rs. 2-8 to Rs. 3 a month, cannot on an emergency keep himself and his family alive by his own unaided efforts. It has been proved over and over again that one seer a day is short but not insufficient commons for a man, a woman, and a child. On this quantity of food the trio can not only exist, but can do a certain amount of work. How comes it then that, instead of being self-supporting, the poor man and his belongings either die of hunger, leave their home, or look to the State for support? The answer is, I think, that in time of drought he has not the usual means of commanding money, just as the system under which he lives precludes the possibility of his saving. If he is a hired labourer, the zemindar has no need for his services so long as the land is too parched for sowing to be effective. He therefore stops his wages and casts him adrift. If he is a peasant proprietor—only a step removed in point of worldly wealth from the ryot—the advances on which his crop would be raised are not forthcoming. The banker of course obstinately refuses a loan when there is little or no chance of the seed germinating. To add to their troubles, the peasantry of India have not the means to lay by sufficient of the grain that they have produced in one harvest to feed themselves till the next. Their whole crop is generally delivered to the dealers at prices much lower than those current in the market, and immediately afterwards they begin to draw supplies of the same grain at prices much higher than those of the day. The relation between the dealer and the labourer is in fact similar to that which exists between the money-lender and the landowner. It is founded on that disastrous principle of advances which bids fair to cripple the energies of the country for ever. A sudden incentive to the production of some particular commodity—as, for instance, the impulse which high prices gave recently to the cultivation of cotton—may serve to free whole communities from the burden of hereditary debt; but nothing short of this will avail. The lower classes of the people are ruined by the extortionate demands of their task-masters, and yet are so deeply involved that they have no alternative but to submit. They are utterly at the mercy of their creditors, to do and to will as they please. So long as times are favourable, they live on from hand to mouth, without the power of taking precautions against future calamity, and at length, when the storm breaks, many succumb without a struggle, for they have not an atom of property to call their own.

**162. The State cannot on the spur of the moment find Money enough to feed the Famine-stricken.**—But, it may be urged, it is the business of Government, in time of extraordinary pressure, to take care that its subjects shall not starve; and if the question is merely one of money, it is comparatively easy to take such precautions as shall ensure his daily meal to every deserving person during the period of want. At first sight nothing seems simpler, but a few figures will reveal the impracticability of such a course. If grain is on the spot, it must be purchased at the sellers' price, or if brought from a region of plenty, the cost of carriage will leave little to compensate Government for having transferred its custom to a distant market. Let us suppose a season of scarcity, in which Government has to provide food for five millions\* of persons, who either have not grain in their neighbourhood, or cannot afford the current prices of the market. Let us take the highest average of the inferior grains in 1860-61 as the rate at which Government must pay for its supplies, and let us reckon that one seer a day suffices for a man, a woman, and a child. Such a multitude will require (omitting fractions) 16,66,666 seers a day, or 4,99,99,980 seers a month for consumption. The cost to Government would be Rs. 37,03,702 a month, or Rs. 4,50,61,440 a year—a sum which exceeds the land revenue† of the North-Western Provinces by nearly 52 lakhs.

\* Five millions constitute, according to Colonel Baird Smith, the population of the worst localities in the last two great famines.

† On May 1st, 1867, the land revenue of the North-Western Provinces was estimated at Rs. 3,98,63,633 annually.



**163. Nor on an emergency can the State import Food enough.**—It ought henceforth to be fairly within the competence of Government to arrest a local famine such as that which desolated Bundelcund in 1834. But if once drought should extend over so wide an area as the famine tracts of 1837-38 and 1860-61, I very much doubt whether anything short of rain would release the lower classes from their destitution. Meanwhile, as the country must undergo a period of distress, it becomes necessary to consider how Government can best help its subjects. I have shown how impossible it is for the State to find money enough to buy grain, even if grain exists on the spot. I now propose to set forth the difficulties attendant on importation. 243½ lbs. per head per annum is the average famine allowance, and as such I make it my basis for calculating what would be wanted to feed the inhabitants of a famine tract in time of drought, and what would be the cost of importing grain to make up for the shortcomings of the local harvests. The population of the famine tract in 1860-61 was about 13 millions. This number of months would therefore require, on the lowest scale compatible with existence, some 1,367,560 tons. The produce raised from canal lands (almost all of which were situated in the tract) was 82,64,320\* maunds, or 295,154 tons. The extent of ground within the area of distress irrigated by wells, permanent and temporary, was about 1½ millions of acres, and the produce, assuming the proportion to be the same to acreage as on the canal lands, would be about 667,000 tons.† By adding these items together, and deducting their sum from the amount of grain required, it appears that there was less by about 405,406 tons than would keep the people alive during the year. Mr. John Strachey, in the note‡ from which I quote below, estimates the cost of carriage at two annas per ton per mile in time of famine. According to this calculation, the deficit of 1860-61 would have entailed an expenditure of Rs. 50,675 for every mile of its transit. If ever the links are made which shall connect all our isolated canals, it is probable that the cost of transporting food will be much diminished. Water-carriage is always cheap compared to railway rates, and there is practically no limit to the use which may be made of it in case of emergency.

**164. Remission of Revenue is the best means of alleviating distress.**—Such, then, being the present difficulties in connection with importation of food, what course remains open to Government when it is convinced that famine is near at hand, and is desirous of alleviating the distress which it cannot wholly keep off? The remedy was clearly recognized by Mr. Rose after the events of 1837-38, and as clearly described :—

“One of the errors of Government,” he wrote, “was in not being sufficiently explicit and early in making known to the people the extent of negative relief intended to be granted by means of remission

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\* I calculate roughly 80 lbs. to a maund.

† I do not take into account the partial crops in the Doab due to rain in this year, as I am arguing now concerning the effect of a total drought.

‡ The cost of transport, which is always enormous, becomes in time of famine greatly increased by the difficulty and expense of obtaining supplies of food for cattle. In ordinary times the average cost of transport in this part of the North-Western Provinces is calculated to be about one anna and eight pie per ton per mile.§ At the present time this rate must probably be increased to at least two annas. It is easy to understand how hopeless it is under such circumstances to expect that the importations of food in time of actual famine can be anything but insufficient. Thus, to give an illustration, the five millions of people inhabiting Rohilcund certainly require for their consumption a supply of at least 800,000 tons of grain every year. To import even a tenth part of this quantity appears almost impossible. The mere cost of transport in bringing 80,000 tons of grain a distance of only 200 miles would not be less than 30 lakhs of rupees. According to Mr. Well's Traffic Tables, the average total annual imports into Rohilcund, including every branch of trade without exception, amount only to about 80,000 tons; so that, if every cart engaged in the trade of the province were employed in bringing food, not a tenth part of the quantity consumed in the year could be imported.—See *Note on Famines, Supplement to the "Gazette of India,"* Dec. 21, 1867.

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§ See Mr. H. Well's Report on Rohilcund Railway.

of revenue. It is true little or nothing was collected by Government until the Rubbee harvest was ripe, and the people were early told that they were to expect leniency; but the Collector unfortunately could not tell them what amount of remission it was intended to allow, and whilst he was prosecuting his enquiries to determine that point, the malgoozars, never before having experienced or ever heard of such sweeping remissions as were ultimately granted, and expecting in their most sanguine hopes nothing beyond a remission of ten or twenty per cent. of the revenue, continued to press their ryots for the rents,—thus driving away thousands who, if unmolested, would have remained in their villages, and by means of artificial irrigation would have raised a sufficient Rubbee crop to subsist on.

“Should, therefore, the country be ever again visited with a similar calamity, I would recommend, as a first step, that the total suspension of all demands for the November and December instalments be proclaimed, provided the malgoozars adopted the same course towards their cultivators; and that the duty of the Tehseeldar and Collector should for the time be limited to ascertaining how far the malgoozars adhered to that provision, and taking, of course, when they deviated therefrom, a fair proportion of the rent exacted by them from the cultivators.

“When the Rubbee harvest came into the market there would be ample time to commence to determine what each mehal should pay; nor is there any danger that such a course would cause undue loss of revenue. The scramble between the malgoozar and Tehseeldar to forestall each other in getting hold of the rents would cease, and instead of a desire to exact all he could out of the ryot, the malgoozar would be impressed with the conviction that the lighter he dealt with his cultivator, the more leniently he himself would be treated by the Government.

“After four years’ official acquaintance with the zemindars of this district, I am bound to say that, with the exception of a few Rajpoot communities, they are never backward in paying that portion of revenue which can fairly be demanded from them. The principle of looking to the land instead of to the person and effects of the malgoozars for the revenue is now so well understood in this district that I believe in a very few years process of imprisonment and distraint of property might be entirely abolished, without any additional difficulty in realizing the revenue, and without any increase in sales or transfers.”

The plan of course has its disadvantages, but there seems no reason why, with proper care, they should not be overcome. The subject occupied the attention of Mr. W. Muir when he was settling the Calpee pergunnahs, and he pointed out both the evil and its cure at the time :—

“When remissions are granted on such emergencies,” he observed, “the usual plan adopted has been to call on the Tehseeldars to furnish detailed estimates of the produce of the year, and upon them to found a limited demand. This system gives full scope to the malpractices and intrigue of the native officers, who on such occasions are found to attend to their own interests as much as to those of Government or the people. The remissions granted in the district in the drought of 1834 were most liberal, but it is proved that they greatly failed of their effect through the gross venality of the subordinate authorities.

“Now, whether we look to the extreme facility with which such transactions can be carried on without exciting suspicion, or to the extreme difficulty of obtaining proof sufficient for conviction when they have reached our ears, or to the irresistible temptation to indulge in them which must overwhelm most natives from a combination of both these circumstances, the more desirable does it appear to procure some standard which we can use in place of their opinion. And it is obvious that it would be more for the advantage of Government, in making use of such a standard, occasionally to err a little too far on the side of remission, than by trusting to the native officers to make them sharers in benefits intended solely for its suffering subjects; for in the last case the reductions, to produce an effect equal to those in the first, must include a separate charge—that of corruption, which if they do not include, as the native officers will seldom let go their prize, the result will be the ruin, in a greater or less degree, of the country affected. In the first case, again, even if the abatement be greater than the occasion calls for, still all of it is applied to its proper object, and at the worst can never fail of benefitting those for whom it is intended, of warding off the effects of famine, and of adding to the prosperity of the country.

“A standard such as that alluded to above it is possible to obtain in Bundelcund. Want of rain affects each of the different soils in a different degree, and as the classification of the villages is based on that of the soils, it follows that the different classes of villages are affected by drought in a manner that can be previously ascertained. Upon this principle, I have with great care prepared a scale by a collation of statements from the Canoongoes, Tehseeldars, and other experienced officers and intelligent natives; and though, of course, I cannot pretend that it is perfect, I am certain that it approximates to the real effects which accompany the different degrees of drought.

“Whether the particular famine to which the standard is to be applied belongs to the first, second, or last degree of intensity, must be judged of by the Collector; and it will often happen that while one pergunnah, or even division of a pergunnah, is affected by one degree, another may be affected by a different. It would be most desirable that the record of meteorological phenomena obtained from the observations of the rain-gauge (directed in the Board’s fourth Circular to be erected in every tehseeldaree and thannah)

should be placed parallel with the effects of different years on the produce of the soil, and that their mutual bearings in each of the different gradations of famine should be correctly ascertained. Such an induction of facts might thus be secured as to reduce to an almost infallible rule both the general principles on which remissions should be founded, and the mode of their application in particular seasons and places. Meanwhile I beg to suggest whether it would not be more politic, in a country so liable to severe drought, to adjust remissions according to the following scale, than to trust to those unconnected estimates of the Tehsildar, which not only are founded on no uniform rule, but give birth to many evils and abuses:—

CLASS OF VILLAGES.					DEMAND PER CENT. ON THE GOVERNMENT JUMMA.		
					In a drought of moderate intensity.	In a drought of great intensity.	In a drought of extreme intensity.
Kuchar,	...	...	...	...	84	50	22
First,	...	...	...	...	80	50	18
Second,	...	...	...	...	70	35	12
Third,	...	...	...	...	60	24	7

"Two remarks must be here made. The volume of the jumma is not invariably affected by drought, or in proportion to it, for it depends on the fall of rain beyond the country. But when the stream flows unabated, the fertility of the *tree* lands is unimpaired; the value indeed in scarcity is increased by the rise in prices. In this instance an exception would be made from the scale, and remissions would be granted only in proportion to the cultivated area which was beyond the influence of the river. The case here supposed would be a matter of notoriety—not such as could be garbled and concealed from a Collector who should avail himself of ordinary enquiry; and the measurement papers would render it difficult for the native officers to mislead regarding the portion of an estate which should be subject to the rules of remission and that which should not. The tributaries of the Jumna are less independent on the local rains, and I apprehend that the scale would apply with correctness to the villages on their banks.

"Secondly,—A total suspension of rain, if such should occur, ought undoubtedly to be followed by a total suspension of demand. I again except the Kuchar villages, from which, if the flood were not much diminished, a demand of one-tenth might, even in such seasons, be made. If in like manner, after a total suspension of rain in the regular season, a fall of some duration should occur in the month of December, the produce of the first-class villages would justify the collection of a similar proportion. These observations are introduced chiefly to show that the general adoption of the scale would in nowise interfere with particular instances in which the Collector recognized peculiar and extraordinary grounds for departing from it.

"The scale for Koonch would, from the preponderance of *war* and the humidity of its soil, vary thus:—

CLASS OF VILLAGES.					DEMAND PER CENT. ON THE GOVERNMENT JUMMA.		
					In a drought of moderate intensity.	In a drought of great intensity.	In a drought of extreme intensity.
First,	...	...	...	...	86	64	22
Second,	...	...	...	...	80	52	16
Third,	...	...	...	...	72	42	12

"But the arrangement would exhibit a serious defect were it to make no provision for the ryot. The first-class villages are not composed entirely of *war*, nor the third entirely of *rakar*; and, as the productive power of each field depends not so much on the class of village as on the species of soil, the latter must regulate the demand. I propose, therefore, that the same indulgence granted to the zemindars should



be extended by them to their ryots, that they should be instructed to collect according to the annexed table, and that no claim beyond it should be upheld in a summary complaint:—

SOIL.					DEMAND PER CENT. ON THE RENT USUALLY PAYABLE BY THE RYOT.		
					In a drought of moderate intensity.	In a drought of great intensity.	In a drought of extreme intensity.
1. Mar,	...	...	...	...	87	65	23
2. Kabur,	...	...	...	...	75	38	16
3. Purwa,	...	...	...	...	70	30	14
4. Rakur,	...	...	...	...	48	17	5
5. Turee,	...	...	...	...	100	72	35
6. Kuchar,	...	...	...	...	92	53	22

“ The observations in paragraph 139 apply to the first, fifth, and sixth soils, and especially to the *turee*, the rents of which, as long as the stream is full, need not be abated.

“ The subject being one of difficulty, it is with great diffidence that I put forth the above remarks. It cannot however be doubted that the *principle* is a just one, and, if judiciously set in operation, would be attended with inestimable benefits. In addition to the advantages of security and confidence, and the exclusion of bribery, there is another, scarcely inferior, which I think would be secured. When collection is made of every farthing which can be extracted, the proprietor has no object in avoiding, to the utmost of his power, the effects of the drought; his constant aim is rather to depreciate his village, that he may gain a greater abatement. But if the demand were uniform and fixed, this indifference would be supplanted by all the inducements of self-interest; his mind, set at ease as to the amount to be exacted, would turn with vigour towards the preservation and improvement of his estate;—in a word, instead of cavilling about remissions, he would make the most he could of a bad season.”

The practice of remissions is, strictly speaking, against the letter of the law, for the theory on which our present system of assessment is based is that of fixing a moderate average demand for a long term of years. “ The Government agrees to relinquish the excess in a good year, and it is fair to expect that the deficiency of a bad year should be made good from the accumulated surplus of past or the anticipated surplus of coming years.” But practically this rule has been more honoured in the breach than the observance. Like the Bank Charter Act, it has often had to yield to stress of circumstances, and whenever it has been set aside in time the relief has been speedily apparent. It at once checks emigration, and herein lies its expediency. If the ryots can be kept in the neighbourhood of their villages during the period of famine, it is evident that the country will recover more quickly from its exhaustion, for their labour is available on the first fall of rain. The fear of consequences when they have fallen into arrears has been as much the disposing cause to emigration as hunger, and therefore the announcement that Government will remit its demand is the plainest proof to the poor man that it has a fellow-feeling for him in his trouble. So attached is he by nature to the soil, so difficult to move from the home of his fathers, that this token of sympathy is generally enough to make him remain steadfast to his land. If public works of relief are instituted, he has an additional reason for staying. The ruin that the absence of such men causes is matter of history. Within a year after the famine of 1803-4, many estates in Cawnpore, though put up to auction, came back upon the hands of Government for lack of purchasers, and were consequently managed at a loss. No speculator would buy the land, because he had no certainty that he could find labourers to cultivate it. The same thing happened again in 1838. Concerning Etawah Mr. Martin Gubbins wrote in 1841\*:—“ That the population has been very sensibly reduced by death is abundantly evident from the still deserted

\* See his Settlement Report, para. 43.

houses and abandoned lands, as well as from the general fall of rents throughout the district. This latter fact sufficiently indicates the competition, not of cultivators for land, but of land-holders for cultivators." For the same reason the transfers of ownership in landed property were numerous in Allygurh and Boolundshuhur, and the rates of purchase-money very low. There is no need to multiply instances. What I have cited is sufficient to give an idea of the loss in revenue alone, not to mention in agricultural produce, which must ensue after a famine, if the means are not at hand to till the soil.

**165. Present Capabilities for Irrigation in the North-Western Provinces.**—The best safeguard however against famine consists in the improvements which every year is witnessing. We have made a great stride since 1861. We shall make a greater still before the decade is over. I have shown what has been done by means of roads and railways. Let us see now whether canals, the chief artificial element in securing a crop, have been keeping pace with the times. In 1860-61 the area protected was about 820,933 acres. The details are these :—

1860-61.				Acres.
Ganges Canal,	...	...	...	454,316
Eastern Jumna Canal,	...	...	...	251,153
Agra Irrigation Works,	...	...	...	26,342
Rohilcund Irrigation Works,	...	...	...	89,122
Total,				820,933

In 1865-66 I estimate that the area of irrigation was as follows :—

1865-66.				Acres.
* Ganges Canal,	...	...	...	573,129
* Eastern Jumna Canal,	...	...	...	160,356
* Dhoon Canals,	...	...	...	6,990
* Rohilcund Canals,	...	...	...	59,416
† Agra Irrigation Works,	...	...	...	26,342
* Humeerpore Irrigation Works,	...	...	...	628
Total,				826,861

This year was exceptionally unfavourable to irrigation, chiefly, I believe, owing to the introduction of new water-rates, and the increase since 1860-61, it will be seen, was almost nominal. To judge by the comparison of these two tables alone, the prospect is anything but cheering. It remains however to show what, according to undoubted authority, these canals either have done or are capable of doing in a very short space of time. It has been found that on the Eastern Jumna Canal† each cubic foot of discharge can irrigate on the average 220 acres. The average discharge into the canal throughout 1865-66 was 1,106 § cubic feet per second. The conclusion therefore is that the Eastern Jumna Canal can with ease water 243,320 acres. As a matter of fact it can do more, for it watered 251,153 acres in 1860-61. The Ganges Canal attained an average of 73|| acres per cubic foot of discharge in 1860-61, and 141 acres in 1864-65; but the Committee appointed to consider Major Crofton's project were of opinion that there was nothing to prevent an average¶ of 200 acres per cubic foot, and the full discharge contemplated by its originators—namely, 6,750

\* See General Statement No. IV. (Proceedings of Government, North-Western Provinces, Irrigation Department, February, 1868).

† These works were closed in 1865-66. I therefore borrow the figures from the previous table.

‡ Report of the Ganges Canal Committee, para. 159.

§ Irrigation Revenue Report for 1865-66, page 36.

|| Report of the Ganges Canal Committee, para. 158.

¶ Report, para. 151.

cubic feet—being speedily reached. The result would then be an irrigated area of 1,350,000 acres. In 1864-65 the Rohileund Canals irrigated 93,566\* acres. The returns relating to this year do not include the operation of the Nehtour and Nugeena Canals. In 1865-66 the Nehtour and Nugeena Canals supplied 3,744† acres with water. The influence of the Humeerpore Irrigation Works extends to 6,492‡ acres. Concerning the Agra and the Dhoon Works I have not been able to obtain any additional information. The capability therefore of the above-mentioned works for irrigation is as below :—

	<i>Acres.</i>
Ganges Canal, ...	1,350,000
Eastern Jumna Canal, ...	251,153
Dhoon Canals, ...	6,990
Rohileund Canals, ...	93,556
Nehtour and Nugeena Canals (Bijnour), ...	3,744
Agra Irrigation Works, ...	26,342
Humeerpore Irrigation Works, ...	6,492
Total, ...	<u>1,738,277</u>

From this let us exclude the land irrigated in Rohileund. There remains then a balance of 1,640,977 irrigated acres for the Doab and the country south of the Jumna (exclusively of Ajmere and the districts in the Jhansie Commission), which, as I have already observed, constitute the tract where drought is most to be feared. The calculation of irrigated land throughout this tract is not, however, complete without the items in the following table, which must only be accepted as approximately correct :—

	<i>Acres.</i>
§ Area of land in the Doab irrigated from wells, ...	1,500,000
Ditto in Humeerpore, Banda, and Trans-Jumna Pergunnahs of Allahabad, Agra, and Muttra, ...	133,671
Area of land in the Doab, Humeerpore, Banda, and Trans-Jumna Pergunnahs of Allahabad, Agra, and Muttra, irrigated from tanks, &c. (2 per cent. of cultivated and culturable area), ...	300,158
	<u>1,933,829</u>
Add land irrigated by Canals, &c., ...	1,640,977
Total, ...	<u>3,574,806</u>

The commonly-received opinion is that, if one-third of the cultivated and culturable land be provided with the means of irrigation, the labouring classes will be safe from actual want.|| According to the Census Returns of 1865, the population of our

\* Irrigation Revenue Report for 1865-66, page 57.

† Irrigation Revenue Report, page 72.

‡ Irrigation Revenue Report, page 77.

§ I am obliged here, for the want of more accurate statistics, to take Colonel Baird Smith's estimate (see his Report, Section 2., paras. 92 to 104). It is impossible to say how many wells and tanks have been made since 1861 up to the present time. In the Proceedings of the Revenue Board No. 163, dated 5th October, 1865, I find that 1,346 wells and 51 tanks were constructed in 1862 to 1864. No later statistics exist, nor is there anything to show what wells were thrown out of use meanwhile. It is a well-known fact that in many canal districts zemindars whose estates lie within the influence of the canal disregard the wells at their door, and purchase water from Government, because they find the latter plan the cheaper of the two.

|| "Ten millions of people," says Sir Arthur Cotton (see page 13 of his Lecture on the Famine in India, delivered before the Social Science Congress in 1866), "require two and a half millions of tons of mere food per annum;" or, in other words, each member of the population requires on an average yearly a quarter of a ton, or 569lbs. But, as we have seen, they can do with an average of as little as 248½lbs. a year a head. In 1860-61 the average yield of grain crops from land irrigated by canals was 865lbs. per acre. On this calculation 5,002,631 acres will yield 4,327,275,815lbs., which, divided amongst a population of 13,771,055, will give about 314½lbs. per head per year.

probable drought tract is 13,771,055, the area is 21,080,533 acres, and the cultivated and culturable land 15,007,895 acres. A third of this latter amount, or 5,002,631 acres, must be provided with water, or the people may suffer from lack of food. There is only a tolerable certainty of ensuring irrigation to 3,574,806 acres within the next few years. There are therefore 1,427,825 acres of this third at present altogether without the means of irrigation.

**166. Expenditure for purposes of Irrigation should not be exclusively in favour of Canals.**—But there is no reason why the irrigation of the country should not be enormously increased in a manner irrespective of canals. The magnificence of such undertakings has a tendency to eclipse the value of all humbler projects in the eyes of our engineers, and the benefits which have accrued to some of the continental countries of Europe, specially to the North of Italy, have inclined them to generalize too rapidly with regard to India. It is curious to contrast the different circumstances of Lombardy and the Doab—how great the facilities are there, and how many the obstacles here. In Italy there is the long mountain range running parallel with the Po at a distance varying from 60 to 100 miles, and the chain of lakes below the Alps whence issue the numerous rivers which feed the canals. Here our great canals (I speak of the Ganges and Eastern Jumna Canals) are far from the Himalayas, and possess only two sources of supply. In Lombardy there is a network of irrigating channels, each an auxiliary to the other, which together leave not an acre unwatered; in the North-West there are two independent water-courses which have no pervading influence over the country that they intersect. An Indian canal and its ducts bear about the same proportion to the surface of the Peninsula as a narrow ribbon does to a good-sized map. Place the ribbon on the map, and twist it hither and thither to mark the windings that a canal takes in search of naturally fertile soil, and it will be seen at once what is the influence of the artificial stream on the country at large. Moreover between one duct and another there is much ground that does not come in for its due share of moisture, and it is these spots and the country altogether beyond the reach of the canal which require water. The remedy for supplying them is simple. It needs only to supplement the canals with additional tanks and masonry wells to make the benefit of the former complete. At the present time much valuable water passes away by defiltration from every canal. This might be at once utilized by means of a well dug wherever there is a spot a little higher than the surrounding land. Again, wells are the best means of supplementing a canal wherever inequality of surface precludes the formation of a duct. The system is one that natives thoroughly understand. Whereas a canal is a most expensive undertaking, in the construction of which much capital must perforce lie idle for long, and which when completed is not at once appreciated by the people, may fail in its supply when water is most wanted, and may occasionally bring down deleterious instead of fertilizing matter, a well is easily built, necessitates only a moderate outlay, is quickly available for irrigation, and is a unit complete in itself. If the landholder has the money at his disposal, well and good; if not, there is a provision by which he may borrow from Government. The system of *tuccavee*\* is well known in Native States, and in the early days of our Government was more liberally granted than it is now. During the three years 1862-63 to 1864-65 the amount of *tuccavee* sanctioned for the whole of the North-West was only Rs. 1,29,599,† and for the three years following only Rs. 1,22,058,—in all Rs. 2,51,657. In June, 1804, the Collector of Cawnpore asked for two lakhs and a half, and actually obtained Rs. 1,80,826. In 1807-38 Mr. John Lawrence was unwearied in his applications for loans to build wells in the Delhi Territory, and his request was never denied. Natives of wealth freely sink their money now-a-days on such undertakings, because they know that they will pay, but it is the poor

\* See Directions to Collectors, paras. 45 to 47; and its Appendix V., Rules for the Advances of *Tuccavee*.

† See No. 159, dated March 13th, 1865, from the Board of Revenue, North-Western Provinces, to Government, North-Western Provinces. The information for the last three years has been supplied to me directly from the Board's office.

landholders who need to be stimulated. Though the surplus on the budget estimates is still small, the increased expenditure would be little more than nominal, for the conditions entail speedy repayment, and after a year or two what was lent out in one quarter would be paid back from another. By calculating the loss arising from a famine, Government knows at a glance what it may spend with advantage in the hope of preventing another, and even 2½ lakhs\* set aside as a loan fund for needy zemindars would by the rapidity with which it would pass from hand to hand be a remunerative investment on the part of Government. It would make the soil more productive, it would lessen the chance of balances, and it would help to neutralize the power of drought. Besides adding to the number of wells, we should also teach the people to use such mechanical appliances in drawing water as will diminish labour, and therefore cost, or else with the same labour and cost will tend to better results. A mere increase in the diameter of the wheel over which the rope of a well works gives greater leverage, and, by throwing less strain on the bullocks, makes it possible for a larger bucket to be used. A wider shaft gives room for more buckets to work at the same time. Colonel Baird Smith reckoned that a masonry well only irrigated 4½ acres in each crop, and a temporary well only 1½ acres in each crop. With better methods of drawing, the area in each case might be doubled. But of all conservative people the natives of India are the most conservative, and they will cling to the custom of their fathers unless we substitute example for precept. The damming up of streams and water-courses affords another plan for utilizing water, which, so far as I know, has been nowhere adopted except in Ajmere, and parts of Humeerpore and Rohilcund. Colonel Dixon's exertions in the former district succeeded in bringing 24,620 acres out of 1,703,423 under cultivation by means of tank embankments alone, to say nothing of the wells, "narees," and weirs which he made. The cost of these embankments was Rs. 2,41,112, and the revenue of the district advanced from Rs. 96,805 in 1835-36 to Rs. 2,10,219 in 1846-47. The increase of revenue in eleven years beyond the jumma of 1835-36 was Rs. 6,41,234. It is almost needless to remark that there are many minor streams throughout the North-West to which the system of dams might be extended with advantage. In the Bareilly District, exclusive of Pillibheet, 58,030 acres are watered from rivers and natural streams. Here too the facilities for temporary wells are so great that irrigation should be virtually unlimited. Contrary to the case of the Doab, the complaint from Rohilcund often is that there is too much moisture in parts, and the thing needed is rather a proper distribution of the existing supply than an increase, so that every patch of land shall have its full share. But to do this even at so slight a cost as a temporary well demands requires more money than a peasant proprietor can muster out of his own pocket, for the price varies between Re. 1-8 and Rs. 15. The cheaper rate will irrigate half an acre, and the higher three or four acres, with this advantage, that the more costly well lasts for four or five years, whilst the other must be renewed annually.

**167. Irrigation the only means of preventing Famine.**—Irrigation, then, I conclude, is the only means in our power of rendering another dearth impossible. Though other expedients may serve to lessen the severity of famine, this alone will prevent its recurrence. If, as I verily believe, water is the one thing needful to secure the people of India against extraordinary want, we must be ready to furnish by art that moisture which the heaven occasionally denies. It is folly to pin our faith on one system of irrigation, to the exclusion of all others. Canals, wells, tanks, and dams, all have their advantages; but the land will never be safe against the disastrous effects of drought until the interdependence of these sources of supply is recognized as a primary necessity. In a country where rain in due season cannot be reckoned upon with certainty, it is essential to husband every drop of water against the day of need. It is not that India lacks water. There is enough, and to spare; but the means of storing and distributing it are insufficient. As the superfluity of our great rivers is

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\* This was about the amount absolutely remitted in the North-West in consequence of the famine of 1860-61.

diverted into canals, so should the water that escapes through the banks of canals be collected into wells, to be drawn off as it is wanted ; whilst tanks should be excavated wherever rain is likely to lie, and embankments be erected wherever the overflowings of a stream can benefit the surrounding fields. With such a system the chance of waste is reduced to a minimum, and the influence of drought is no longer irresistible. It requires no superhuman effort and no inordinate delay to provide irrigation for one-third of the cultivated and culturable land of these Provinces. When this has been done, the agricultural classes need never be without employment, and the wages that they earn, even though prices may rise at times to an unusual height, will ensure them sufficient of the crop that they have raised with their labour to keep them above want.

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## APPENDIX I.

### LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED FOR THIS REPORT.

#### *Government Records and Reports.*

- Proceedings of the Sudder Board of Revenue for the years mentioned in paragraph 5—*passim*.
- Judicial letters from the Government of Agra to the Court of Directors, 1835-39, 2 Volumes.
- Letters on Miscellaneous Revenue from the Government of Agra to the Court of Directors, 1836-37. 1 Volume.
- General Despatches from the Government of Agra to the Court of Directors, 1835-39. 2 Volumes.
- Selections from *Calcutta Gazette*, Seton Karr. 3 Volumes.
- Settlement Reports of the North-Western Provinces. 3 Volumes.
- Montgomery's Report of Cawnpore. 1 Volume.
- Hutchinson's Statistics of Allyghur. 1 Volume.
- Kinloch's Statistics of Futtehpoore. 1 Volume.
- Court's History of Budaon. 1 Volume.
- Edgeworth's Statistics of Banda. 1 Volume.
- Swinton's Statistics of Goruckpoore. 1 Volume.
- Shakespeare's Statistics of North-Western Provinces. 1 Volume.
- Dixon's Sketch of Ajmere and Mairwara.
- Mr. G. Campbell's Extracts from the Records in the India Office relating to Famines in India, 1769-1788. 1 Volume.
- Colonel Baird Smith's Famine Report. 1 Volume.
- Colonel Baird Smith's Italian Irrigation.
- Records in the Office of the Benares Commissioner, from 1780 to 1799.
- Famine Files, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, containing correspondence preserved in the Secretary's Office, North-Western Provinces, about Famines between 1837 and 1861, and the apprehension of Famine in 1865.
- Famine Files for 1860-65, containing additional information concerning the Famine of 1860-61.
- Famine Papers concerning 1838, supplied by the Commissioner of Allahabad.
- Famine Papers concerning 1861 and 1867, supplied by the Commissioner of Kumaon.
- Proceedings of Government, North-Western Provinces, relating to Famine from 1860 to 1865.
- Papers supplied by the Record Commission relating to Famines between 1803 and 1823.
- Thomason's Despatches. 2 Volumes.
- Accounts of the East India Company's revenues and disbursements as submitted to Parliament, 1836-1839.
- The Ganges Canal. 3 Volumes.
- Report of the Ganges Canal Committee convened to decide upon Major Crofton's project for remodeling the Ganges Canal, 1866.
- Note on Irrigation by Colonel R. Strachey, R.E., dated 13th July, 1867.
- Mr. J. Strachey's Note on the measures adopted for the relief of the poor in Moradabad during 1861—(Selections of Government, North-Western Provinces, Part XXXVI).
- Mr. J. Strachey's Note regarding the principles upon which measures of relief should be undertaken by Government in time of Famine—(Supplement to *Gazette of India*, December 21st, 1867).
- Report of the Orissa Famine Commissioners, for 1866. 2 Volumes.
- Reports on the Administration of the North-Western Provinces, for 1860-61, 1861-62, and 1862-63.
- Reports of the Police Administration in the North-Western Provinces, for 1861 and 1862.
- Reports of the Sudder Nizamut Adawlut, for 1860, 1861, and 1862.
- Orders of Government, North-Western Provinces, for 1861.
- Files of the *Allahabad Government Gazette*, from July 1860 to October, 1861.
- Files of the *Calcutta Gazette*, from July, 1860 to October, 1861.
- Notes by Luchmun Singh, Deputy Collector of Boolundshahr.

Report on Rohilkund Irrigation.

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## APPENDIX II. TABLE A.

*Towjee Account for Kartick, 1211 Fuslee = November, 1803.*

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	... Rupees of sorts ...	90,146	1,80,892	2,71,338	90,146	1,80,892	..	...	1,80,892
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees ...	39,130	1,04,685	1,44,105	95,246	48,859	...	26,172	...
Etawah	... Furruckabad Rupees	2,30,736	2,37,504	5,18,240	1,11,587	4,06,653	...	...	...
Furruckabad	... Furruckabad Rupees	11,524	64,332	75,856	64,155	11,401	...	11,400	...
Goruckpore	... Lucknow Rupees...	No Towjee received.		...	...	...	...	...	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees...	18,990	2,36,777	2,50,767	2,25,768	24,999	...	24,999	...
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	1,52,743	1,75,144	3,28,887	31,220	2,97,667	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	5,39,859	10,19,334	15,89,198	6,18,722	9,70,471	...	62,871	1,80,892

## APPENDIX II. TABLE B.

Towjee Account for Aghun, 1211 Fuslee=December, 1803.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Kuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	... Rupees of sorts	1,80,892	1,80,892	3,61,784	1,80,892	1,80,892	...	...	1,80,892
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees	48,859	1,57,803	2,06,662	1,68,200	38,462	...	29,552	...
Etawah	... Furruckabad Rupees	4,06,652	2,78,043	6,82,695	2,19,308	4,63,387	...	...	...
Furruckabad	... Furruckabad Rupees	11,400	80,163	91,563	71,300	20,263	...	9,412	...
Goruckpore	... Lucknow Rupees	...	3,28,166	3,28,166	3,11,147	17,019	...	10,255	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees	24,999	3,23,872	3,47,871	3,11,068	36,803	...	36,803	...
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	2,97,608	2,40,781	5,38,449	75,334	4,63,115	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	9,70,470	15,86,720	25,57,190	18,37,249	12,19,941	...	86,032	1,80,892

# APPENDIX II. TABLE C.

Towjee Account for Poos, 1211 Fuslee = January, 1804.

District.	TOWJEE ACCOUNT FOR POOS, 1211 FUSLEE = JANUARY, 1804.								
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
	Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.	
Allahabad	1,80,892	2,71,338	4,52,230	2,71,338	1,80,892	...	..	1,80,892	
Bareilly	38,463	1,84,095	2,22,558	1,69,375	53,183	...	20,446	...	
Etawah	4,63,387	2,73,189	7,36,576	2,38,523	5,08,054	...	...	...	
Furruckabad	20,263	1,11,941	1,32,204	1,10,454	21,750	...	9,711	...	
Goruckpore	27,019	1,40,642	1,57,661	1,45,940	11,721	...	2,073	...	
Cawnpore	36,303	2,47,112	2,83,915	2,26,953	56,962	...	30,584	2,880	
Moradabad	4,63,115	2,94,376	6,97,491	1,36,330	5,69,161	...	...	...	
	12,19,942	14,62,698	26,82,695	12,35,912	13,96,723	...	62,814	1,88,722	
	Total Rupees, sorts								...

## APPENDIX II. TABLE D.

*Towjee Account for Magh, 1211 Fuslee = February, 1804.*

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	...	1,80,892	1,80,892	3,61,784	1,80,892	1,80,892	...	...	1,80,892
Bareilly	...	53,133	1,74,281	2,27,464	1,39,108	98,356	...	6,801	...
Etawah	...	5,03,083	2,75,303	7,78,356	1,79,150	5,99,206	...	...	...
Furruckabad	...	1,36,460	95,633	2,32,092	56,616	1,75,476	...	16,538	1,46,010
Goruckpore	...	11,723	1,40,643	1,52,364	1,35,089	17,325	...	4,781	...
Cawnpore	...	56,962	2,50,279	3,07,241	2,16,305	90,936	...	88,106	2,880
Moradabad	...	5,69,101	2,33,719	7,92,880	67,153	7,25,727	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	15,11,433	13,40,743	38,52,181	9,64,363	18,87,918	...	1,16,226	3,29,732

# APPENDIX II. TABLE E.

Towjee Account for Phagun, 1211 Fulsee = March, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fulsee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allabad	... Rupees of sorts	1,80,892	4,52,231	6,33,123	4,52,231	1,80,892	...	...	1,80,892
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees	4,99,971	1,91,433	6,91,404	1,88,131	5,53,273	...	40,425	3,60,817
Etawah	... Furruckabad Rupees	5,99,306	2,63,706	8,61,912	2,50,682	6,11,230	...	...	...
Furruckabad	... Furruckabad Rupees	1,75,477	65,339	2,40,816	94,743	1,46,074	...	25,090	1,14,710
Goruckpore	... Lucknow Rupees	17,325	1,40,642	1,57,967	1,38,959	19,008	...	3,569	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees	90,396	3,14,862	4,05,798	2,46,865	1,58,933	...	1,56,104	2,830
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	7,25,726	1,37,392	8,63,048	2,04,808	6,58,240	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	22,89,533	15,64,535	38,54,068	15,36,418	28,27,650	...	2,35,188	6,59,249

TOWJEE ACCOUNT FOR PHAGUN, 1211 FULSEE = MARCH, 1804.

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## APPENDIX II. TABLE F.

Towjee Account for Cheit, 1211 Fuslee = April, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Expended by authority.
Allahabad	...	1,80,892	5,42,677	7,23,569	3,97,082	3,26,487	...	1,45,595	1,80,892
Bareilly	...	5,53,374	2,63,822	8,17,096	2,45,528	5,71,568	...	78,271	3,86,583
Kaawah	...	6,11,230	2,36,279	8,97,509	3,38,462	5,59,047	...	...	...
Furruckabad	...	1,46,073	1,27,739	2,73,812	1,36,635	1,37,187	...	48,796	82,308
Goruckpore	...	19,008	1,87,524	2,06,532	1,79,055	27,477	...	8,178	...
Cawnpore	...	1,56,334	4,00,693	5,59,627	3,27,951	2,31,676	...	2,28,845	2,330
Moradabad	...	6,58,240	2,81,211	8,39,451	2,08,036	6,31,415	...	...	4,79,307
Total Rupees, sorts	...	28,27,651	19,89,945	48,17,596	18,32,739	24,84,857	...	5,09,685	11,82,370

## APPENDIX II. TABLE G.

Towjee Account for Bysack, 1211 Fuslee = May, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Rupees of sorts	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bareilly	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Bareilly Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Etawah	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Furruckabad Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Furruckabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Furruckabad Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Goruckpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Lucknow Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cawnpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Lucknow Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Moradabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
...	Moradabad Rupees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	24,84,854	99,69,478	47,47,832	14,95,182	82,52,150	...	12,31,475	10,82,315

APPENDIX II. TABLE H.

Towjee Account for Jayte, 1211 Fuslee=June, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	... Rupees of sorts	7,28,570	1,90,892	9,04,462	1,25,444	7,79,018	...	5,98,126	1,80,892
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees	6,56,883	2,63,380	8,20,213	2,87,283	5,32,930	* 2,96,030	10,000	90,503
Etawah	... Furruckabad Rupees	6,40,081	2,92,155	8,41,236	1,88,961	6,52,275	...	...	...
Furruckabad	... Furruckabad Rupees	1,89,636	1,34,481	3,24,057	45,197	2,78,860	...	2,37,760	31,800
Goruckpore	... Lucknow Rupees	1,17,331	2,34,404	3,51,735	2,02,767	1,48,968	...	88,031	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees.	4,21,971	1,71,211	5,93,182	59,676	5,33,506	2,05,207	1,20,261	2,08,037
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	6,93,688	3,35,710	10,29,398	1,59,624	8,69,774	...	...	5,03,240
Total Rupees, sorts		32,52,150	16,12,183	48,64,283	10,18,952	38,45,331	5,01,237	10,49,178	10,18,973

\* Of this sum, 2 lacs represented simply the enhancement of Jumma beyond that of the previous year.



## APPENDIX II. TABLE I

Towjee Account for Asarh, 1211 Fuslee=July, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	... Rupees of sorts	7,79,018	1,80,959	9,59,977	4,56,907	5,03,070	1,50,468	2,62,904	79,702
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees	2,86,900	1,13,266	4,00,166	1,01,884	2,98,282	...	14,034	90,503
Etawah	... Furruckabad Rupees	6,32,275	2,87,724	9,20,000	1,84,550	7,55,449	...	...	...
Furruckabad	... Furruckabad Rupees	2,78,859	69,203	3,48,062	27,671	3,20,391	...	1,48,512	...
Gorakhpore	... Lucknow Rupees	1,48,969	98,761	2,47,730	87,041	1,56,689	...	42,187	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees	5,33,506	...	5,33,506	12,749	5,20,757	2,04,836	1,08,855	2,07,468
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	8,69,774	1,92,598	10,62,372	1,99,606	9,32,766	...	...	5,05,885
Total Rupees, sorts	...	85,49,301	9,37,505	44,86,806	10,00,403	34,86,398	3,65,098	5,76,242	8,83,856

## APPENDIX II. TABLE K.

Towjee Account for Sawun, 1211 Fuslee = August, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.						
		2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
Allahabad	... Rupees of sorts	3,42,606	...	3,42,606	...	3,42,606	...	...	...
Bareilly	... Bareilly Rupees	2,98,272	...	2,98,272	69,709	2,28,563	...	8,507	90,503
Etawah	... Farruckabad Rupees	7,55,449	85,570	8,41,019	66,081	7,74,938	...	...	...
Farruckabad	... Farruckabad Rupees	3,20,391	...	3,20,391	91,985	2,28,406	...	59,557	...
Goruckpore	... Lucknow Rupees	1,55,690	...	1,55,690	45,265	1,10,425	...	6,623	...
Cawnpore	... Lucknow Rupees	3,16,121	...	3,16,121	24,782	2,91,339	...	83,965	2,07,374
Moradabad	... Moradabad Rupees	9,32,759	...	9,32,759	18,881	9,18,878	...	...	5,05,685
Total Rupees sorts,	...	31,21,288	85,570	32,06,858	3,16,703	28,90,155	...	1,58,652	8,03,563

## APPENDIX II. TABLE I.

Towjee Account for Bhadun, 1211 Fuslee=September, 1804.

District.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Net balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
Allahabad	...	1,16,843	...	1,16,843	...	1,16,843	...	...	78,968
Bareilly	...	2,28,563	...	2,28,563	38,263	1,90,300	...	10,877	83,277
Etawah	...	7,74,938	...	7,74,938	18,113	7,61,825	...	...	...
Farruckabad	...	2,28,406	...	2,28,406	44,373	1,84,033	1,49,605	15,681	17,616
Goruckpore	...	1,10,424	...	1,10,424	63,013	47,411	...	...	...
Cawnpore	...	2,91,339	...	2,91,339	75,341	2,15,998	...	9,763	2,02,882
Moradabad	...	9,13,877	...	9,13,877	47,734	8,66,093	...	...	5,01,166
Total Rupees, sorts	...	26,64,390	...	26,64,390	2,81,837	23,82,553	1,49,605	35,330	8,83,909

**APPENDIX II. TABLE M.**  
*Towjee Account for Komar, 1211 Fuslee=October, 1804.*

District.	Not balance at close of last Towjee.	Kist for current Fuslee month.	Total demand.	Total collections.	Gross balance.	Remissions.	In train of liquidation.	Suspended by authority.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
Allahabad ... Rupees of sorts	...	1,82,082	1,82,082	73,303	1,08,779	...	1,08,779	...
Bareilly ... Bareilly Rupees	...	1,58,383	1,58,383	18,505	1,39,878	...	15,025	...
Etawah ... Furruckabad Rupees	...	2,80,930	2,80,930	1,72,713	1,08,217	...	...	...
Furruckabad ... Furruckabad Rupees	...	65,146	65,146	25,718	39,428	...	39,428	...
Goruckpore ... Lucknow Rupees	...	1,17,398	1,17,398	10,413	1,06,985	...	1,06,985	...
Cawnpore ... Lucknow Rupees	...	2,43,011	2,43,011	2,08,253	34,758	...	34,758	...
Moradabad ... Moradabad Rupees	...	1,94,170	1,94,170	76,068	1,18,102	...	...	...
Total Rupees, sorts	...	12,41,120	12,41,120	5,84,973	6,56,147	...	3,04,975	...

APPENDIX III. TABLE A.

Statement of Demands, Collections, and Balances on account of Land Revenue for 1219-20 Fuslee (=1st May, 1812, to 30th April, 1813).

	Demand.	Collections.	Remissions.	Net balance.	Deduct collections from May 1st to June 30th.	Balance on July 1st, 1813.
Ceded Provinces ... { Lucknow Rupees	1,70,41,812	1,43,06,803	21,844	27,33,165	17,11,781	10,21,384
... { Sicca Rupees	1,68,06,884	1,36,89,822	1,764	26,15,297	16,87,960	9,77,337
Conquered Provinces ... { Lucknow Rupees	96,52,624	84,41,106	† 11,105	12,00,413	8,63,124	3,37,289
... { Sicca Rupees	92,36,354	80,77,082	10,826	11,43,645	8,25,901	3,22,743
Benares ... { Lucknow Rupees	42,91,293	40,23,207	3,994	2,64,091	1,83,796	80,294
... { Sicca Rupees	41,06,231	38,49,706	3,322	2,52,702	1,75,870	76,832
Total, Lucknow Rs.	3,09,85,729	2,67,71,115	16,943	41,97,669	27,58,701	14,38,967
Total, Sicca Rs.	3,96,49,469	3,56,16,610	16,212	40,16,644	26,39,731	13,76,913

\* Bareilly.  
† Bundelcund.

NOTE.—The Ceded Provinces were still seven in number.

The Conquered Provinces consisted of Agra, Allypurb, Bundelcund, and Saharunpore.

STATEMENT OF DEMANDS, COLLECTIONS, AND BALANCES ON ACCOUNT OF LAND  
REVENUE FOR 1220-21 FUSLEE (=1st MAY, 1813, TO 30th APRIL, 1814).

## APPENDIX III. TABLE B.

Statement of Demands, Collections, and Balances on account of Land Revenue for 1220-21 Fuslee (=1st May, 1813, to 30th April, 1814).

		Demand.	Collections.	Remissions.	Net balance.	Deduct collections from May 1st to June 30th.	Balance on July 1st, 1814.
Ceded Provinces ...	{ Lucknow Rupees ...	1,74,74,833	1,60,29,064	* 10,654	14,35,113	8,16,260	6,18,853
		1,67,31,230	1,53,37,811	10,195	13,78,224	7,81,059	5,92,164
Conquered Provinces	{ Lucknow Rupees ...	99,41,822	90,57,750	† 4,700	8,79,370	5,23,160	3,56,210
		95,13,081	86,67,135	4,498	8,41,448	5,00,599	3,40,849
Benares ...	{ Lucknow Rupees ...	42,62,964	41,30,230	6,762	65,983	1,844	64,138
		40,79,124	40,03,526	6,461	63,136	1,764	61,372
	Total, Lucknow Rupees	3,16,79,619	2,92,77,044	22,106	23,80,465	13,41,264	10,39,200
	Total, Sicca Rupees	3,03,13,435	2,80,14,472	21,154	22,77,808	12,83,422	9,94,384

\* { Cawnpore, Rs. 4,525  
Etawah, " 6,129

† { Agra, " 994  
Hundelkund, " 3,504  
Saharanpore, " 201

Ceded Provinces, Furruckabad Suspensions Rs. 241

Conquered Provinces, Allypore ditto Rs. 3,474

STATEMENT OF DEMANDS, COLLECTIONS, AND BALANCES ON ACCOUNT OF LAND      xvii.  
REVENUE FOR 1221-22 FUSLEE(=1st MAY, 1814, TO 30TH APRIL, 1815.)

APPENDIX III. TABLE C.

Statement of Demands, Collections, and Balances on account of Land Revenue for 1221-22 Fuslee(=1st May, 1814, to 30th April, 1815).

	Demand.	Collections.	Remissions.	Net balance.	Deduct collections from May 1st to June 30th.	Balance on July 1st, 1815.
• Ceded Provinces ... { Lucknow Rupees ...	1,78,32,546	1,60,83,314	† 1,598	17,37,633	14,40,354	2,97,378
• Sicca Rupees ...	1,70,53,948	1,53,89,721	1,529	16,62,698	13,78,239	2,84,458
• Conquered Provinces ... { Lucknow Rupees ...	1,02,09,484	89,38,925	† 3,649	12,66,909	9,42,003	3,24,905
• Sicca Rupees ...	97,69,200	85,53,434	3,492	12,12,273	9,01,379	3,10,894
• Lucknow Rupees ...	42,66,925	41,66,647	10,725	89,551	49,767	39,784
• Benares ... { Sicca Rupees ...	40,82,914	39,86,960	10,263	85,890	47,621	38,068
Total, Lucknow Ra. ...	3,22,98,955	2,91,88,886	15,973	30,94,098	24,32,124	6,61,967
Total, Sicca Ra. ...	3,08,06,062	2,79,30,115	15,284	29,60,661	23,27,339	6,33,420

† Of this Rs. 1,498 for Cawnpore.

‡ Of this Rs. 3,446 for Bundelcund.

• Shahjehanpore was now a separate district.

## APPENDIX IV.

## RULES FOR THE RELIEF OF THE HELPLESS IN 1860-61.

I.—No able-bodied person whether man, woman, or child, of age to carry a basket of earth, or perform other such light work, will receive relief from the Committee. All such will be sent off to a labouring gang.

II.—All who are helpless from age or physical infirmity, and who, being destitute and without the means of procuring food, may apply to the Committee for relief, shall receive it in the form of food.

III.—The food so distributed shall be cooked by persons to be engaged for the purpose, care of course being taken that these persons shall be such as that none may object, on the ground of caste prejudices, to receive food from their hands.

IV.—The purchase, preparation, and distribution of food may be conveniently entrusted to a Sub-Committee, composed of respectable members of the Native community, with some trustworthy officer of Government, as *e.g.*, A Native Deputy Collector, or Tehseeldar, as their President.

V.—There shall be but one distribution of food, to be made in the presence of two or more members of the Sub-Committee at a fixed time, and at a fixed place, due notice being given of both.

VI.—A full ration shall be given to each man, woman, and child relieved, and the rations of all of each class shall be uniform.

VII.—The Sub-Committee shall receive from the Committee periodical advances to enable them to purchase grain, to pay the wages of the cooks, and other servants that may be required, and to meet any incidental expenses.

VIII.—These advances shall be accounted for by the Sub-Committee, who shall be required to keep up—

1st.—A Daily Register.

2nd.—A Cash Book, showing daily disbursements.

3rd.—A monthly debtor and creditor account, exhibiting all advances received from the Committee, and per contra all disbursements made during the month, and the balance in hand at its close.

IX.—The Daily Register, signed at the close of each day by two or more members of the Sub-Committee, or by the President on their behalf, shall be laid daily before some member, selected for the purpose, of the Local or Central Committee, who will examine and countersign it. An extract from the Cash Book for each day will be sent at its close to the same member, and at the end of the month the debtor and creditor account will be laid before the Committee at large, who will submit a copy thereof to this Government together with a General Account showing the receipts during the month—

By donations	...	...	...	...	0	0	0
By monthly subscriptions		...	...	...	0	0	0
By Government contributions		...	...	...	0	0	0

and the disbursements per contra, under appropriate headings, with the balance of funds in their hands.

X.—The accounts so to be submitted shall be accompanied by the briefest report, showing the numbers received during the month, the state of distress, whether increasing or decreasing, and the expectations of the Committee as to the stability and adequacy of their funds, together with any suggestions they may wish to offer. These accounts and reports should be in the hands of the Government on or before the 15th of the month following that to which they relate.

XI.—The entries in the Daily Register above prescribed will be checked by the visit of some member of the Committee daily, or four or five days in the week, to the place of distribution of the rations.



APPENDIX V.

ENUMERATION OF RELIEF WORKS UNDERTAKEN IN THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES IN 1860-61.

*Works in the Mohun Pass.*

Months during which work was carried on.	Total number of people employed.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure*.	Remarks.
					Rs. As. P.	
1860.						
December ...	18,978	3,837	3	1,054	4,317 0 4	
1861.						
January ...	2,78,068	16,598	4,607	8,970	34,228 12 6	
February ...	4,51,811	16,318	15,869	16,136	36,866 3 3	
March ...	4,57,410	15,739	12,381	14,755	37,344 4 5	
April ...	2,78,055	12,434	8,077	9,268	22,477 7 5	
May ...	4,86,395	18,183	11,488	15,690	37,770 0 11	
June ...	5,07,655	18,317	14,478	16,922	39,840 7 4	
July ...	3,56,983	14,273	7,193	11,514	27,341 12 1	
August ...	54,193	6,256	50	2,709	5,721 5 3	
Total ...	28,89,498	...	...	...	2,45,407 5 6	

*Road from Haupper to Ghurmookhtesur.*

Months during which work was carried on.	Total number employed.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
					Rs. As. P.	
1861.						
January ...	53,471	3,095	593	2,546	17,043 15 0	The work-people employed in metalling were not separated from those on earth-work, and the rate cannot therefore be calculated, but it was under Rs. 2 per 1,000 cubic feet.
February ...	16,235	897	452	581	2,328 8 3	
March ...	31,474	1,174	931	1,015	7,346 3 11	
April ...	27,045	1,063	676	901	4,023 5 4	
May ...	35,816	1,472	936	1,155	12,310 10 4	
June ...	53,002	2,108	1,420	1,766	6,197 3 5	
July ...	55,243	2,032	1,323	1,782	4,091 0 8	
August ...	24,890	2,256	436	1,185	1,876 0 11	
September ...	...	...	...	...	...	
October ...	2,210	398	80	245	375 1 3	
Total ...	2,99,430	...	...	...	55,652 1 1	

\* The expenditure as given in pages 19—23 is according to the monthly returns. The Account current on page 24 gives the actual expenditure incurred during the season of trouble, and shows what sums had been provided for in the Budget.

## XX. ENUMERATION OF RELIEF WORKS UNDERTAKEN IN THE N. W. P. IN 1860-61.

*Hindun Diversion Works.*

Months.	Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
					Rs. As. P.	
February ...	2,941	701	11	327	216 7 5	The rates for earth-work varied greatly. They were at first as high as Rs. 5 and 6 per 1,000 cubic feet, but towards the close of the work they fell to Rs. 2-12-0.
March ...	52,595	2,993	688	1,697	4,378 13 8	
April ...	97,189	4,083	2,922	3,240	8,576 7 2	
May ...	1,09,321	5,283	1,142	3,523	9,068 9 4	
June ...	1,14,921	5,566	2,402	3,831	7,529 6 0	
July ...	56,631	2,913	1,356	1,327	4,175 8 9	
August ...	11,394	1,082	8	538	849 15 6	
Total ...	4,44,792	...	...	...	34,795 3 10	

*Futtehgurh Branch of the Ganges Canal.*

Months.	Total number of work people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
1861.					Rs. As. P.	
January ...	17,035	2,078	40	1,065	1,359 1 6	
February ...	84,749	4,653	1,989	2,734	8,847 7 4	
March ...	1,04,419	3,724	2,410	3,363	16,369 5 7	
April ...	1,17,236	4,920	2,841	3,903	10,013 15 0	
May ...	2,59,432	9,478	6,523	3,369	21,934 10 10	
June ...	2,78,160	12,244	2,703	9,272	24,043 3 10	
July ...	2,25,175	8,570	1,195	7,263	19,630 2 6	
August ...	1,53,403	6,563	2,439	4,949	13,059 2 1	
September ...	1,11,703	4,512	1,398	3,723	9,936 0 2	
October ...	97,353	4,434	636	3,103	8,457 12 3	
November ...	29,014	2,207	190	1,319	3,101 13 3	
Total ...	14,77,689	...	...	...	1,37,307 11 2	

*Boolundshuhur Branch of the Ganges Canal.*

Months.				Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
								Rs. As. P.	
May	...	1861.	...	2,23,034	8,816	4,366	7,194	22,845 1 10	
June	...	...	...	2,18,186	9,389	1,059	7,272	30,508 10 2	
July	...	...	...	3,51,610	14,253	1,450	11,343	31,101 1 6	
August	...	...	...	3,11,753	13,861	5,545	10,057	29,445 8 4	
September	...	...	...	2,26,918	8,783	2,972	7,564	21,617 11 5	
October	...	...	...	1,89,332	7,459	4,800	6,104	18,872 13 5	
Total				15,20,733	...	...	...	1,54,390 14 8	

*Irrigation Works in Rohilcund.*

Months.				Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
								Rs. As. P.	
1861.									
May	...	...	...	20,345	1,038	115	912	1,398 6 6	
June	...	...	...	23,734	1,160	652	791	2,049 9 5	
July	...	...	...	36,798	1,320	860	1,200	3,152 2 3	
August	...	...	...	35,501	1,242	928	1,148	2,967 1 0	
September	...	...	...	15,419	816	99	618	1,356 1 0	
October	...	...	...	2,897	387	60	207	241 13 3	
Total				1,34,494	...	...	...	11,665 1 5	

*Bareilly and Budaon Road.*

Months.				Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
								Rs. As. P.	
May	...	1861.	...	7,267	1,076	12	234	1,230 14 3	
June	...	...	...	37,988	1,819	996	1,436	4,276 11 9	
July	...	...	...	46,396	1,728	1,261	1,496	3,847 4 7	
August	...	...	...	40,779	2,188	1,462	1,938	8,333 3 5	
September	...	...	...	28,258	1,234	937	941	7,289 14 4	
October	...	...	...	24,968	1,309	344	805	4,446 14 3	
Total				1,85,656	...	...	...	29,424 14 7	

*Special Works at Agra.*

Months.				Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
								Rs. As. P.	
January	...	...	...	1,26,839	13,567	2,371	7,927	8,428 14 6	
February	...	...	...	71,410	3,137	2,310	2,550	12,226 9 7	
March	...	...	...	68,082	3,176	2,332	2,723	14,991 6 5	
April	...	...	...	48,995	2,699	1,575	1,923	12,019 15 7	
May	...	...	...	41,911	1,942	1,203	1,352	10,802 2 2	
June	...	...	...	44,394	3,294	1,277	1,707	8,542 5 0	
July	...	...	...	45,047	2,523	467	1,623	7,354 2 1	
August	...	...	...	31,549	1,485	1,055	1,127	6,531 7 9	
September	...	...	...	22,467	1,264	564	749	7,491 6 7	
October	...	...	...	5,905	1,057	77	295	644 4 10	
Total				5,06,599	...	...	...	89,032 10 6	

*Shekoabad Road.*

Months.			Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
							Rs. A s. P.	
May	...	...	11,706	430	340	404	2,324 9 2	
June	...	...	11,086	422	322	369	2,068 5 9	
July	...	...	6,056	374	88	195	898 14 0	
			Work subsequently executed by contract.				798 3 1	
Total	...	...	28,848	...	...	...	6,000 0 0	

*Ajmere and Pohkur Road.*

Months.			Total number of work-people.	Maximum number on one day.	Minimum number on one day.	Average number per diem.	Expenditure.	Remarks.
							Rs. A s. P.	
May	...	...	2,449	814	2	175	219 8 9	
June	...	...	12,700	801	48	423	1,104 13 9	
July	...	...	396	66	30	57	83 15 6	
August	...	...	614	57	17	25	388 10 0	
September	...	...	891	No details given.			573 8 0	
October	...	...	210	Do. do.			87 5 10	
Total	...	...	17,360	...	...	...	2,407 13 10	

xxiv. ENUMERATION OF RELIEF WORKS UNDERTAKEN IN THE N. W. P. IN 1860-61.

*Account-Current of Expenditure on Relief Works.*

1860-61.	Rs. As. P.	1860-61.	Rs. As. P.
By grant ...	3,00,000 0 0	To expenditure on the Roorkee and Dehra Road ...	1,35,233 1 11
Balance ...	48,708 2 1	To ditto on road from Ghurmookhtesur Ghât to Ghazeeooddeenuggur ...	30,802 0 6
		To ditto on Futtehghurh Branch Ganges Canal ...	37,589 13 5
		To ditto on special works at Agra ...	47,666 14 1
Actually expended ...	2,51,291 13 11	Total Expenditure ...	2,51,291 13 11
1861-62.		1861-62.	
By grant ...	8,30,000 0 0	To expenditure on the Roorkee and Dehra Road ...	1,21,368 15 1
		To amount allowed for expenditure under Public Works Department Budget Rules ...	18,497 5 0
		To expenditure on Ghurmookhtesur and Ghazeeooddeenuggur Road ...	24,850 0 7
		To amount allowed for expenditure as above ...	6,347 14 11
		To expenditure on Hindun Diversion...	6,170 0 0
		To ditto on Futtehghurh Branch ...	1,00,217 13 9
		To amount allowed for expenditure under Budget Rules ...	62,192 4 10
		To expenditure on Boolundshuhur Branch ...	1,54,390 14 8
		To amount allowed for expenditure as above ...	45,609 1 4
		To expenditure on Bohilcund Irrigation Works ...	11,065 1 5
		To amount allowed for expenditure as above ...	13,334 14 7
		To expenditure on Bareilly and Budaon Road ...	29,424 14 7
		To amount, &c., as above ...	575 1 5
		To expenditure on special works at Agra ...	41,365 12 5
		To additional ditto for relief of Local Agency Accounts ...	13,184 9 10
Balance ...	1,66,997 5 9	To expenditure on Shekoabad Road ...	6,000 0 0
		To ditto on Ajmere and Pohkur Road, ...	2,407 13 10
		To amount granted for improvement of the Pohkur Pass ...	500 0 0
Actually expended ...	6,63,002 10 3	Total expenditure ...	6,63,002 10 3
Total grants for 1860-61 and 1861-62 ...	11,30,000 0 0		
Balance ...	2,15,705 7 10		
Actual expenditure ...	9,14,294 8 2	Total expenditure in 1860-61 and 1861-62 ...	9,14,294 8 2

*Note.*—The total number of persons who received employment on Relief works was 75,04,999 ; the average daily number relieved, 33,808.

## APPENDIX VI. TABLE A.

*Meteorological Returns for 1860.\**

District.	Rain-gauge Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1860.	District.	Rain-gauge Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1860.
		Inches.			Inches.
Kansoon & Gurhwal.	Gurhwal	1.50	Moradabad.	Sudder Station	22.71
	Nynsee Tal	105.31		Amroha	22.08
	Almorah	6.60		Kashseepore	20.18
	Paoree	9.83		Hussunpore	10.49
	Sreesnuggur	2.06		Thakoordeoara	30.93
Deotah Dhoon.	Sudder Station	26.48		Bilharree	24.92
	Kalsee	22.34		Sumbhul	29.65
	Mussooree	3.59		Buchraon	15.16
Saharanpore.	Sudder Station	9.95		Usmonlee	10.55
	Roorkee	11.07		Chujlat	20.82
	Deobund	8.46		Oodmanwallah	13.73
	Moozufferabad	1.50		Chundosee	17.7
	Sirsawa	1.70	Bareilly.	Sudder Station	18.00
	Nekore	.80		Pillibheet	96.26
	Jowalapore	1.10		Nuwabgunj	51.46
	Gungoh	.50		Chowmehlah	37.36
	Rampore	.90		Crora	47.77
Mossafferunggur.	Sudder Station	8.97		Doonka	No return.
	Boodhana	8.78		Furreedpore	32.94
	Shamlee	6.66		Beesulpore	46.55
	Kiranah	15.41		Jehanabad	.60
	Bhowun	6.99		Shahee	56.57
	Jhinjhanah	12.10		Purava	56.80
	Khatoulee	14.46		Ritcha	61.38
	Meeranpore	16.63		Meergunj	20.79
Meerut.	Poor	5.83		Aonla	16.31
	Bhokerberree	17.84	Shajehanpore.	Sudder Station	27.14
	Collector's Office	6.60		Tilhur	24.14
	Hauper	20.99		Powain	22.73
	Barout	8.01		Khotar	27.71
	Shadurra	9.52		Jelalabad	17.04
	Gurbmukhtesur	22.89	Muttra.	Sudder Station	11.01
	Pureechutgurrh	13.10		Nohjheel	18.36
Boolundshuhur.	Ghazeepore	21.34		Kosce	26.89
	Sirdhana	.90		Sahar	28.85
	Ghazeabad	34.33		Areeug	29.73
	Sudder Station	8.13		Mant	24.60
	Burrin	No return.		Mahabun	30.69
	Ahar	10.07		Sadabad	25.73
	Syanah	4.99		Jullaisur	31.83
	Debhasee	5.30	Agra.	Sudder Station	9.55
Allypurrh.	Anoopshuhur	5.80		Pinahut	16.46
	Shikarpore	9.56		Ferozabad	4.47
	Secunderabad	7.42		Furrah	6.44
	Dadree	3.54		Futtehpore	7.63
	Khoorjah	6.25		Futteabad	7.53
	Jewar	3.35		Irradutnuggur	1.43
	Boolundshuhur Jai	7.59		Etmadpore	.40
	Sudder Station	11.45	Farrukhabad.	Kheragurrh	1.20
Bijnour.	Atrowlee	7.12		Khundowlee	5.58
	Akrabad	5.01		Sudder Station	13.91
	Eglass	4.64		Kaimgunj	27.26
	Secundra Rao	12.75		Chubramow	15.37
	Khyr	5.65		Kunouje	14.49
	Hattrass	6.46		Thutteea Tirwa	17.18
	Tappull	12.94		Imrutpore	16.53
	Dadon	9.83	Mynpoory.	Mohumdabad	12.87
Bijnour.	Sasnee	8.06		Sudder Station	11.03
	Sudder Station	40.91		Shekoabad	3.13
	Tehseel Bijnour	2.60		Mooatuffabad	7.25
	Chandpore	6.40		Bhoongaon	12.26
	Dhanpore	5.82			
	Nugeena	9.29			
	Nujeeabad	7.57			
	Ufsulgurrh	4.84			
	Chowkee Keorunpore	8.07			

\* The figures in this and the following table are as accurate as the weekly returns in the *Government Gazette* will admit of. Some stations occasionally omitted to send in their reports. Hence apparent inconsistencies, as for instance Nynsee Tal in 1861 had 105.31 inches, and in 1861 the return shows only 1.7 inches; I have preferred to follow the entries in the *Gazette*, and not to attempt any averages.

District.	Rain-guage Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1860.	District.	Rain-guage Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1860.
		Inches.			Inches.
Etawah.	Sudder Station	...	Futteeppore.	Sudder Station	...
	Beylah	...		Kora	...
	Sahail	...		Khujooa Tuhseelee	...
	Kinchosee	...		Ghazeepore	...
	Oreyah	...		Bindkee	...
	Bidheena	...		Tehseel Hatgaon	...
	Phuppoond	...		Ekdula	...
	Dulleinugger	...		Balnuma	...
	Ayrwa	...		Thana Hutgaon	...
	Chuchoond	...		Thana Khujooa	...
Etah.	Ajeetmul	...	Banda.	Boelunda	...
	Oosurhar	...		Tuppeh Jar	...
	Bhartna	...		Khaga	...
	Bukewar	...			No return.
	Sindous	...			
	Chukurnugger	...		Sudder Station	...
	Rahun	...		Pylansee	...
	Burhpoora	...		Ougasseo	...
	Jaswuntunggur	...		Dursenda	...
	Tuhseel Etawah	...		Paharee	...
	Thannah Bhurtua	...		Chiboo	...
				Tirohan	...
				Manikpore	...
				Budousa	...
				Seonda	...
Jaloun.	Sudder Station	...	Allahabad.	Collector's Office	...
	Atta	...		City	...
	Jainier	...		Puchim Sureera	...
	Duboh	...		Khayragurh	...
	Koonch	...		Kiwassee Niah	...
	Kahar	...		Kurra	...
	Madhogurh	...		Secundra Jhoossee	...
	Indoorkee	...		Arail	...
		No rain.		Kheres	...
				Kurraree	...
Jhansi.	Sudder Station	...	Goruckpore.	Hunoomangunj	...
	Moth	...		Surase Arail	...
	Mhow Moradpore	...		Nuwabgunj	...
	Bhadouraha	...		Soraon	...
	Bijnore	...		Tehaseeldaree Puchim Sureera	...
	Gurotha	...		Sainee	...
	Pundwaha	...		Mooratgunj	...
	Ghilsocoo	...		Chowkee Meh	...
	Bhander	...		Barrah	...
	Mourampore	...			
Chandoyee.	Kurerah	...		Sudder Station	...
				Circle I.	...
				Circle II.	...
				Circle III.	...
Humeeppore.	Sudder Station	...		Circle IV.	...
	Punwary	...		Circle V.	...
	Jelalpoore	...		Circle VI.	...
	Jeitpore	...		Circle VII.	...
Cawnpore.	Mohda	...	Azingurh.	Sudder Station	...
	Muhoba	...		Mohomedabad	...
	Soomerpoore	...		Nizamabad	...
				Secunderpoore	...
	Sudder Station	...		Chryakote	...
	Sheorajpore	...		Deogaon	...
	Bilhour	...		Ghosee	...
	Ghatumpore	...		Kourree	...
	Ukberpoore	...		Sugree	...
	Dhurra Munglour	...		Mahool	...
	Bhogneepore Munglepore	...		Keelisa	...
	Secundra	...	Jounpore.	Sudder Station	...
	Bithoor	...		Unglee	...
	Russoolabad	...		Muryahoo	...
	Dehrapore	...		Keerakut	...
	Sarh Sulempore	...		Ghiswa	...



## APPENDIX VI. TABLE B.

District.	Rain-gauge Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1861.	District.	Rain-gauge Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1861.
		Inches.			Inches.
Kumaon and Gurhwal.	Almorah ...	27.8	Moradabad.	Sudder Station ...	1.3
	Chumpawut ...	30.3		Pergunnah Moradabad ...	36.7
	Pitoragurh ...	26.5		Sumbhul ...	41.0
	Kalee Kumaon ...	7.7		Bilharee ...	42.3
	Nynsee Tal ...	1.7		Amroha ...	39.8
	Thana Shore ...	2.2		Haseenpore ...	40.7
	Paoree ...	55.0		Thakoordwara ...	43.9
	Sreenuggur ...	41.4		Kasheepore ...	66.7
Deyrah Dhoon.	Sudder Station ...	97.2		Oodmanwalla ...	44.2
	Kalsee ...	105.6		Buljoe ...	.7
Seharunpore.				Uamoulee ...	25.1
	Seharunpore ...	49.2		Buchraon ...	42.3
	Rampore ...	33.1		Chujlait ...	39.3
	Deobund ...	26.6		Chundowra ...	31.3
	Roorkee ...	35.1	Bareilly.	Sudder Station ...	45.7
	Jowalapore ...	37.4		Core ...	45.9
	Mookufferabad ...	49.0		Nuwabgunj ...	43.3
	Sirawah ...	44.6		Shahoe ...	43.9
Moruffe- nuggur.	Nukoor ...	27.4		Chowmehla ...	45.6
	Gungoh ...	26.1		Purewa ...	46.4
				Aonla ...	26.5
	Sudder Station ...	28.9		Furzedpore ...	41.2
	Shamlee ...	21.6		Pillibheet ...	50.7
	Bhowun ...	29.8		Beesulpore ...	37.3
	Jhinjhana ...	.2		Ritcha ...	32.5
	Khatowlee ...	30.8		Meergunj ...	37.4
Meerut.	Poor ...	41.3	Shahjehanpore.	Sudder Station ...	44.5
				Tehseelee Shahjehanpore ...	1.6
	Sudder Station ...	31.3		Tilhur ...	50.3
	Moradnuggur ...	1.3		Jallalabad ...	40.7
	Sirdhanah ...	37.0		Powayne ...	52.7
	Mowanah ...	36.5		Khota ...	54.5
	Haupper ...	24.7		Poorunpore ...	49.9
	Barout ...	26.2	Muttra.	Sudder Station ...	36.1
Boodundabehar.	Ghazeabad ...	.1		Nohjbeel ...	.7
	Gurhmuktesur ...	33.2		Kosee ...	32.4
	Pureechutgurh ...	30.0		Chaata ...	27.3
	Shadurra ...	.2		Areeng ...	28.5
				Maat ...	30.7
	Sudder Station ...	17.0		Muhabun ...	26.2
	Secundrabad ...	6.4		Sadabad ...	41.0
	Dadree ...	3.2		Jallesur ...	37.6
Allghurh.	Khooja ...	7.5	Agra.	Sudder Station ...	27.1
	Jewur ...	1.7		Pinahut ...	29.1
	Syaneh ...	3.3		Ferozabad ...	32.3
	Anoopahur ...	3.2		Furrah ...	32.5
	Debaee ...	3.8		Futtohabad ...	26.8
				Irradotnuggur ...	21.0
	Sudder Station ...	51.2		Khundowlee ...	22.9
	Attrowlee ...	33.0		Surendee ...	26.2
Bijnour.	Akrabad ...	41.1	Farruckabad.	Futtehpore ...	20.6
	Eglasee ...	52.2		Sudder Station ...	39.5
	Secundra Rao ...	42.5		Kaimgunj ...	25.9
	Khayr ...	42.8		Chubramow ...	44.6
	Hattrass ...	43.0		Kanauj ...	29.7
	Tuppul ...	33.6		Thuttia Tirwa ...	40.2
	Dadon ...	36.3		Imrulpore ...	.7
	Sasnee ...	43.5		Nawabgunj ...	21.0
Etawah.			Mys- poory.	Sowrick ...	37.9
	Sudder Station ...	27.9		Ullesgunj ...	35.1
	Chandpore ...	45.3		Mohomdabad ...	31.4
	Dhampore ...	40.6		Sudder Station ...	47.2
	Nugeenah ...	45.1		Shekoabad ...	43.7
	Nujeebabad ...	35.9		Moostufabad ...	52.8
	Ufzulgurh ...	34.7		Bhoongaon ...	39.0
	Keerutpore ...	28.5		Sudder Station ...	18.8
			Etawah.	Phuppoond ...	19.0
				Ayrawah ...	18.2
				Ajeetmull ...	13.6
				Rehur ...	23.7
				Jaswuntnuggur ...	33.1

District.	Rain-guage Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1861.	District.	Rain-guage Station.	Total fall up to 21st September, 1861.
		Inches.			Inches.
Etah.	Sudder Station ...	37.1	Banda.	Sudder Station ...	32.8
	Allygunj ...	37.9		Pylanee ...	33.0
	Kashgunj ...	34.1		Ougasee ...	42.2
	Puttealee ...	24.5		Darsenda ...	44.8
	Soron ...	23.5		Paharee ...	35.5
Jaloun.	Sudder Station ...	1.8	Allahabad.	Chiboo ...	35.0
	Orai ...	39.0		Tirohan ...	21.0
	Calpee ...	23.0		Manickpore ...	22.8
	Kotera ...	50.8		Budowsa ...	29.5
	Atta ...	36.3		Seonda ...	31.8
	Jaloun ...	31.4	Goruckpore.	Sudder Station ...	25.3
	Kunnar ...	71.7		Karra... ..	32.4
	Koonch ...	31.2		Puchum Sureera ...	36.8
	Mahoba ...	22.5		Socundra ...	23.8
	Madhogurh ...	19.3		Kewasee ...	19.8
Jhansie.	Indoorkee ...	.3		Soraon ...	35.8
	Daboh... ..	3.0		Arail ..	22.6
	Sudder Station ...	48.4		Barra ...	20.3
	Jhansie Tehseelee ...	44.4		Khyragurh ...	30.6
	Mow ...	36.8		Surai Akil ...	26.7
	Pachore ...	.2		Khoree Thana ...	28.7
Humnaspore.	Pundwaha ...	23.5	Agingurh.	Sudder Station ...	54.8
	Mote ...	19.5		Circle I., Captaingunj ...	34.5
	Garotah ...	1.1		" II., Bansie ...	47.9
	Sudder Station ...	37.3		" III., Khuleelabad ...	73.8
	Raat ...	27.2		" IV., Bansgaon ...	34.9
	Punwaree ...	35.2		" V., Munsoorgunj ...	35.7
	Mondha ...	30.7		" VI., Pudrcwna ...	36.1
	Jelalpore ...	33.5		" VII., Deoresa ...	56.0
Cawnpore.	Jaitpore ...	39.3	Jounpore.	Sudder Station ...	46.7
	Muhoba ...	30.2		Nizamabad ...	45.4
	Islampore ...	32.4		Khourna Tuhlunee ...	2.5
	Jhujun ...	.4		Mahool... ..	35.5
	Kasheepore ...	28.3		Deogaon ...	34.5
	Soopa... ..	25.2	Jounpore.	Cherlakote ...	.2
	Guhroulee ...	27.0		Mohumdabad ...	33.9
	Bewar ...	.9		Sujree ...	55.5
	Sudder Station ...	34.5		Nugra ...	30.9
	Akberpore ...	41.8		Sudder Station ...	34.4
Futtehpore.	Bilhour ...	39.8		Murreesahoe ...	30.6
	Bhogneepore ...	44.0		Muchleeshuhur ...	37.0
	Derapore ...	32.2		Tigra ...	45.3
	Ghatumpore ...	36.0		Kutgurh ...	43.5
	Russoolabad ...	29.1		Keerakut ...	31.9
	Sarh Sulempore ...	36.6		Chundowk ...	43.4
	Sheorajpore ...	32.0		Gowra Badshapore ...	29.4
	Secundra ...	25.0		Buksha ...	35.4
	Sudder Station ...	34.9		Budlapore ...	39.4
	Ghazeepore ...	36.0		Jelalpore ...	32.6
	Bindkee ...	32.2			
	Kora ...	34.4			
	Khaga... ..	32.8			
	Ekdulla ...	36.6			
	Tuppeh Jar ...	25.7			

## APPENDIX VII.

Statement showing the Relief Operations during the Famine of 1860-61 in the Distressed Districts of the North-Western Provinces.

Divisions.	Districts.			RECEIPTS.				
				Local subscrip- tions and do- nations.	Government Equivalents.		Grant by the Agra Central Committee.	
					Amount drawn.	Amount not drawn.		
				Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.		
MEERUT.	Deyrah Dhoon	...	...	2,007 9 6	2,007 9 6	...	1,000 0 0	
	Seharunpore	...	...	10,058 14 8	6,364 15 9	3,693 14 11	27,000 0 0	
	Roorkee	...	...	6,415 12 7	6,415 12 7	...	2,000 0 0	
	Moozuffernuggur	...	...	4,156 12 6	3,415 7 5	741 5 1	27,500 0 0	
	Meerut	...	...	21,442 4 8	19,563 15 8	1,878 5 0	1,14,600 0 0	
	Boolundshuhur,	...	...	7,805 8 0	3,188 3 2	4,617 4 10	73,839 18 0	
	Allygurh	...	...	12,042 15 6	12,042 15 6	...	71,500 0 0	
	Total	...	...	63,929 13 5	52,998 15 7	10,930 13 10	3,16,939 13 0	
AGRA.	Muttra	...	...	14,640 15 8	6,228 6 7	3,412 9 1	63,300 0 0	
	Agra	...	...	12,290 15 3	12,290 15 3	...	89,110 7 5	
	Furruckabad	...	...	5,972 2 3	200 0 0	5,772 2 3	17,500 0 0	
	Etawah	...	...	1,661 8 0	...	1,661 8 0	4,600 0 0	
	Mynpoory	...	...	2,355 0 0	...	2,355 0 0	48,113 0 0	
	Etah	...	...	2,117 2 0	...	2,117 2 0	53,000 0 0	
	Total	...	...	39,087 11 2	18,7 9 5 10	20,318 5 4	2,75,623 7 5	
ROHILKHAND.	Bijnour	...	...	7,365 7 6	7,193 7 6	172 0 0	42,900 0 0	
	Moradabad	...	...	14,906 3 0	14,413 3 0	493 0 0	37,000 0 0	
	Budaon	...	...	2,864 9 0	2,771 15 0	92 10 0	33,000 0 0	
	Bareilly	...	...	5,540 8 2	5,540 8 2	...	...	
	Total	...	...	30,676 11 8	29,919 1 8	757 10 0	1,12,000 0 0	
	GRAND TOTAL	...	...	1,33,644 4 3	1,01,637 7 1	32,006 13 2	7,04,563 4 5	

## APPENDIX

Statement showing the Relief Operations during the Famine of 1860-61,

Divisions.	Districts.	RECEIPTS.—(Concluded.)		Number of kitchens.	Number of rations distributed at Sudder Station and at the kitchens.	Number of rations distributed to purdah-nusheens.	Number of people employed on minor works.
		Miscellaneous.	Total.				
		Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.				
MEERUT.	Deyrah Dhoon ...	6 15 6	5,022 2 6	1	43,951	...	...
	Seharunpore ...	81 5 0	43,505 3 5	4	2,33,543	...	6,124
	Roorkee ...	213 9 8	15,045 2 10	1	2,43,262	3,245	...
	Moozuffernuggur ...	15 7 3	35,087 11 2	11	1,30,809	1,719	2,261
	Meerut ...	4,973 6 11	1,60,579 11 3	19	11,86,413	1,38,582	6,000
	Boolundshuhur ...	258 12 10	84,592 5 0	23	52,00,080	46,729	...
	Allypore ...	849 11 1	96,435 10 1	14	9,52,158	...	1,83,788
	Total ...	6,399 4 3	4,40,267 14 3	73	80,40,216	1,90,275	1,93,173
AGRA.	Muttra ...	282 9 5	84,451 15 8	27	14,29,410	...	...
	Agra ...	1,347 4 4	1,15,039 10 3	9	13,15,725	...	21,282
	Farrukhabad ...	342 5 6	24,014 7 9	3	3,43,753	11	...
	Etawah ...	...	6,261 8 0	2	49,905	...	54,277
	Mynpoory ...	207 3 11	50,675 3 11	7	6,98,645	60	...
	Etah ...	37 5 10	55,154 7 10	11	8,10,568	...	...
	Total ...	2,216 13 0	3,35,597 5 5	59	46,48,006	71	75,559
ROHTAK.	Bijnour ...	1,909 6 8	53,468 5 8	7	9,42,259	40,320	...
	Moradabad ...	3,979 15 6	70,299 5 6	4	7,95,570	1,41,629	...
	Budaon ...	184 7 9	38,320 15 9	11	4,79,514	412	...
	Bareilly ...	74 4 3	11,155 4 7	2	2,15,408	...	...
	Total ...	6,146 2 2	1,73,243 15 6	24	24,32,751	1,82,361	...
	GRAND TOTAL ...	11,764 3 5	9,54,609 3 2	156	1,51,20,973	3,72,707	2,73,732

## DIX VII.

*in the distressed Districts of the North-Western Provinces.—(Concluded.)*

## DISBURSEMENTS.

Amount allotted for the purchase of seed and cattle.	Amount expended on minor works.	Amount expended in relief.	Balance remaining in hand.	Total.
Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.	Rs. As. P.
...	...	3,522 18 1	1,499 5 5	5,022 2 6
20,000 0 0	5,000 0 0	16,366 11 9	2,138 7 8	43,505 3 5
...	...	13,455 11 0	1,589 7 10	15,045 2 10
25,000 0 0	2,500 0 0	6,493 12 9	1,093 14 5	35,087 11 2
50,000 0 0	2,500 0 0	1,05,969 11 3	2,110 0 0	1,60,579 11 3
50,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	81,523 3 1	1,069 1 11	84,592 5 0
30,000 0 0	9,661 4 11	56,156 1 8	618 3 6	96,435 10 1
1,75,000 0 0	21,661 4 11	2,33,488 0 7	10,118 8 9	4,40,267 14 3
50,000 0 0	...	30,871 1 9	3,580 13 11	84,451 15 8
20,100 0 0	4,000 0 0	80,785 15 2	10,153 11 1	1,15,039 10 3
...	...	22,994 6 1	1,020 1 8	24,014 7 9
...	4,256 14 0	1,790 0 7	214 9 5	6,261 8 0
20,118 0 0	...	30,427 4 2	184 15 9	50,675 3 11
30,000 0 0	...	22,486 5 3	2,668 2 7	55,154 7
1,20,213 0 0	8,256 14 0	1,89,355 1 0	17,772 6 5	3,35,597 5 5
20,000 0 0	...	35,600 7 10	2,867 13 10	58,468 5 8
10,000 0 0	...	52,597 9 4	7,701 12 2	70,299 5 6
15,000 0 0	...	21,106 13 0	2,714 2 9	38,820 15 9
...	...	9,635 9 8	1,519 10 11	11,155 4 7
45,000 0 0	...	1,18,940 7 10	14,803 7 8	1,78,743 15 6
3,40,213 0 0	29,918 2 11	5,41,783 9 5	42,694 6 10	9,54,609 3 2



**APPENDIX VII. TABLE B.**  
*Price Current of Barley at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.	1860.																		1861.	
	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January
1. Seharunpore	0 34 6	0 24 8	0 15 0	0 17 2	0 11 12	0 11 14	0 12 12	0 10 12	0 11 4	0 12 14	0 18 4	0 17 0	...	...	0 16 0	0 16 8	0 20 0	0 19 4	...	...
2. Meerut	0 24 8	0 21 0	0 15 0	0 13 0	0 10 0	0 10 8	0 11 0	0 11 0	0 13 8	0 18 0	0 18 0	0 17 0	0 18 0	0 17 8	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 26 0	0 27 0	...	...
3. Allypore	0 22 0	0 19 0	0 14 8	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 12 0	0 11 8	0 12 8	...	0 18 8	0 20 0	0 17 8	0 18 0	0 19 8	0 25 0	0 25 8	0 29 8	0 30 0	...	...
4. Moradabad	0 22 0	0 16 8	0 14 0	0 13 0	0 11 8	0 10 8	0 11 8	0 11 8	0 16 0	0 19 0	0 20 0	0 17 8	0 18 0	0 20 0	0 22 0	0 20 0	0 22 0	0 22 0	...	...
5. Bareilly	0 23 12	0 20 10	0 13 12	0 15 10	...	...	0 11 4	0 13 12	0 15 0	0 20 0	0 21 4	0 20 10	0 22 8	0 25 0	...	0 22 8	0 27 8	0 30 0	...	...
6. Budson	0 18 0	...	0 18 0	0 11 10	0 8 0	0 9 4	0 9 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 19 8	0 22 12	0 21 0	0 21 8	0 21 0	0 29 6	0 25 3	0 28 13	0 32 8	...	...
7. Muttra	0 26 0	0 21 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 11 8	0 11 0	...	0 13 0	0 14 0	0 18 8	0 18 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 20 0	0 28 0	0 26 0	0 32 0	0 35 0	...	...
8. Agra	0 24 8	0 21 0	0 12 8	0 12 8	0 11 8	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 13 0	0 15 8	0 20 0	0 17 0	0 18 0	0 18 0	0 20 0	0 27 0	0 23 8	0 28 0	0 30 0	...	...
9. Furruckabad	0 23 8	0 23 0	0 12 12	0 16 12	0 14 4	0 18 8	0 15 8	0 16 4	0 20 4	0 22 12	0 21 8	0 24 8	0 22 8	0 23 6	0 26 10	0 27 0	0 25 5	0 29 6	...	...
10. Cawnpore	0 26 0	0 28 0	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 22 0	0 22 0	0 19 0	0 18 0	0 19 0	0 22 0	0 23 0	0 23 0	0 20 8	0 20 0	0 21 0	0 23 0	0 21 0	0 23 0	...	...
11. Banda	...	...	...	0 28 0	0 18 0	...	...	0 24 0	...	0 24 0	0 25 0	...	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 26 8	...	0 24 0	0 25 0	...	...
12. Allahabad	0 33 8	0 23 12	0 32 12	0 28 12	0 27 8	0 30 0	...	0 23 12	0 30 0	0 29 0	0 28 0	0 28 2	0 26 4	0 26 0	...	0 26 0	0 23 12	0 27 0	...	...
13. Goruckpore	1 3 12	1 0 8	1 0 8	0 38 8	1 2 0	1 3 12	1 2 0	1 2 0	0 38 8	1 8 0	1 3 12	1 5 0	1 0 8	1 0 8	1 2 0	...	...	1 2 0	...	...
14. Mirzapore	0 31 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 32 0	0 32 0	0 31 0	...	0 38 0	0 31 0	0 32 0	0 32 0	0 30 0	0 29 0	0 27 0	0 26 0	0 26 0	0 27 0	...	...
15. Benares	0 27 5	0 26 15	0 27 3	0 26 13	0 26 13	0 28 2	0 28 9	0 27 3	0 26 13	0 26 10	0 25 0	0 24 13	0 24 12	0 23 15	0 23 0	0 24 1	0 20 9	0 23 6	...	...
16. Ghazepore	0 24 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 28 12	0 32 8	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 31 4	0 30 0	0 23 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 23 0	...	0 23 0	...	...
17. Jubbulpore	0 32 0	0 30 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 20 0	0 17 0	0 18 0	0 30 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 28 0	0 27 0	0 30 0	...	...
18. Sangor	...	1 0 0	0 34 0	0 34 0	0 34 0	0 33 9	0 35 0	0 30 0	...	0 30 0	0 25 0	0 27 8	0 26 8	0 26 8	0 25 0	0 27 1	0 30 0	...	...	...

**APPENDIX VIII. TABLE C.**  
*Price Current of Dal Mussoor at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.																		
	June, 1860.	July, 1860.	August, 1860.	September, 1860.	October, 1860.	November, 1860.	December, 1860.	January, 1861.	February, 1861.	March, 1861.	April, 1861.	May, 1861.	June, 1861.	July, 1860.	August, 1860.	September, 1861.	October, 1861.	November, 1861.
1.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.
1. Seharunpore ...	0 20 8	0 17 0	0 20 8	0 11 12	0 8 8	0 6 6	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 9 12	0 10 4	0 11 4	...	...	0 9 0	0 9 12	0 11 4	0 10 12
2. Meerut ...	0 14 0	0 14 0	0 12 0	0 11 8	0 11 0	0 10 8	0 10 8	0 10 0	0 11 0	0 11 8	0 11 4	0 12 0	0 13 8	0 16 8	0 14 0	0 13 0	0 14 0	0 18 0
3. Allypore ...	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 13 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	0 10 8	0 11 0	0 11 0	...	0 15 8	0 14 8	0 13 8	0 14 0	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 15 0
4. Moradabad ...	0 14 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	0 8 0	0 7 8	0 10 0	0 9 0	0 10 0	0 10 8	0 11 8	0 11 0	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 10 8	0 11 8	0 12 0	0 12 0
5. Bareilly ...	0 13 2	0 11 4	0 11 4	0 9 6	...	...	0 10 0	0 11 14	0 12 8	0 13 12	0 13 12	0 13 12	0 13 12	0 13 12	...	0 12 8	0 13 2	0 15 10
6. Budson ...	...	...	0 10 0	0 8 0	0 8 0	0 8 0	0 8 4	0 10 0	0 10 0	0 13 8	0 10 12	0 12 10	0 13 8	0 12 0	0 13 0	0 13 8	0 13 8	0 12 0
7. Muttra ...	...	0 14 0	0 13 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	...	0 10 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 13 0	0 12 8	0 13 0	0 14 0	0 12 8	0 11 0	0 15 0
8. Agra ...	0 13 8	0 13 8	0 11 0	0 10 8	0 10 0	0 11 0	0 10 8	0 11 0	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 13 8	0 14 0	0 15 8	0 16 8	0 13 8	0 12 0	0 15 0
9. Furruckabad ...	0 18 0	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 13 12	0 13 4	0 14 8	0 14 0	0 13 13	0 15 8	0 17 0	0 13 12	0 16 0	0 15 12	0 16 2	0 17 6	0 18 12	0 18 0	0 20 4
10. Cawnpore ...	...	0 18 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 20 0	0 20 0	0 19 0	0 19 0	0 19 0	0 19 0	0 19 0	0 19 0	0 19 0
11. Banda ...	0 29 0	...	0 30 0	0 28 0	0 32 0	0 30 0	0 26 0	0 24 0	0 29 0	0 28 0	0 28 0	...	0 26 0	0 27 0	0 27 8	0 28 0	0 27 8	0 28 8
12. Allahabad ...	0 22 8	0 22 8	0 22 8	0 20 0	0 20 0	0 22 8	...	0 20 10	0 22 8	0 24 0	0 22 8	0 20 0	0 19 0	0 20 0	0 16 0	0 21 0	0 19 0	0 18 8
13. Goruckpore ...	0 27 0	0 27 0	0 27 0	0 25 8	0 24 0	0 25 8	0 24 0	0 21 0	0 24 0	0 29 0	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 27 0	0 25 8	0 27 0	...	...	0 27 0
14. Mirzapore ...	0 24 0	0 23 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 26 0	0 25 0	...	0 26 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 20 0	0 20 0
15. Benares ...	0 21 14	0 21 7	0 21 8	0 21 0	0 21 4	0 21 13	0 22 10	0 23 10	0 23 4	0 22 0	0 21 1	0 20 12	0 19 9	0 18 11	0 18 14	0 18 6	0 14 12	0 16 11
16. Ghaseepore ...	0 19 0	0 23 12	0 23 8	0 23 8	0 22 8	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 26 4	0 26 4	0 25 0	0 18 0	0 13 0	0 18 0	0 18 0	...	...	0 16 0
17. Jubbulpore ...	1 9 0	1 3 0	1 1 0	1 1 0	1 11 0	1 2 0	0 34 0	1 10 0	1 4 0	1 5 0	1 5 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	2 0 1	2 0 1	3 0 1	0 0
18. Saugor ...	1 2 12	1 0 14	0 39 8	0 38 0	0 39 8	0 34 4	0 34 0	0 32 12	...	0 30 10	0 37 5	0 29 4	0 28 0	0 25 8	0 28 0	0 26 8	0 27 8	0 28 8



**APPENDIX VIII. TABLE D.**  
*Price Current of Joar at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.																			
	June, 1860	July, 1860	August, 1860	September, 1860	October, 1860	November, 1860	December, 1860	January, 1861	February, 1861	March, 1861	April, 1861	May, 1861	June, 1861	July, 1861	August, 1861	September, 1861	October, 1861	November, 1861	
1.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	
1. Seharanpore ...	0 21 8	0 17 0	0 17 2	0 13 14	0 11 12	0 15 0	0 12 6	0 10 4	0 9 12	0 11 4	0 15 8	0 11 12	...	...	0 11 12	0 31 8	0 21 8	0 25 12	
2. Meerut ...	0 19 0	0 18 0	0 15 0	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 12 0	0 11 8	0 12 4	0 14 8	0 14 0	0 14 0	0 11 0	0 12 0	0 24 0	...	0 29 0	0 27 0	
3. Aligarh ...	0 18 0	0 17 0	0 15 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 13 8	0 11 8	0 12 8	...	0 17 0	0 18 8	0 15 0	0 10 0	0 14 0	0 18 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 29 0	
4. Moradabad ...	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 10 0	0 14 0	0 15 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 15 8	0 18 0	0 19 0	0 17 0	0 13 8	0 17 0	0 24 0	0 30 0	1 0 0	1 3 0	
5. Bareilly ...	0 12 8	0 12 8	0 12 8	0 12 8	...	...	0 11 9	0 14 6	0 16 4	0 16 4	0 21 4	0 18 12	0 16 4	0 20 0	...	0 25 0	1 3 12	1 6 14	
6. Budaon ...	0 12 0	0 12 0	...	...	0 14 0	0 14 0	0 12 8	0 11 8	0 13 8	0 16 6	...	0 19 3	...	0 16 0	...	...	...	1 5 0	
7. Muttra ...	...	0 20 0	0 13 0	0 15 8	0 12 8	0 12 4	...	0 12 0	0 13 4	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 17 0	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	
8. Agra ...	0 23 8	0 20 0	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 13 8	0 13 8	0 11 12	0 13 4	0 14 4	0 18 8	0 16 0	0 17 0	0 16 8	0 17 0	0 19 0	0 21 0	0 23 8	0 27 8	
9. Furruckabad ...	...	0 20 0	...	0 16 12	0 18 0	0 19 0	0 15 4	0 15 12	0 17 12	0 19 12	0 19 12	0 18 12	0 19 0	0 21 2	...	...	...	0 28 4	
10. Cawnpore ...	0 30 0	0 29 0	0 29 0	0 21 0	0 25 0	0 24 0	0 18 0	0 18 0	0 19 0	0 21 0	0 24 0	0 22 0	0 22 0	0 20 0	0 22 0	0 24 0	0 22 0	0 25 0	
11. Banda ...	...	...	0 32 0	0 29 0	0 30 0	0 36 0	0 26 0	0 24 0	0 28 0	0 28 0	0 27 0	...	0 26 0	0 26 0	0 27 8	0 27 0	0 27 8	0 37 0	
12. Allahabad ...	0 33 12	0 33 12	0 32 8	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 37 0	...	0 24 6	0 29 6	0 29 0	0 30 0	0 27 8	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 24 0	0 23 0	0 30 0	
13. Goruckpore ...	0 35 0	0 35 0	0 35 0	1 3 12	1 2 0	1 2 0	1 2 0	1 0 4	0 33 8	0 33 8	0 38 8	0 38 8	0 38 8	...	...	...	...	0 34 0	
14. Mirzapore ...	0 34 0	0 32 0	0 30 0	0 28 0	...	0 36 0	0 31 0	...	0 30 0	0 28 0	0 29 0	0 28 0	0 26 0	0 25 0	0 26 0	0 25 0	...	0 30 0	
15. Benares ...	0 29 0	0 27 0	0 27 0	0 26 0	0 23 6	0 31 10	0 30 12	0 24 9	0 24 0	0 32 0	0 32 0	0 29 0	0 26 2	0 21 0	...	0 30 0	0 20 0	0 23 0	
16. Ghazepore ..	0 24 0	0 30 0	0 27 8	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 37 8	0 32 8	0 27 8	0 30 0	0 28 12	0 28 12	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 20 0	0 20 0	0 22 0	...	...	
17. Jubbulpore ...	1 5 0	1 0 0	0 37 0	1 5 0	1 16 0	1 5 0	1 10 0	1 10 0	1 5 0	0 35 0	0 32 0	0 30 0	1 1 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	
18. Saugor ...	...	1 8 12	1 1 4	0 36 8	0 38 0	0 30 2	0 36 8	0 37 2	...	0 35 0	...	0 35 0	0 30 0	0 28 0	...	0 30 0	0 32 0	...	

**APPENDIX VIII. TABLE E.**  
*Price Current of Bajra at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.	1860.																	
	June, 1860.	July, 1860.	August, 1860.	September, 1860.	October, 1860.	November, 1860.	December, 1860.	January, 1861.	February, 1861.	March, 1861.	April, 1861.	May, 1861.	June, 1861.	July, 1861.	August, 1861.	September, 1861.	October, 1861.	November, 1861.
1. Sharnpore	0 23 10	0 17 0	0 17 2	0 21 8	...	0 12 14	0 12 14	0 10 4	0 10 12	0 11 12	0 10 12	0 12 12	...	...	0 11 12	0 25 12	0 26 12	0 25 2
2. Meerut	0 20 0	0 19 0	0 15 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 12 4	0 12 0	0 10 0	0 13 8	0 14 0	0 16 0	0 15 8	0 14 0	0 15 0	0 20 0	0 26 0	0 29 0	0 28 0
3. Allypore	0 19 0	0 18 0	0 16 0	0 11 8	0 12 8	0 13 8	0 11 8	0 12 4	...	0 17 8	0 18 0	0 16 0	0 15 0	0 18 0	0 26 0	0 20 0	0 29 0	0 30 8
4. Moradabad	0 16 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 10 0	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 11 8	0 12 4	0 15 0	0 17 0	0 16 8	0 16 0	0 17 0	0 17 0	0 22 0	0 18 0	0 1 0	1 2 8
5. Bareilly	0 20 0	0 12 8	0 12 8	0 12 6	...	...	0 11 4	0 14 6	0 16 6	0 16 4	0 20 0	0 17 8	0 17 8	0 17 8	...	0 20 0	0 36 4	1 2 8
6. Budaon	...	0 12 8	...	0 12 12	0 13 8	0 13 0	0 12 0	0 11 4	0 13 4	0 16 0	0 15 0	0 18 0	0 12 0	0 14 6	0 19 0	...	0 33 8	1 2 0
7. Muttra	...	0 20 0	0 11 8	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 12 4	...	0 11 8	0 13 4	0 16 0	0 15 8	0 16 0	0 16 0	0 18 0	0 21 0	0 26 0	0 32 0	1 28 0
8. Agra	...	0 20 0	0 12 0	0 12 8	0 13 8	0 13 0	0 11 4	0 12 8	0 14 0	0 19 8	0 16 0	0 17 8	0 16 8	0 17 0	0 21 0	0 23 0	0 25 0	0 28 0
9. Furruckabad	...	0 20 0	...	0 16 12	0 18 0	0 18 4	0 15 8	0 16 4	0 17 4	0 19 0	0 21 0	0 20 4	0 20 0	0 21 14	0 23 10	0 26 0	0 24 10	0 32 0
10. Cawnpore	0 24 0	0 30 0	0 24 0	0 23 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 18 0	0 18 0	0 19 0	0 23 0	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 22 0	0 24 0	0 22 0	0 26 0
11. Banda	...	...	0 33 0	0 29 0	0 34 0	0 30 0	0 26 0	0 23 0	0 28 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	...	25 0	0 24 0	0 27 8	0 28 0	0 27 8	0 32 8
12. Allahabad	0 33 8	0 28 12	0 31 4	0 28 12	0 28 12	0 30 10	...	0 28 2	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 28 0	0 27 8	0 25 0	0 25 12	0 25 0	0 23 0	0 24 0	0 24 0
13. Goruckpore	...	...	...	...	...	1 3 12	1 2 0	1 2 0	1 2 0	1 2 8	1 2 0	2 0 2	1 2 0	...	...	...	...	...
14. Mirzapore	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 28 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 32 0	0 28 0	...	0 30 0	0 29 0	0 30 0	0 29 0	0 28 0	0 27 0	0 28 0	0 26 0	...	0 27 0
15. Benares	0 26 12	0 25 12	0 25 5	0 25 0	0 27 5	0 28 4	0 27 12	0 25 8	0 26 10	0 26 12	0 25 4	0 22 13	0 23 4	0 22 9	0 22 6	0 23 0	0 20 0	0 19 0
16. Ghazepore	0 22 0	0 25 0	0 25 0	0 27 8	0 27 8	0 23 12	0 27 8	0 27 8	0 27 8	0 23 4	0 27 8	0 23 0	0 22 0	0 18 0	0 16 0	...	...	...
17. Jubbulpore	0 30 0	0 30 0	0 27 0	0 27 0	0 28 0	0 27 0	0 35 0	0 34 0	0 30 0	0 31 0	0 30 0	0 25 0	0 35 0	0 30 0	0 32 0	0 29 0	0 27 0	0 23 0
18. Saugor	...	0 30 0	0 34 0	0 34 0	0 31 0	0 34 12	0 35 0	0 30 0	...	0 27 8	...	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	0 24 0	...	...	...

**APPENDIX VII. TABLE F.**  
*Price Current of Gram at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.																			
	June, 1860	July, 1860	August, 1860	September, 1860	October, 1860	November, 1860	December, 1860	January, 1861	February, 1861	March, 1861	April, 1861	May, 1861	June, 1861	July, 1861	August, 1861	September, 1861	October, 1861	November, 1861	
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	
	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	M.S.C.	
1. Seharunpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
2. Meerut	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
3. Allypore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
4. Moradabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
5. Jareilly	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
6. Budaon...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
7. Muttra...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
8. Agra	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
9. Farruckabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
10. Cawnpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
11. Banda	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
12. Allahabad	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
13. Goruckpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
14. Mirzapore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
15. Benares	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
16. Ghazepore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
17. Jubbulpore	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
18. Saugor...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	



**APPENDIX VIII. TABLE H.**  
*Price Current of Zillah Rice at the Chief Stations in the North-Western Provinces.*

Stations.																			
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
		June, 1860.	July, 1860.	August, 1860.	September, 1860.	October, 1860.	November, 1860.	December, 1860.	January, 1861.	February, 1861.	March, 1861.	April, 1861.	May, 1861.	June, 1861.	July, 1861.	August, 1861.	September, 1861.	October, 1861.	November, 1861.
		M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.
1. Seharanpore	...	...	0 10 12	0 9 8	0 9 9	0 7 8	0 9 0	0 8 8	0 8 0	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 10 8	0 9 12	...	...	0 8 0	0 8 8	0 9 0	0 15 0
2. Meerut...	...	...	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 8	0 10 0	0 9 8	0 7 0	0 8 0	0 10 0	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 9 0	0 8 0	0 16 0	0 9 0
3. Allypore	...	...	0 8 0	0 8 0	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 0	...	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 0	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8
4. Moradabad	...	...	0 9 0	0 8 0	0 7 0	0 7 8	0 7 0	0 7 0	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 8 0	0 9 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	0 10 0
5. Bareilly	...	...	0 7 8	0 7 8	0 10 10	0 10 0	...	0 10 10	0 11 14	0 12 8	0 11 9	0 13 7	0 13 2	0 13 12	0 15 10	...	0 22 8	0 22 8	0 23 12
6. Budaon...	...	...	0 8 0	0 7 0	0 9 8	0 9 8	0 11 0	0 10 8	0 10 8	0 10 0	0 12 9	0 12 14	0 13 4	0 13 8	0 13 8	0 12 0	0 9 8	0 14 4	0 22 12
7. Muttra...	...	...	0 8 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 8 0	0 11 8	0 10 8	...	0 10 0	0 7 8	0 8 0	...	0 8 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 7 0	...	...
8. Agra	...	...	0 7 0	0 7 0	0 8 0	0 10 0	0 10 0	...	...	...	...	...	...	0 6 0	...	...	...	...	...
9. Furruckabad	...	...	0 11 0	0 10 0	0 8 3	0 12 4	0 14 4	0 13 4	0 13 0	0 7 0	0 7 4	...	0 14 0	0 10 4	0 12 1	0 14 10	0 17 0	0 16 6	0 20 4
10. Cawnpore	...	...	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 8 0	0 15 0	0 16 0	0 8 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	...	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 12 0	0 9 0	0 12 0	0 12 0
11. Banda	...	...	...	...	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	0 11 0	0 11 0	0 12 0	0 11 0	0 13 0	...	0 11 0	0 11 0	0 11 0	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 8 0
12. Allahabad	...	...	...	...	0 10 0	0 11 4	0 12 8	...	0 12 8	0 11 4	0 11 0	0 10 8	0 15 0	0 16 0	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 16 0	0 12 8	0 15 0
13. Goruckpore	...	...	0 19 4	0 19 4	0 17 8	0 17 8	0 17 8	0 17 8	0 17 8	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 21 0	0 18 0	0 15 0	0 17 0	0 16 14	...	...	0 19 0
14. Mirzapore	...	...	...	...	0 14 0	0 13 0	0 13 8	0 13 0	...	0 10 0	0 13 0	...	0 11 0	0 12 0	0 14 0	0 12 0	0 14 0	0 12 0	0 19 0
15. Benares	...	...	0 8 4	0 8 13	0 14 0	0 11 0	0 12 1	0 12 12	0 13 2	0 14 18	0 15 0	0 14 12	0 13 5	0 14 0	0 13 4	0 13 10	0 12 0	0 11 15	0 12 0
16. Ghazepore	...	...	0 9 0	0 11 4	0 13 12	0 12 8	0 12 8	0 13 12	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 15 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 9 0	0 12 0	0 9 0	...	0 12 0
17. Jubbulpore	...	...	...	0 11 0	0 11 0	0 22 0	0 20 0	0 20 0	0 20 0	0 23 0	0 12 0	0 22 0	0 12 0	0 11 0	0 21 0	0 24 0	0 22 0	0 23 0	0 23 0
18. Saugor	...	...	0 13 14	0 13 12	0 13 2	0 13 1	0 15 12	0 14 8	0 15 0	...	0 15 8	0 15 0	0 15 2	0 15 0	0 14 8	0 17 0	0 16 4	0 16 12	0 16 10



# **APPENDIX IX.** *Results of Canal Irrigation during 1860-61.*

CANAL.	WHEAT (PURE AND MIXED.)			BARLEY.			RICE.			SUGAR-CANE.		
	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.
	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.
I.—GANGES CANAL.												
1. Northern Division	85,936	8,07,798	24,06,308	11,516	1,08,250	2,42,914	11,445	1,17,386	5,31,133	12,789	92,720	4,31,925
2. Upper Central Division	31,767	10,16,544	27,44,698	3,896	1,24,672	2,74,340	1,153	29,516	29,536	10,872	4,51,182	4,56,390
3. Lower ditto ditto	48,962	5,99,784	15,59,676	33,159	5,30,544	10,61,110	245	3,136	6,971	5,520	61,324	1,24,818
4. Etawah Terminal Division	10,906	1,58,137	5,17,641	13,280	2,38,984	6,86,150	413	5,016	8,733	1,910	24,448	97,841
5. Cawnpore ditto ditto	24,314	3,89,024	9,72,575	22,929	3,65,264	9,13,175	1,153	9,224	18,450	2,557	61,368	2,04,600
Total	2,01,885	29,71,287	82,00,898	89,680	13,62,714	31,97,689	14,414	1,64,228	5,94,823	38,148	6,91,542	13,15,574
II. Eastern Jumna Canal	91,587	8,79,285	26,05,147	...	...	...	47,544	6,84,633	32,31,830	32,916	5,00,323	17,51,152
IV. Agra Irrigation Works	11,205	1,33,943	4,50,390	6,498	80,575	2,11,875	5	24	104	247	2,766	940
V. Rohileund ditto ditto	32,375	4,20,800	11,08,216	2,778	35,558	67,733	41,562	6,64,992	22,16,666	5,360	77,184	3,08,736
GRAND TOTAL	3,37,552	44,10,264	1,23,64,651	98,956	14,78,847	34,66,797	1,03,525	15,13,877	60,38,423	71,671	12,71,815	33,76,402

## RESULTS OF CANAL IRRIGATION DURING 1860-61.

**APPENDIX IX—(Continued.)**  
*Results of Canal Irrigation during 1860-61.*

CANAL.	INDIGO.			COTTON.			TOBACCO.			DAL.		
	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.
	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.
<b>I.—GANGES CANAL.</b>												
1. Northern Division	...	...	...	7,320	8,660	41,937	...	...	...	13,531	37,951	33,753
2. Upper Central Division	68	1,958	1,980	600	8,640	8,649	...	...	...	791	6,328	19,851
3. Lower ditto	7,353	14,706	1,17,658	2,264	10,819	31,030	234	...	2,150	3,169	15,311	33,039
4. Etawah Terminal Division	1,792	2,15,040	43,008	124	595	2,394	18	230	1,077	57	684	1,829
5. Cawnpore ditto	4,038	1,292.6	1,34,325	450	1,462	27,037	18	57	348	...	...	...
<b>Total</b>	13,251	2,32,996.6	3,96,971	10,748	25,176	1,19,047	260	287	3,575	17,548	1,10,174	92,962
<b>II. Eastern Jumna Canal</b>												
...	976	117.4	9,360	7,406	38,511	3,85,150	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>IV. Agra Irrigation Works</b>												
...	...	...	...	277	1,108	11,911	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>V. Rohilcund ditto</b>												
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	734	5,872	16,957
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	14,227	2,33,118.10	3,06,331	18,431	64,795	5,10,108	260	287	3,575	18,282	1,16,046	1,09,919



**APPENDIX IX.—(Concluded.)**  
*Results of Canal Irrigation during 1860-61.*

CANAL.	GRAM.			OPUM.			BAJRA JOWAR.			MISCELLANEOUS.		
	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.	Area of Cultivation.	Total produce.	Value at average market prices of 1860-61.
	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.	Acres.	Maunds.	Rs.
<b>I.—GANGES CANAL.</b>												
1. Northern Division ...	10,887	77,902	2,32,681	...	...	...	12,307	66,381	22,149	19,981	At various rates.	5,92,832
2. Upper Central Division ...	1,258	20,128	54,386	...	...	...	11	324	365	4,046	98,294	1,16,683
3. Lower ditto ditto ...	2,850	18,240	56,294	...	...	...	2,913	32,625	81,670	8,514	1,12,384	1,42,305
4. Etawah Terminal Division...	1,228	13,753	40,128	252	53-22	10,787	264	3,879	16,417	5,840	77,832	2,09,703
5. Cawnpore ditto ditto ...	436	3,488	5,235	583	93-11	14,880	1,805	11,552	17,328	1,907	...	15,623
Total	16,159	1,33,511	3,88,624	885	146-38	25,667	17,800	1,03,201	1,37,829	40,088	2,86,510	10,76,646
<b>II. Eastern Jumna Canal</b>												
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	50,681	4,05,448	10,81,200	20,048	...	4,38,215
<b>IV. Agra Irrigation Works</b>												
...	5,965	40,562	1,16,898	...	...	...	1,869	10,466	26,172	276	4,278	41,916
<b>V. Rohilkund ditto ditto</b>												
...	3,983	50,982	1,56,898	...	...	...	132	1,056	2,389	1,698	11,206	53,667
GRAND TOTAL ...	26,107	2,25,055	6,61,420	885	146-38	25,667	69,982	5,20,231	13,47,590	62,105	3,01,994	16,55,434



To

R. SIMSON, Esq.,

*Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.*

FORT WILLIAM, *the 2nd March* 1869.

SIR,

WITH reference to a remark made in the second paragraph of my Report on Past Famines in the North-Western Provinces, I have the honour to inform you, on the authority of the Secretary to the Record Commission, that a careful search has been made in the volumes of Proceedings of the Supreme Government for the years subsequent to 1828, but that no further particulars have been elicited on the subject of my narrative. I should also like to withdraw the imputation of discourtesy which I made against the Editor of the *Indian Daily News* in the same paragraph. That gentleman has since told me that he duly answered my enquiries, and I can only regret that the shortcomings of the post made me wrong him. It appears that, though the *Bengal Hurkaru* was incorporated with the *Indian Daily News*, the files of the former paper never passed into the Office of the younger journal.

2. A tradition, I have ascertained, exists that the construction of the mound which forms the courtyard of the great mosque of Hossein in the city of Jaunpore, was the means employed by that monarch for utilizing the labour of men who must otherwise have perished during a period of seven years' famine. This would seem to show that the famine of 1471 was the climax to many previous years' want, and that this want was especially felt in a province which, as a rule, has escaped in later days from a similar calamity. The circumstance is recorded in an article on Jaunpore which appeared in the *Calcutta Review* in the course of 1865, and it was the author himself, Mr. R. Taylor, of the Bengal Civil Service, who drew my attention to it.

3. A typographical error occurs in the last line but one of the foot-note on page 25 of my Report, the word Marwar having been substituted for Mairwara. This mistake I should feel obliged if you would have corrected.

4. The Tabular Statement at page 94 is, too, I am sorry to say, incorrect. It was prepared for me in the Office of the Sudder Board of Revenue, and as at the time it was returned great pressure was being put

( 2 )


upon me to complete my work, I trusted to the Compiler for its accuracy. When, however, I had leisure to test the figures, I found that the averages had in several instances been wrongly computed, and I would therefore ask you to accept the accompanying Statement in its place, and to distribute the same to all those who have received a copy of the Report.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE,  
*Offg. Under-Secretary to the Govt. of India,*  
*Foreign Dept.*



Tabular Statement of the average cost of Wheat in the Districts of the North-Western Provinces.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
STATIONS.	August 1860.	September 1860.	October 1860.	November 1860.	December 1860.	January 1861.	February 1861.	March 1861.	April 1861.	May 1861.	June 1861.	July 1861.	General District Average.
	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.	M. S. C.
1. Saharunpore	0 11 12	0 13 2	0 9 9	0 10 12	0 9 12	0 8 8	0 8 4	0 10 2	0 14 8	0 14 8	0 16 0	0 15 4	0 11 1 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>16</sub>
2. Meerut	0 11 8	0 11 8	0 9 8	0 10 4	0 10 0	0 9 0	0 11 0	0 11 8	0 14 8	0 14 8	0 16 0	0 15 8	0 12 0 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
3. Allypore	0 12 4	0 10 8	0 11 4	0 12 4	0 10 8	0 10 4	.....	0 12 0	0 15 8	0 14 0	0 14-8	0 15 8	0 12 9 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>11</sub>
4. Moradabad	0 10 0	0 9 4	0 9 0	0 10 12	0 9 8	0 9 8	0 10 0	0 11 8	0 16 8	0 14 12	0 15 0	0 15 4	0 11 12
5. Bareilly	0 10 10	0 11 14	.....	.....	0 9 11	0 10 10	0 11 4	0 13 2	0 14 6	0 15 0	0 16 14	0 18 2	0 13 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
6. Budaon	0 10 0	0 9 8	0 9 0	0 9 8	0 9 0	0 8 6	0 9 1	0 12 8	0 15 10	0 16 4	0 16 13	0 18 0	0 11 15 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>
7. Muttra	0 9 12	0 9 0	0 10 12	0 10 12	.....	0 9 12	0 11 4	0 12 0	0 13 12	0 14 0	0 14 0	0 15 0	0 11 13 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>11</sub>
8. Agra	0 10 0	0 9 12	0 11 0	0 11 8	0 10 8	0 10 8	0 11 0	0 12 0	0 13 12	0 14 12	0 14 4	0 15 0	0 12 0
9. Furruckabad	0 11 0	0 13 4	0 14 4	0 14 8	0 13 0	0 13 0	0 14 4	0 14 12	0 16 12	0 19 4	0 17 4	0 17 4	0 14 14
Average over the famine tract for each month	0 10 12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 10 13 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	0 10 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 11 4 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 10 3 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	0 9 15 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	0 10 12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 12 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 15 0 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	0 15 3 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	0 15 9 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	0 16 2 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	0 12 5 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>



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REPORT

ON

PAST FAMINES

IN THE

NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

BY

C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE,

*late Special Duty.*



Allahabad:

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS, NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES,

1868.













